Intracranial transplantation of the tumor induced by adenovirus type 12 in Syrian hamster--an experimental brain tumor model

A method of intracranial transplantation of the tumor induced by adenovirus type 12 in syrian hamster has been described. The incidence of intracranial tumor development was 86 (90.5 %) out of 95 animals and the average survival time and tumor size at death were 15.1 days and 4.1 mm in diameter respectively. The consistency of the days of death after intracranial transplantation of the tumor was remarkable. The transplanted tumors developed preferentially at the site of implantation and tumor cell seeding and tumor growing took place rarely along the ventricular system. Glial or lymphoid cell response to the tumor was not observed at any stage after transplantation in surrounding cerebral tissues of the animals. Histomorphologically, no elementary differences were observed between intracranially transplanted tumors and serially transplanted subcutaneous tumors. These facts permit the system to be applied to an experimental brain tumor model as large-scale testing.</p

"Hotelling's Spatial Competition Reconsidered"

Oligopoly models are usually analyzed in the context of two firms anticipating that market outcomes would be qualitatively similar in the case of three or more firms. This is not an exception in the literature on Hotelling's location-then-price competition. In this paper, we show that the main findings in Hotelling's duopoly, brand bunching and the max-min principle of product differentiation no longer hold once three or more firms are allowed to enter the market. That is, oligopolists with three or more firms proliferate brands and neither maximize nor minimize product differentiation.

"Self-organizing Marketplaces"

Dynamics of retail firms in marketplaces is analyzed, assuming that firms compete within a marketplace as well as between marketplaces under monopolistically competition. The number, size, and location of marketplaces or edge cities are analytically obtained, which is hardly done in the previous literature. Furthermore, extending the model to a two-dimensional space, Christaller-Losch system of hexagonal market areas is analytically derived.

Local politics and economic geography

We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a New Economic Geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. We compare a national election, where full information equivalence is attained, with local elections in a three district model. A stable equilibrium accounting for both the economic and political sectors is shown to exist. Restricting to an example, we show that full information equivalence holds in only one of the three districts when transport cost is low. The important comparative static is that full information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts. We examine the implications of the model using data on corruption in the legislature of the state of Alabama and in the Japanese Diet.information aggregation in elections, informative voting, new economic geography, local politics

Local politics and economic geography

We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a New Economic Geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. We compare a national election, where full information equivalence is attained, with local elections in a three district model. A stable equilibrium accounting for both the economic and political sectors is shown to exist. Restricting to an example, we show that full information equivalence holds in only one of the three districts when transportation cost is low. The important comparative static is that full information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts. We examine the implications of the model using data on corruption in the legislature of the state of Alabama and in the Japanese Diet.information aggregation in elections; informative voting; new economic geography; local politics

Local Politics and Economic Geography

We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a New Economic Geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. We compare a national election, where full information equivalence is attained, with local elections in a three district model. A stable equilibrium accounting for both the economic and political sectors is shown to exist. Restricting to an example, we show that full information equivalence holds in only one of the three districts when transport cost is low. The important comparative static is that full information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts. We examine the implications of the model using data on corruption in the legislature of the state of Alabama and in the Japanese Diet.Information aggregation in elections; Informative voting; New economic geography; Local politics

"Estimating Interregional Utility Differentials"

The examination of long-term Japanese data on interregional migration revealed three stylized facts of migration behavior. Based on the facts, we formulated an operational model and estimated interregional utility differentials. We found that the interregional utility differentials have been converging until the late 1970s. We showed that the utility estimates are highly correlated with per capita real income. We also applied the model to interregional migration in the United States and Canada as well as the interindustry movement in Japan and confirmed the model's validity.

"Self-organizing Urban Hierarchy"

We have considered a general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive markets, in which urban centers are service suppliers to all the agricultural regions as well as to the other urban centers. We have retained the forward and backward linkages of NEG to generate the agglomeration of firms and workers in cities. Our main result is that central places arise endogenously when transport costs take intermediate values.

Power Grows for Striking Chinese Workers

This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide. Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.CLW_2010_Report_China_power_grows.pdf: 279 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020