Inelastic Processes in the Collision of Relativistic Highly Charged Ions with Atoms

A general expression for the cross sections of inelastic collisions of fast (including relativistic) multicharged ions with atoms which is based on the genelazition of the eikonal approximation is derived. This expression is applicable for wide range of collision energy and has the standard nonrelativistic limit and in the ultrarelativistic limit coincides with the Baltz's exact solution ~\cite{art13} of the Dirac equation. As an application of the obtained result the following processes are calculated: the excitation and ionization cross sections of hydrogenlike atom; the single and double excitation and ionization of heliumlike atom; the multiply ionization of neon and argon atoms; the probability and cross section of K-vacancy production in the relativistic $U^{92+} - U^{91+}$ collision. The simple analytic formulae for the cross sections of inelastic collisions and the recurrence relations between the ionization cross sections of different multiplicities are also obtained. Comparison of our results with the experimental data and the results of other calculations are given.Comment: 25 pages, latex, 7 figures avialable upon request,submitted to PR

Raising rivals’ fixed costs

This article demonstrates that raising fixed costs can serve as a credible mechanism for a well placed firm to exclude its rivals. We identify a number of credible avenues, such as increased regulation, vexatious litigation and increased prices for essential inputs, through which such a firm can raise fixed costs. We show that for a wide range of oligopoly models this may be a profitable strategy, even if the firm’s own fixed costs are affected as much (or even more) than its rivals and even if it is less efficient. The resulting reduction in the number of firms in the market is detrimental to consumer welfare and hence worthy of scrutiny by competition and regulatory authorities

Sabotage in Contests: A Survey

A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable prize(s). ‘Sabotage’ is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rival’s' likelihood of winning the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, political or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model and various perspectives on such sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We discuss the theories and evidence highlighting the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs, and the effects of sabotage on individual players and on overall welfare, along with possible mechanisms to reduce sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest player, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive effort exerted by the players, and sabotage may lessen the effectiveness of public policies, such as affirmative action, or information revelation in contests. We discuss various policies that a designer may employ to counteract sabotage activities. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research