Informed Consent Without Autonomy

This Essay explains why and how the Roman Catholic basis for informed consent is different from the secular basis. It argues that the Catholic basis, which is rooted in natural law, is the better model for society to adopt. The author explains that the secular view is rooted in the belief that patient autonomy must never be violated but the Catholic view is based on human dignity, which simply requires doctors to allow patients to exercise their free will within moral limits. This view allows doctors to override patients\u27 decisions if those decisions are morally wrong or irrational

Informed Consent Without Autonomy

This Essay explains why and how the Roman Catholic basis for informed consent is different from the secular basis. It argues that the Catholic basis, which is rooted in natural law, is the better model for society to adopt. The author explains that the secular view is rooted in the belief that patient autonomy must never be violated but the Catholic view is based on human dignity, which simply requires doctors to allow patients to exercise their free will within moral limits. This view allows doctors to override patients\u27 decisions if those decisions are morally wrong or irrational

What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word 'conscience.' This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one's ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed

Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law

The question before us is whether international law is useful or required to govern the covert intelligence-gathering activities of nation-states during peacetime. The very notion that international law is currently capable of regulating intelligence gathering is dubious. In fact, we suggest that international regulation of intelligence operations could have the perverse effect of making international conflict more, rather than less, likely. Certainly, there is legitimate space for coordination and cooperation between states in sharing intelligence, but such sharing does not involve significant needs for universal regulation by international law. Simply stated, it is not in the interests of nation-states or the international system to permit regulation of their intelligence-gathering activities. This Article will explore both the historical and current views of intelligence gathering, U.S. domestic issues related to regulation of intelligence operations, and the benefits of refraining from regulating such operations through an international entity or via international law