Understanding the effects of education through the lens of biology

Early educational interventions aim to close gaps in achievement levels between children. However, early interventions do not eliminate individual differences in populations and the effects of early interventions often fade-out over time, despite changes of the mean of the population immediately following the intervention. Here, we discuss biological factors that help to better understand why early educational interventions do not eliminate achievement gaps. Children experience and respond to educational interventions differently. These stable individual differences are a consequence of biological mechanisms that support the interplay between genetic predispositions and the embedding of experience into our biology. Accordingly, we argue that it is not plausible to conceptualize the goals of educational interventions as both a shifting of the mean and a narrowing of the distribution of a particular measure of educational attainment assumed to be of utmost importance (such as a standardized test score). Instead of aiming to equalize the performance of students, the key goal of educational interventions should be to maximize potential at the individual level and consider a kaleidoscope of educational outcomes across which individuals vary. Additionally, in place of employing short-term interventions in the hope of achieving long-term gains, educational interventions need to be sustained throughout development and their long-term, rather than short-term, efficacy be evaluated. In summary, this paper highlights how biological research is valuable for driving a re-evaluation of how educational success across development can be conceptualized and thus what policy implications may be drawn

Symbols Are Special: An fMRI Adaptation Study of Symbolic, Nonsymbolic, and Non-Numerical Magnitude Processing in the Human Brain

How are different formats of magnitudes represented in the human brain? We used functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation to isolate representations of symbols, quantities, and physical size in 45 adults. Results indicate that the neural correlates supporting the passive processing of number symbols are largely dissociable from those supporting quantities and physical size, anatomically and representationally. Anatomically, passive processing of quantities and size correlate with activation in the right intraparietal sulcus, whereas symbolic number processing, compared with quantity processing, correlates with activation in the left inferior parietal lobule. Representationally, neural patterns of activation supporting symbols are dissimilar from neural activation patterns supporting quantity and size in the bilateral parietal lobes. These findings challenge the longstanding notion that the culturally acquired ability to conceptualize symbolic numbers is represented using entirely the same brain systems that support the evolutionarily ancient system used to process quantities. Moreover, these data reveal that regions that support numerical magnitude processing are also important for the processing of non-numerical magnitudes. This discovery compels future investigations of the neural consequences of acquiring knowledge of symbolic numbers

Number symbols are processed more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes: Findings from a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task

Are number symbols (e.g., 3) and numerically equivalent quantities (e.g., •••) processed similarly or distinctly? If symbols and quantities are processed similarly then processing one format should activate the processing of the other. To experimentally probe this prediction, we assessed the processing of symbols and quantities using a Stroop-like paradigm. Participants (NStudy1 = 80, NStudy2 = 63) compared adjacent arrays of symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333) and were instructed to indicate the side containing either the greater quantity of symbols (nonsymbolic task) or the numerically larger symbol (symbolic task). The tasks included congruent trials, where the greater symbol and quantity appeared on the same side (e.g. 333 vs. 4444), incongruent trials, where the greater symbol and quantity appeared on opposite sides (e.g. 3333 vs. 444), and neutral trials, where the irrelevant dimension was the same across both sides (e.g. 3333 vs. 333 for nonsymbolic; 333 vs. 444 for symbolic). The numerical distance between stimuli was systematically varied, and quantities in the subitizing and counting range were analyzed together and independently. Participants were more efficient comparing symbols and ignoring quantities, than comparing quantities and ignoring symbols. Similarly, while both symbols and quantities influenced each other as the irrelevant dimension, symbols influenced the processing of quantities more than quantities influenced the processing of symbols, especially for quantities in the counting rage. Additionally, symbols were less influenced by numerical distance than quantities, when acting as the relevant and irrelevant dimension. These findings suggest that symbols are processed differently and more automatically than quantities

Registered Replication Report on Fischer, Castel, Dodd, and Pratt (2003)

The attentional spatial-numerical association of response codes (Att-SNARC) effect (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003)—the finding that participants are quicker to detect left-side targets when the targets are preceded by small numbers and quicker to detect right-side targets when they are preceded by large numbers—has been used as evidence for embodied number representations and to support strong claims about the link between number and space (e.g., a mental number line). We attempted to replicate Experiment 2 of Fischer et al. by collecting data from 1,105 participants at 17 labs. Across all 1,105 participants and four interstimulus-interval conditions, the proportion of times the effect we observed was positive (i.e., directionally consistent with the original effect) was 50. Further, the effects we observed both within and across labs were minuscule and incompatible with those observed by Fischer et al. Given this, we conclude that we failed to replicate the effect reported by Fischer et al. In addition, our analysis of several participant-level moderators (finger-counting habits, reading and writing direction, handedness, and mathematics fluency and mathematics anxiety) revealed no substantial moderating effects. Our results indicate that the Att-SNARC effect cannot be used as evidence to support strong claims about the link between number and space

Registered replication report on Fischer, Castel, Dodd, and Pratt (2003)

The attentional spatial-numerical association of response codes (Att-SNARC) effect (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003)—the finding that participants are quicker to detect left-side targets when the targets are preceded by small numbers and quicker to detect right-side targets when they are preceded by large numbers—has been used as evidence for embodied number representations and to support strong claims about the link between number and space (e.g., a mental number line). We attempted to replicate Experiment 2 of Fischer et al. by collecting data from 1,105 participants at 17 labs. Across all 1,105 participants and four interstimulus-interval conditions, the proportion of times the effect we observed was positive (i.e., directionally consistent with the original effect) was .50. Further, the effects we observed both within and across labs were minuscule and incompatible with those observed by Fischer et al. Given this, we conclude that we failed to replicate the effect reported by Fischer et al. In addition, our analysis of several participant-level moderators (finger-counting habits, reading and writing direction, handedness, and mathematics fluency and mathematics anxiety) revealed no substantial moderating effects. Our results indicate that the Att-SNARC effect cannot be used as evidence to support strong claims about the link between number and space

Registered Replication Report on Fischer, Castel, Dodd, and Pratt (2003)

The attentional spatial-numerical association of response codes (Att-SNARC) effect (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003)—the finding that participants are quicker to detect left-side targets when the targets are preceded by small numbers and quicker to detect right-side targets when they are preceded by large numbers—has been used as evidence for embodied number representations and to support strong claims about the link between number and space (e.g., a mental number line). We attempted to replicate Experiment 2 of Fischer et al. by collecting data from 1,105 participants at 17 labs. Across all 1,105 participants and four interstimulus-interval conditions, the proportion of times the effect we observed was positive (i.e., directionally consistent with the original effect) was .50. Further, the effects we observed both within and across labs were minuscule and incompatible with those observed by Fischer et al. Given this, we conclude that we failed to replicate the effect reported by Fischer et al. In addition, our analysis of several participant-level moderators (finger-counting habits, reading and writing direction, handedness, and mathematics fluency and mathematics anxiety) revealed no substantial moderating effects. Our results indicate that the Att-SNARC effect cannot be used as evidence to support strong claims about the link between number and space

The role of the angular gyrus in arithmetic processing: a literature review

Since the pioneering work of the early 20th century neuropsychologists, the angular gyrus (AG), particularly in the left hemisphere, has been associated with numerical and mathematical processing. The association between the AG and numerical and mathematical processing has been substantiated by neuroimaging research. In the present review article, we will examine what is currently known about the role of the AG in numerical and mathematical processing with a particular focus on arithmetic. Specifically, we will examine the role of the AG in the retrieval of arithmetic facts in both typically developing children and adults. The review article will consider alternative accounts that posit that the involvement of the AG is not specific to arithmetic processing and will consider how numerical and mathematical processing and their association with the AG overlap with other neurocognitive processes. The review closes with a discussion of future directions to further characterize the relationship between the angular gyrus and arithmetic processing

The role of self-math overlap in understanding math anxiety and the relation between math anxiety and performance

Recent work has demonstrated that math anxiety is more than just the product of poor math skills. Psychosocial factors may play a key role in understanding what it means to be math anxious, and hence may aid in attempts to sever the link between math anxiety and poor math performance. One such factor may be the extent to which individuals integrate math into their sense of self. We adapted a well-established measure of this degree of integration (i.e., self-other overlap) to assess individuals’ self-math overlap. This nonverbal single-item measure showed that identifying oneself with math (having higher self-math overlap) was strongly associated with lower math anxiety (r=-.610). We also expected that having higher self-math overlap would leave one especially susceptible to the threat of poor math performance to the self. We identified two competing hypotheses regarding how this plays out in terms of math anxiety. Those higher in self-math overlap might be more likely to worry about poor math performance, exacerbating the negative relation between math anxiety and math ability. Alternatively, those higher in self-math overlap might exhibit self-serving biases regarding their math ability, which would instead predict a decoupling of the relation between their perceived and actual math ability, and in turn the relation between their math ability and math anxiety. Results clearly favored the latter hypothesis: those higher in self-math overlap exhibited almost no relation between math anxiety and math ability, whereas those lower in self-math overlap showed a strong negative relation between math anxiety and math ability. This was partially explained by greater self-serving biases among those higher in self-math overlap. In sum, these results reveal that the degree to which one integrates math into one’s self – self-math overlap – may provide insight into how the pernicious negative relation between math anxiety and math ability may be ameliorated