Empirical analysis of social insurance, work incentives and employment outcomes

In the design of social insurance programs, policy makers face the complex trade-off between providing income security to those in need and maintaining incentives that reduce the risk of unemployment. The impact of incentives driving these effects may differ vastly among groups of individuals, and may be influenced by contextual factors or program design differences. Given this complexity, it is crucial to continuously investigate the impact of incentives in the labor market and in social insurance programs through empirics. This evidence increases the overall knowledge on these topics and can then assist policy makers in making evidence-based and welfare-improving decisions.This thesis contains four studies that provide empirical evidence on the relationship between social insurance and the labor market in the context of the Netherlands. The studies investigate which groups of individuals are more responsive to (changes in) social insurance program parameters and how this relates to the targeting and welfare-maximizing objectives of the programs. The findings presented in this thesis have direct and important implications for the design of policies related to income inequalities, social insurance programs, and active labor market policies.Instituut GAKHervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Decomposing employment trends of disabled workers

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Inkomenspositie partners steeds vaker vergelijkbaar

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Afboeking bijstandsschuld nauwelijks effect op werk en mentale gezondheid

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Belastingdrukverdeling

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

De samenstelling en verdeling van inkomen

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Inkomensongelijkheid en het effect van herverdeling

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin