Intuitions and Competence in Formal Semantics

<p>In formal semantics intuition plays a key role, in two ways. Intuitions about semantic properties of expressions are the primary data, and intuitions of the semanticists are the main access to these data. The paper investigates how this dual role is related to the concept of competence and the role that this concept plays in semantics. And it inquires whether the self-reflexive role of intuitions has consequences for the methodology of semantics as an empirical discipline.</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Baggio, Giosuè, van Lambalgen, Michiel &amp; Hagoort, Peter. 2008. ‘Computing and recomputing discourse models: an ERP study of the semantics of temporal connectives’. Journal of Memory and Language 59, no. 1: 36–53.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2008.02.005" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2008.02.005</a><br /><br />Chierchia, Gennaro &amp; McConnell-Ginet, Sally. 2000. Meaning and Grammar. second ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.<br /><br />Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.<br /><br />Cresswell, Max J. 1978. ‘Semantic competence’. In F. Guenthner &amp; M. Guenther-Reutter (eds.) ‘Meaning and Translation’, 9–27. Duckworth, London. de Swart, Henriëtte. 1998. Introduction to Natural Language Semantics. Stanford: CSLI.<br /><br />Dowty, David, Wall, Robert &amp; Peters, Stanley. 1981. Introduction to Montague Semantics. Dordrecht: Reidel.<br /><br />Heim, Irene &amp; Kratzer, Angelika. 1998. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell.<br /><br />Larson, Richard &amp; Segal, Gabriel. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.<br /><br />Lewis, David K. 1975. ‘Languages and Language’. In Keith Gunderson (ed.) ‘Language, Mind and Knowledge’, 3–35. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.<br /><br />Montague, Richard. 1970. ‘Universal Grammar’. Theoria 36: 373–98.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00434.x" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00434.x</a><br /><br />Partee, Barbara H. 1979. ‘Semantics – Mathematics or Psychology?’ In Rainer Bäuerle, Urs Egli &amp; Arnim von Stechow (eds.) ‘Semantics from Different Points of View’, 1–14. Berlin: Springer.<br /><br />Partee, Barbara H. 1980. ‘Montague Grammar, Mental Representation, and Reality’. In S. Ohman &amp; S. Kanger (eds.) ‘Philosophy and Grammar’, 59–78. Dordrecht: Reidel.<br /><br />Partee, Barbara H. 1988. ‘Semantic Facts and Psychological Facts’. Mind and Language 3: 43–52.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1988.tb00132.x" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1988.tb00132.x</a><br /><br />Stokhof, Martin. 2007. ‘Hand or Hammer? On Formal and Natural Languages in Semantics’. Journal of Indian Philosophy 35, no. 5: 597–626.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-007-9023-7" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-007-9023-7</a><br /><br />Stokhof, Martin &amp; van Lambalgen, Michiel. 2011a. ‘Abstraction and Idealisation: The Construction of Modern Linguistics’. Theoretical Linguistics 37, no. 1–2: 1–26.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2011.001" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2011.001</a><br /><br />Stokhof, Martin &amp; van Lambalgen, Michiel. 2011b. ‘Comments–to–Comments’. Theoretical Linguistics 37, no. 1–2: 79–94.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2011.008" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/THLI.2011.008</a><br /><br />Thomason, Richmond H. 1974. ‘Introduction’. In Richmond H. Thomason (ed.) ‘Formal Philosophy. Selected papers of Richard Montague.’, 1–71. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.<br /><br />Weinberg, Jonathan M., Gonnerman, Chad, Buckner, Cameron &amp; Alexander, Joshua. 2010. ‘Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?’ Philosophical Psychology 23, no. 3: 331–55.<br /><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944</a><br /><br /></p

What Cost Naturalism?

The paper traces some of the assumptions that have informed conservative naturalism in linguistic theory, critically examines their justification, and proposes a more liberal alternative