The Impact of Error-Management Climate, Error Type and Error Originator on Auditors’ Reporting Errors Discovered on Audit Work Papers

We examine factors affecting the auditor’s willingness to report their own or their peers’ self-discovered errors in working papers subsequent to detailed working paper review. Prior research has shown that errors in working papers are detected in the review process; however, such detection rates only rarely exceed 50% of the seeded errors. Hence, measures that encourage auditors to be alert to their own (or their peers’) potential errors any time they revisit the audit working papers may be valuable in detecting such residual errors and potentially correcting them before damage occurs to the audit firm or its client. We hypothesize that three factors affect the auditor’s willingness to report post detailed review discovered errors: the local office error-management climate (open versus blame), the type of error (mechanical versus conceptual) and who committed the error (the individual who committed the error (self) or a peer). Local office error-management climate is said to be open and supportive where errors and mistakes are accepted as part of everyday life as long as they are learned from and not repeated. In alternative, a blame error-management climate focuses on a “get it right the first time” culture where mistakes are not tolerated and blame gets attached to those admitting to or found committing such errors. We find that error-management climate has a significant overall effect on auditor willingness to report errors, as does who committed the error originally. We find both predicted and unpredicted significant interactions among the three factors that qualify these observed significant main effects. We discuss implications for audit practice and further research

The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors' risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client’s business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.status: publishe

Auditor-client management relationships and roles in negotiating financial reporting

We carry out an interview based field study of chief financial officer (CFO)-audit partner dyads to examine the assumption that the roles played by each side and the nature of the relationships are similar across negotiations. These dyads freely discussed with us their relationship, a specific issue negotiated and it's resolution process. Employing the lens of social positioning negotiation research, we find these negotiations are 'fluid', with continual redefinition not only of the substantive issues under negotiation, but also of the negotiation roles and relationships (i.e. 'shadow' negotiations). The CFO's actions and expectations in these 'shadow' negotiations appear to define the auditor's role and the relationship's parameters, but both can evolve over time. The audit partners express a desire to be in the "ideal" relationship where they assume the role of the 'expert advisor' (as opposed to a 'police officer') but they seemingly have no explicit strategy to move the relationship toward a 'proactive' (rather than 'reactive') state. Furthermore, the audit partner is always the 'relationship manager' whose job it is to see that client management remains "happy". These roles and relationships negotiated in the 'shadows' also affect how the negotiation process unfolds, including the set of alternative accounting treatments considered during negotiations. Finally, audit firms appear to manage the assignment of partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and remove those partners who are in "poor" relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be "poor". Implications for the broader research program on auditor-client management negotiations are discussed.

The construction of auditability: MBA rankings and assurance in practice

For much of the past decade, the audit profession has been enjoined to enter new and novel fields of assurance services. This call implies the importation of constructs from traditional attest financial audits into new domains to provide elevated levels of assurance for information-users and decision-makers. Little is presently known about the process by which audit scope, practices and communications about the work done are developed in these new fields. This paper attempts to shed light on these issues through an in-depth field study of KPMG's "audit" of the Financial Times MBA rankings. The audit project is argued to import legitimacy to data provided by International Business Schools as well as imbue a derived legitimacy to the Financial Times rankings. At an operational level, audit planning, procedures and communicated written conclusions emerge as a much more negotiated and adaptive practice than rhetoric might suggest.accounting, organizations, society

The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors' risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client's business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.