31 research outputs found
ÂżSon el asilo y la inmigraciĂłn realmente una cuestiĂłn de la UniĂłn Europea?
La bĂşsqueda de una soluciĂłn al asilo para toda la UE podrĂa estar bloqueando que se encontrasen soluciones a nivel nacional o bilateral
The Strategic Use of Resettlement: Changing the Face of Protection?
Discussion about resettlement is increasing worldwide. Traditional resettlement countries look to the EU to establish new programs to expand the use of this durable solution. Some EU Member States appear most interested in resettlement for the potential it might offer in resolving the problems of smuggling, high asylum-seeker arrivals, and widespread anti-immigrant tendencies. This article sets out four key arguments on: the reasons for conducting resettlement; the “see-saw” numbers hypothesis; perceptions of refugees according to their means of arrival; and the links between asylum and resettlement, while discussing the European developments and global discussion of the strategic use of resettlement.La réinstallation devient de plus en plus un sujet de préoccupation au niveau international. Les pays de réinstallation traditionnels se tournent vers l’Union Européenne et s’attendent à ce qu’elle développe de nouveaux programmes pour étendre l’usage de cette solution durable. Certains pays de l’UE semblent extrêmement intéressés dans la réinstallation en vue du potentiel qu’elle offre pour résoudre les problèmes de passages clandestins de personnes, de hauts niveaux d’arrivée de demandeurs d’asile et des tendances généralisées anti-immigrants. Cet article met de l’avant quatre arguments principaux : les raisons d’avoir une politique de réinstallation; l’hypothèse des nombres en balançoire à bascule; la perception variable qu’on a des réfugiés selon leur mode d’arrivée; et, les liens entre le droit d’asile et la réinstallation – tout en discutant des développements européens et des pourparlers globaux sur l’utilisation stratégique de la réinstallation
Kosovo's Refugees and the ED: Wherein Lies the Threat?
The crisis in Kosovo, which has developed
over the course of a decade into a conflict
involving more states than any since
World War II has resulted in the
displacement of almost the entire Kosovar-
Albanian population, as well as of a great
many Serbs and other regional
populations. The European Union (EU)
memberstates have prided themselves on
their unity of action under NATO, in
tackling this crisis. However, there has
been no unity of policy toward the "refugees"
- in spite of the entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam, with its goal of 'an
area of freedom security and justice'
involving a common asylum and immigration
policy. The most frequently heard
arguments for the reluctance to accept
Kosovars in EU states are that this would
only encourage ethnic cleansing, and that
EU states already have too many
immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees
who will not go home. The position of the
"refugees" is thus a politically difficult
one, and becomes a security issue in many
senses. In this article, the author explores
some ideas about the nature of the nexus
between refugees (and migration more
generally) and security in the post-Cold
War world. In doing this, she will set out
to critique the writings on 'societal
security' in particular, posing the key
question as to where exactly the threat lies
as far as refugees are concerned.La crise du Kosovo, qui s' est développé
en une decennie pour deboucher sur un
conflit impliquant Ie plus grand nombre d'Ă©tats depuis la Seconde Guerre Mondiale,
a eu pour resultat Ie déplacement de la
quasi totalité de la population kosovarde
de souche albanaise, ainsi que d'un grand
nombre de serbes et autres segments de population locale. Les Ă©tats
membres de l'Union Européenne (UE) se
sont glorifiés de leur unité d'action sous
couvert de l'OTAN lors de leur prise en
charge de la crise. Cependant, il n'y a eu
aucune unité de doctrine sur la question
des «réfugiés» - et ce en dépit de l' entrée
en vigueur du traité d'Amsterdam, avec ses
objectifs de mise en place «d' une zone de
liberté, de securité, et de justice» impliquant
asile commun et politique d' immigration.
L' argument Ie plus fréquemment
avance pour expliquer la resistance des
Ă©tats de l'UE a accueillir des Kosovars
est celui selon lequel cela representerait
un encouragement implicite a la purification
ethnique. S'y ajoute l'idée selon laquelle
les états de l'UE comptent déjà trap
d'immigrants, de demandeurs d' asile, et
de réfugiés qui ne rentreront plus chez
eux. Conséquemment la position de «réfugié>
est une position politique difficile,
et pose, de plusieurs points de vue, des
problèmes de sécurité. Dans Ie présent
article, l'auteure développe un certain
nombre de considérations sur la nature du
point nodal entre réfugiés (et immigration,
de façon plus generale) et sécurité dans
Ie monde de l'après Guerre froide. Ce
faisant, elle procède à la critique d' un
certain nombre de travaux, notamment
ceux traitant de la «sécuriée societale», et
soulève la question clef suivante: où
réside exactement la menace en ce qui
concerne les réfugiés
The Refugee-Security Dilemma in Europe
Focusing on two of the institutions involved
in the range of European activities
on conflict prevention and
displacement in the wake of the Yugoslav
crisis, this article seeks to address
the complex interplay of refugee protection
and security enhancing strategies.
The conclusion to an analysis of the
mandates and expectations placed upon
the OSCE's High Commissioner on
National Minorities and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is that the latter is at risk of abrogating
its responsibilities towards
refugees and potentially misinterpreting
the motives of other (actual conflict
prevention) organs in the international
security arena and their impact (or not)
on displacement. The article places this
institutional and conceptual dilemma of
refugee protection and security in the
context of International Relations theories,
and stands squarely against the
view that refugees are themselves a
threat to west European security.En concentrant son attention sur deux
des institutions impliquées dans le réseau
des activités européennes en matière
de prévention des conflits et des
déplacements de populations dans la
mouvance de la crise yougoslave, le présent
article s'efforce d'analyser l'interconnexion
complexe qui s'Ă©tablit entre
la protection des réfugiés et les stratégies
de renforcement de la sécurité. La
conclusion d'une analyse des mandats
et projets chapeautés par le Haut Commissaire
aux Minorités Nationales de
l'OSCE et le Haut Commissariat des
Nations Unies aux réfugiés est que ce
dernier risque purement et simplement
d'abdiquer ses responsabilités envers les
réfugiés et de virtuellement mécomprendre
les motifs d'autres organismes
(assurant de fait la prévention de conflits)
dans l'arène de la sécurité internationale,
ainsi que leur impact (ou
absence d'impact) sur les déplacements
de populations. Le présent article place
ce dilemme institutionnel et conceptuel
de la protection des réfugiés et de la sécurité
dans le contexte des théories sur
les relations internationales et s'inscrit
fermement en faux contre la croyance
selon laquelle les réfugiés seraient eux
même une menace à la sécurité en
Europe occidentale
Early ultrasound surveillance of newly-created haemodialysis arteriovenous fistula
IntroductionWe assess if ultrasound surveillance of newly-created arteriovenous fistulas (AVFs) can predict nonmaturation sufficiently reliably to justify randomized controlled trial (RCT) evaluation of ultrasound-directed salvage intervention.MethodsConsenting adults underwent blinded fortnightly ultrasound scanning of their AVF after creation, with scan characteristics that predicted AVF nonmaturation identified by logistic regression modeling.ResultsOf 333 AVFs created, 65.8% matured by 10 weeks. Serial scanning revealed that maturation occurred rapidly, whereas consistently lower fistula flow rates and venous diameters were observed in those that did not mature. Wrist and elbow AVF nonmaturation could be optimally modeled from week 4 ultrasound parameters alone, but with only moderate positive predictive values (PPVs) (wrist, 60.6% [95% confidence interval, CI: 43.9–77.3]; elbow, 66.7% [48.9–84.4]). Moreover, 40 (70.2%) of the 57 AVFs that thrombosed by week 10 had already failed by the week 4 scan, thus limiting the potential of salvage procedures initiated by that scan’s findings to alter overall maturation rates. Modeling of the early ultrasound characteristics could also predict primary patency failure at 6 months; however, that model performed poorly at predicting assisted primary failure (those AVFs that failed despite a salvage attempt), partly because patency of at-risk AVFs was maintained by successful salvage performed without recourse to the early scan data.ConclusionEarly ultrasound surveillance may predict fistula maturation, but is likely, at best, to result in only very modest improvements in fistula patency. Power calculations suggest that an impractically large number of participants (>1700) would be required for formal RCT evaluation
Los romanĂes apátridas en Macedonia
Muchas personas de etnia roma tienen que lidiar con la discriminaciĂłn y los prejuicios tanto de grupos privados como de gobiernos nacionales
Complementary Pathways to Protection: Promoting the Integration and Inclusion of Refugees in Europe?
Return Seen From A European Perspective: An Impossible Dream, An Improbable Reality, or An Obstruction to Refugee Policy?
The central theme of this Essay is that both individuals in need of protection and governments obliged to grant protection to those in need generally hold the eventual return of citizens to their countries of origin to be the ideal scenario. However, this ideal cannot always come to fruition -- not only due to circumstances in the country of origin, but also as an unintended consequence of policy decisions taken by governments concerning the protection of refugees (or indeed internally displaced persons ( IDPs )) and the reactions of individuals to the outcomes of those policy decisions. Return, it will be suggested, takes on added dream like qualities because those involved know that it is probable to be something of an impossible dream. The suggestion in this Essay is that the myth of return, as envisioned in different ways by refugees and policy makers, obstructs effective policy making on refugee protection issues, and can reduce the potential for a fruitful period of refuge with at least temporary [*1507] integration. At first sight counter-intuitive: perhaps better integration of refugees in and with the host society could in fact support the prospects for eventual and sustainable return. In addressing this theme, we will first look at the story of return in and from Europe in the 1990s and the Cold War thinking which has formed the context of protection policy that is only gradually starting to change. We then turn to the approaches of governments and of individuals sustained by the myth of return. Individual choices in seeking protection and migration also relate to government policies, and their attachment to the ideal of return can be influenced in reaction to their understanding of government policies. Specific attention is given to the situation of IDPs in Georgia, as an example of displaced persons clinging to the myth of return. Turning to the other side of return, the Dutch government policy on the return of rejected asylum seekers is then discussed, demonstrating that the tough language of returning rejected asylum seekers can, but does not automatically, lead to removal. Bringing the issues together, we look more broadly at the focus on readmission within a general refugee, asylum and migration policy, and the international sentiment about the conditions under which return is possible. In conclusion, we consider the policy implications of looking holistically at return, and combining the ideal of return with pragmatic approaches to integration
Are asylum and immigration really a European Union issue?
Attempts to find an EU-wide solution to asylum may be preventing the finding of workable solutions at the bilateral or national level