African Migrants, Xenophobia and Urban Violence in Post-apartheid South Africa

The urban space in South Africa is increasingly becoming a troubled terrain of xenophobic violence. In recent years xenophobia has emerged as one of the major contributing factors to urban violence in several African countries and the phenomenon is becoming an urban management challenge that deserves academic inquiry and policy attention. Yet most of the academic research into the incidence and causes of xenophobic violence has not explored the connections between urbanity and xenophobia. This article aims to contribute to the debate by examining the broader relationship between xenophobia and urban violence in South African cities and by pulling together the latest literature into creating a better understanding of xenophobia in urban spaces. This article provides an assessment of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa within the context of the on-going and important debate regarding the extent to which poverty and poor service delivery are determinants of urban violence. In addition, it argues that debates surrounding the complex spaces of deprivation in urban areas, citizenship and belonging should be central to the discourses on violence in South Africa’s cities, which in many ways are still struggling to erase the imprint of apartheid. Xenophobic violence in cities is a phenomenon that deserves policy attention and direct intervention by central government, local authorities and community leaders.Department of HE and Training approved lis

No. 15: The State of Food Security in Manzini, Swaziland

This study of the food security situation of the poor in Manzini, Swaziland’s economic hub, formed part of AFSUN’s baseline survey of eleven Southern African cities. It found that the urban poor here are less food secure than in any of the other cities in the survey. On the basis of the findings presented in this paper, AFSUN makes several policy recommendations to deal with food security challenges in the poor urban areas of Swaziland. Among these is that government needs to target urban households specifically in addition to its focus on poverty in rural areas. A more national approach that covers both rural and urban areas will help Swaziland to move towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal to reduce hunger by 50%. Because households that are severely food insecure tend to be large, female-headed and female-centred, and have a narrow range of livelihood strategies, it is vital for policies that address urban food security to appreciate the complex relationship between household food security and a range of variables such as income, gender and household size

South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: • Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. • Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). • Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. • Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. • The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. • Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. • A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

Ponovno stvaranje života u transnacionalnome urbanom prostoru: zimbabveanski učitelji migranti u Manziniju u Svaziju

Recent academic debate on the transnationalised lives of skilled migrants from developing countries tends to provide universalizing explanations that often fail to address the underlying socio-economic contexts. This paper aims to contribute to the debate by exploring how skilled migrants in South-South diasporic situations remake their livelihood strategies and expectations as they operate in transnational spaces. The paper is based on field research involving in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean migrant teachers living in Manzini, the commercial hub of Swaziland. The study provides insights into the complicated and transnationalised adjustment strategies pursued by migrants as they grapple with challenges around inclusion and exclusion in the host country and the maintenance of a “virtual presence” in Zimbabwe, their home country through the internet, Skype, mobile phones and remittance flows.Nedavna intelektualna rasprava o transnacionaliziranim životima kvalificiranih migranata iz zemalja u razvoju nastoji pružiti opće primjenjiva objašnjenja, koja često ne uzimaju u obzir pozadinske socio-ekonomske kontekste. Svrha je ovoga rada pridonijeti raspravi istraživanjem kako kvalificirani migranti u južno-južnim dijasporskim situacijama, budući da djeluju u transnacionalnim prostorima, iznova stvaraju svoje strategije zarađivanja za život i očekivanja. Rad se temelji na terenskom istraživanju koje uključuje dubinske intervjue sa zimbabveanskim učiteljima migrantima koji žive u Manziniju, trgovačkom središtu Svazija. Istraživanje pruža uvid u složene i transnacionalizirane strategije prilagodbe koje migranti primjenjuju hvatajući se u koštac s izazovima uključivanja i isključivanja u zemlji primitka i održavanjem »virtualne prisutnosti« u svojoj domovini Zimbabveu internetom, Skypeom, mobilnim telefonima i pošiljkama

No. 49: Gender, Migration and Remittances in Southern Africa

Migrant remittances have become an important source of income for many developing countries, exceeding official development assistance. As a result, migration and remittance behaviour are becoming a growing focus of international attention. Understanding the processes and patterns of remittance behaviour can help shed light on their usage and impact, both on recipient households and on wider socio-economic development in migrant-origin countries. One key aspect of such an understanding is the gender dynamics of migration and remittance practices. Globally, there is evidence of the feminization of migrant flows, with women increasingly migrating as independent migrants in their own right. Female migrants maintain strong ties to family members in their home countries. These include significant flows of remittances, of both cash and goods, sent to family members at home. Southern Africa has a long history of cross-border migration and associated flows of remittances. Although cross-border economic migration in the region has been dominated by male migrant labour to the South African mining industry, women have also engaged in movement across the region’s borders for purposes of seeking work. Evidence suggests that female migration in the region, especially to South Africa, has increased significantly over the past 10-15 years. Little is known about the nature of migrant women’s remittances and their impact on the households that receive them, nor about the changing patterns of male and female migration over the past decade. SAMP devised the Migration and Remittances Surveys (MARS) to provide nationally-representative data on remittance flows and usage at the household level for five SADC countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. SAMP-led research teams in each country conducted the survey using a standardized questionnaire and sampling strategy. Households were randomly selected and included in the survey only if they had members who were cross-border migrants working outside the country. The MARS survey collected two different types of data: data on individual household members, both migrant and non-migrant, and data on migrant-sending households. In total, 4,700 household interviews were conducted in the five countries and information collected on over 30,000 people. In addition to questions about migrant destinations, occupations and demographics, questions were asked about remittance behaviour, the methods used for remittance transfer, the role of remittances in the migrant-sending household economy, and the impact of migrant remittances on migrant-sending households. Gender-related variables were included in the survey through a question asking the sex of individual household members, and also in terms of household headship, marital status, relationship to the head of household, and household type (e.g. female- or male-centered; nuclear or extended). The overall survey findings have been presented in an earlier SAMP report (Migration Policy Series No. 44). Building on that earlier report, this report presents a gender breakdown and analysis of the MARS findings. As the Botswana sample included only a very small number of female migrants, Botswana has been left out of the analysis and so the report covers the four countries of Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Gender analysis reveals significant gender-based differences in migrant demographics, including divergent patterns and trends between male and female migrants in terms of their age and marital status. Yet it also reveals striking similarities between male and female migrants in terms of the nature, role and impact of their remittances. The main findings in terms of migrant demographics and migration trends for men and women are as follows: Cross-border migration in the region remains dominated by men. Overall, just over 15% of the migrants identified in the MARS sample were women. The proportion of women amongst migrants varies widely from country to country. Zimbabwe stands out as the country with by far the highest proportion of migrants who are female, at 43.6%, with Lesotho a distant second at 16.4%. In the other countries surveyed, the proportion of migrants who are female was found to be below 10%. Although the lack of reliable benchmark data makes it impossible to quantify, the MARS data suggests that there has been an increase in female migration over the period 1994-2004. Compared to female migrants, a relatively higher proportion of male migrants had been migrating for periods of over a decade - except in the case of Zimbabwe, where extensive out-migration is a more recent phenomenon for both men and women. The type of women who migrate appears to have undergone significant changes. Migration surveys conducted by SAMP in the late 1990s showed that female migrants were more likely to be older and to be married than male cross-border migrants. MARS findings show that today’s female migrants are younger and less likely to be married than male migrants. The proportion of female migrants in the younger, 15-24 age bracket is significantly higher than the equivalent proportion for males in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. In these same three countries, men are correspondingly over-represented in the older, 40-59 age bracket compared to women. Zimbabwean male and female migrants’ age profiles were roughly equivalent, with the majority in the 25-39 age bracket. In all four countries, and especially in Mozambique and Swaziland, the category containing the highest proportion of female migrants was ‘daughter’ – almost three-quarters of the female migrants in Mozambique and two-thirds in Swaziland. These countries’ female migrants thus most closely conform to the historical pattern of migration to South Africa being dominated by young, unmarried adults. On the male side of the equation, migration appears to be increasing among older, married heads of household. Some 76% of male migrants from Lesotho and 61% of those from Swaziland are heads of their household. Male migration from Mozambique is still dominated by sons (49%); that from Zimbabwe is more or less equally divided between sons and household heads. This suggests that for men, migration is becoming a career path rather than just a temporary phenomenon at a particular stage in younger men’s lives, whereas young single women are engaging in migration practices traditionally found amongst young single men. In Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, female migrants revealed higher levels of divorce, separation, abandonment and widowhood than their male counterparts. This is especially true of Lesotho, where 24% of female migrants are widows and a further 20% divorced or separated. These women are likely to be the primary or sole breadwinner for their families. Female migration and female household headship appear to be closely linked. Among female migrants, the proportion coming from female-centred households, having no husband or male partner, was 43% for Lesotho, 41% for Mozambique, 31% for Swaziland and 28% for Zimbabwe. In addition, 24% of the female migrants from Lesotho and 17% of those from Zimbabwe, the two countries with the highest proportions of women among their migrants, were themselves household heads. Male migrants hail predominantly from male-headed, nuclear or extended-family households. Female migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland are better educated than male migrants. Men from these countries are over-represented in the categories of ‘none’ or ‘primary’ education, while women migrants are more likely than men to have some secondary schooling. Mozambique has the least educated migrants of the four countries, with close to three quarters of both male and female migrants having only primary education. Zimbabwean male and female migrants have roughly equivalent education profiles, with a highly educated migrant cohort in which over 75% have secondary education or above. The geographical and economic profiles of male and female migration also display both similarities and divergences. Here, the main findings are as follows: For both male and female migrants, the main destination is South Africa. Lesotho’s migration is almost entirely (99%) to South Africa, as is that of Swazi men. Some women migrants from Swaziland can be found working in countries beyond the region (13.5%). Mozambique sends small numbers of migrants, especially women, to Swaziland, Botswana and other SADC countries in addition to South Africa. Zimbabwe is again the exception, with only one third of its migrants (male and female) in South Africa and 40% working in countries beyond Southern Africa. Perhaps the greatest difference between male and female migrants is in their activity and employment profiles. Minework is still the predominant form of employment for male migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. Almost 80% of male migrants from Lesotho and two-thirds from Swaziland work on the South African mines. In the case of Mozambique, the figure is one-third. Male migrants from Mozambique also work in a range of non-mining occupations including skilled and unskilled manual labour (18%). Zimbabwe’s more educated male migrants work in professional and service occupations, while others are engaged in trade. Few men from the other three countries listed trade as an occupation. In general, women migrants are spread across a wider range of occupations than their male counterparts. Relative to male migrants, female migrants are less likely to be in formal employment and more likely to be engaged in informal economic activity. Trading is a significant economic activity for female migrants from all four countries, with trade being particularly important as an occupation for women from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Domestic service is a more significant form of employment for women from Lesotho and Swaziland. Informal sector production is another important occupation for female migrants. Agricultural, manual and ‘other service’ work occupy a small but significant number of migrant women. Among more skilled women, professional and office occupations are common, and 16% of Zimbabwe’s female migrants are employed in the health sector. Given this gender difference in occupation and employment, any similarities or differences between men and women in their remittance practices, and in the extent to which their households depend on those remittances, are of interest. The MARS findings outlined below demonstrate the extent and significance of remittance income to recipient households. For most migrant-sending households, migrant remittances form the main source of household income, although male migrants’ remittances are more likely to be the primary or sole source of income for their households. Lesotho has the highest incidence of households reporting remittance earnings, followed by Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland. Households reporting remittance income from male and female migrants respectively in each of the four countries was: Lesotho 96% (M) and 90% (F); Zimbabwe 85% (M) and 78% (F); Mozambique 77% (M) and 65% (F); and Swaziland 63% (M) and 64% (F). The amounts of money remitted by female migrants are significantly lower than those of male migrants, in part reflecting women migrants’ lower levels of income and employment security. Gender differences are most stark in Mozambique and Lesotho. Zimbabwe’s more gender-equivalent migration profile is again borne out in the remittance data, with men and women remitting similar amounts. The median annual values of remittances received by male migrant-sending households were: R9,600 in Lesotho; R2,011 in Mozambique; R2,400 in Swaziland; and R1,093 in Zimbabwe. For households sending female migrants, median remittance receipts were: R3,600 in Lesotho; R302 in Mozambique; R1,800 in Swaziland; and R1,093 in Zimbabwe. Despite remitting less than men, Lesotho’s female migrants still remit larger sums than female migrants from any of the other three countries: twice as much as second-placed Swaziland, three times as much as women from Zimbabwe, and ten times as much as women from Mozambique. This probably reflects the higher incidence of household headship among Lesotho’s women migrants, possibly along with higher earnings than women from other countries (e.g. as domestic workers rather than informal traders). Lesotho’s migrant-sending households displayed the highest dependence on remittance earnings, reporting fewer alternative sources of income. By contrast, many households in the other three countries had remittances as part of a bundle of incomeearning strategies, including wage work, casual work and formal or informal business, although remittances remain their primary source of income. Multiple sources of income were found especially among households sending female migrants. Female migrants remit lower sums, making other household income sources a necessity. Women are also less likely than men to be household heads, which means that they are often members of households with other working adult members. The proportion of female migrants sending home goods is slightly higher than the equivalent proportion of male migrants, especially in Zimbabwe (72% of women, 62% of men) and to a lesser extent Lesotho (23% of women, 20% of men). In Mozambique and Swaziland, male and female migrants were equally likely to remit goods, at 65% and 16% respectively. Zimbabwe and Mozambique had the highest incidence of non-monetary remittances, whereas monetary remittances were much more significant in Lesotho and Swaziland. The significance and impact of both male and female migrants’ remittances is evident in the contribution of remittances to household expenditure and the stated importance of remittances by recipient households: Household expenditure data show that the main household purchases for both male and female migrant-sending households are the basic commodities of food, domestic fuel and clothing, and fundamental services such as schooling, health care and transport. While the rank order of items purchased is broadly similar or even identical for male and female migrant-sending households, gender differences emerge in the actual proportion of households reporting a particular expenditure. In Lesotho, in almost every category, expenditure in the past month was reported by more male than female-migrant households. Gender-based patterns are more mixed in Mozambique, although lower proportions of female migrant-sending households reported expenditure in the key categories of food, clothing, medical expenses, education and transport. In Swaziland, there is no clear or consistent overall difference based on migrant gender. Zimbabwe displays the strongest similarity between expenditure in male and in female migrantsending households, consistent with findings from the rest of the survey in that country. Certainly in Lesotho and Mozambique, female migrant-sending households do thus appear to be poorer than male migrant-sending households. There are also important gender differences, as well as differences between countries, in the estimated amounts of monthly expenditure on particular categories of expenses. Women migrants from Lesotho and Mozambique come from households with lower monthly expenditures, in almost every category, than households with male migrants. Swaziland displays the opposite gender pattern. Swazi households where the migrant members are female spend more in each category than households with male migrant members. Zimbabwe again stands out as the country with strongest gender similarity, suggesting that its male and female migrants come from similar sorts of households in socio-economic terms. As the primary source of income for the majority of households, remittance earnings are vital in enabling households to meet their basic needs. Food is the most common annual expenditure of remittance money in all four countries and in both male and female migrant-sending households. Second in all countries is either clothing or school fees. Clothing or school fees also rank third in all countries except Swaziland, where purchases of agricultural inputs rank above clothing. Remittances do not appear to be spent on non-essential or luxury items; but nor are they commonly directed towards savings or investment in business or other productive activities. They are, however, significant in sources of investment in children’s education. Remittance-receiving households confirmed the significance of remittances to food purchases. The most consistent importance rating, across countries and migrant genders, is food, with school fees and clothes also rated highly by many. There are some gender differences, with men’s remittances seemingly more crucial to the purchase of basic livelihood items such as food, than women’s. Given that men are older, more likely to be married, and more often the heads of households than female migrants, it is perhaps surprising that this gender difference is not greater. Remittances of goods are also focused on basic household commodities. The ‘typical’ male or female migrant sends home money, which their households use to buy food and other basic goods and services, and brings home clothing, food and other goods. Some consumer goods and other ‘luxury’ items (e.g. electronic goods) are also sent home, as they are more readily available and cheaper in South Africa. In addition to making regular remittances, migrants send home money in times of need, or to meet unexpected costs (such as funerals). Some gender differences are evident in these emergency remittances, although this is not consistent across all four countries. In Lesotho and Mozambique, a higher proportion of male migrants send money in times of need, whereas in Swaziland female migrants are more likely to do so. In Zimbabwe, once again, there is very little difference based on the gender of the migrant. Emergency remittances are clearly important to the households receiving them. They are seen as important or very important by over 90% of migrant-sending households in each of the four countries, with only very small differences on the basis of migrant gender. Emergency remittances appear to be especially significant to households in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Perceptions of the overall impact of migration reinforce the overall positive contribution made by migrants: There is a generally favourable view of cross-border migration. Respondents in Zimbabwe are the most positive. Close to 90% regard the impact of migration as either positive or very positive, with only a small difference based on the gender of the migrant. Respondents in the other three countries were broadly positive, although more so for male than for female migration. Close to 70% of the male migrant-sending household respondents in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland regard migration as having positive or very positive impacts. The respective values for each country’s female migrant-sending households were 59%, 53% and 64%. Perceptions of the positive impacts of working in another country reinforce the findings from income, expenditure and deprivation data i.e. that migrants support their households, improve living conditions and provide household income. Female migration is seen as providing the same sorts of benefits as male migration. While the economic benefits of migration are recognized, so too are some of its personal and social costs. These include loneliness, being away too long, and placing too much responsibility on family members left behind. The broad patterns are the same, irrespective of whether the migrant is male or female. Remittances clearly play a vital role in supporting Southern African households. Not only do migrants, whether male or female, demonstrate an unusually high tendency to send money home to their families, but those remittances are fundamental in enabling families to meet their everyday needs. Remittance behaviour and the role of remittances in the household economy differ only slightly based on the gender of the migrant. This demonstrates that women’s migration, while lower in volume than male migration, is nevertheless highly important to the migrant-sending household. Given that so many female migrants come from female-centred households, with no husband or male partner, women’s migration is especially significant to such households as the primary – often only – source of household income. The MARS data also suggest that differences between male and female migration, and between male and female migrants, are starting to diminish. Certainly young, unmarried women appear to be engaging in ‘economic’ migration more than they did previously, while male migration is extending into broader spheres of economic activity, both formal and informal, as well as into older age cohorts. If the patterns and trends identified here are both valid and sustained, women’s cross-border migration in the region looks set to increase in extent and socio-economic significance

Remesas de alimentos transfronterizas y transferencias móviles: Las experiencias de los migrantes zimbabuenses en Ciudad del Cabo, Sudáfrica

Mobile transfers have become a defining feature of cross-border remittance transmission in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, recent studies on mobile transfers have mainly focused on cash remittances and need to pay more attention to mobile food transfers. This paper addresses this research gap on mobile food transfers by examining cross-border food remittances and mobile transfers by Zimbabwean migrants residing in Cape Town, South Africa, to their families and friends back home. In this paper, we seek to understand the factors influencing the uptake of digital food remittances by Zimbabwean migrants who have lived in South Africa for at least three years. The paper is based on a mixed research study carried out in Cape Town during the nationwide COVID-19 lockdown in 2020. The mixed-methods study involved a questionnaire survey of 100 Zimbabwean nationals that was complemented by in-depth interviews with 10 participants selected from the interviewed group. The study findings reveal that the national COVID-19 pandemic lockdown disrupted informal food-remitting channels and, at the same time, helped to solidify the digital and mobile food transfers across national borders that have emerged in SSA in recent years.Las transferencias móviles se han convertido en un rasgo definitorio de la transmisión transfronteriza de remesas en el África subsahariana (ASS). Sin embargo, los estudios recientes sobre las transferencias móviles se han centrado principalmente en las remesas en efectivo y es necesario prestar más atención a las transferencias móviles de alimentos. Este artículo aborda esta laguna en la investigación sobre las transferencias móviles de alimentos examinando las remesas transfronterizas de alimentos y las transferencias móviles de los emigrantes zimbabuenses que residen en Ciudad del Cabo (Sudáfrica) a sus familias y amigos en su país. En este trabajo, tratamos de entender los factores que influyen en la aceptación de las remesas digitales de alimentos por parte de los emigrantes zimbabuenses que han vivido en Sudáfrica durante al menos tres años. El artículo se basa en un estudio de investigación mixto realizado en Ciudad del Cabo durante el cierre nacional de COVID-19 en 2020. El estudio de métodos mixtos incluyó una encuesta por cuestionario a 100 ciudadanos de Zimbabue que se complementó con entrevistas en profundidad a 10 participantes seleccionados del grupo entrevistado. Las conclusiones del estudio revelan que el bloqueo nacional por la pandemia COVID-19 interrumpió los canales informales de transmisión de alimentos y, al mismo tiempo, contribuyó a consolidar las transferencias digitales y móviles de alimentos a través de las fronteras nacionales que han surgido en el ASS en los últimos años

Influence of multiple uses of water on the sustainability of communally-managed rural water supply systems in Zimbabwe

The utilisation of drinking water supply systems for productive uses is not a new practice in Zimbabwe and the world over. This study sought to explore how multiple uses of water, in this case community gardening as a productive use combined with domestic uses influence sustainability of communally-managed rural water supply systems. Using the independent samples t-test, it was noted that community gardening positively influences sustainability. The test was done on institutional, technical, social and financial factors of sustainability. Results showed that there were statistically significant differences in sustainability performance between water points used for multiple uses and those used for domestic uses only. However, it was also noted that using drinking water sources for multiple uses increases the frequency of water use conflicts and water point breakdowns, which negatively impact on sustainability. This means that where water sources are used for multiple uses additional management skills and resources may be required for the water points to be sustained

Assessment of cyclone idai floods on local food systems and disaster management responses in Mozambique and Zimbabwe

In recent years, countries in southern Africa have experienced frequent hydro-meteorological disasters, such as widespread flooding caused by tropical cyclones. This chapter takes a close look at the destructive aspects of tropical cyclone Idai in Mozambique and Zimbabwe and the emergency disaster management responses. The chapter also seeks to understand the impact of the cyclone on food systems. The chapter is based on a desktop study that made use of scholarly publications and various media and organisation reports as the main sources of secondary data. A key finding of the study is that as the cyclone swept across the two countries, it exposed the fragilities of the local food systems, thereby presenting food insecurity challenges that potentially undermined the drive towards the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 on hunger eradication. The other finding is that the disaster management responses in both countries focussed on the emergency needs in the affected areas without giving much attention to making the food systems more resilient

Growing and Eating Food during the COVID-19 Pandemic:Farmers’ Perspectives on Local Food System Resilience to Shocks in Southern Africa and Indonesia

The COVID-19 outbreak forced governments to make decisions that had adverse effects on local food systems and supply chains. As a result, many small-scale food producers faced difficulties growing, harvesting, and selling their goods. This participatory research examines local small-scale farmers’ challenges as farmers but also as consumers and their coping strategies during the month of April and one week in June 2020. The study was initiated and conceptualized in collaboration with small-scale farmer members of an existing research network in selected urban and rural areas in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Indonesia. Participants co-designed the research, collected and uploaded data through digital survey tools, and contributed to data analysis and interpretation. A common observation across regions is that the measures imposed in response to COVID-19 highlighted and partly exacerbated existing socio-economic inequalities among food system actors. Strict lockdowns in Cape Town, South Africa, and Masvingo, Zimbabwe, significantly restricted the production capacity of small-scale farmers in the informal economy and created more foodinsecurityforthem. InMaputo,Mozambique,andTorajaandJava,Indonesia,localfoodsystems continued to operate and were even strengthened by higher social capital and adaptive capacities