A matter of time… consideration of future consequences and temporal distance contribute to the ideology gap in climate change scepticism

Factors that contribute to the well-established ideology gap in climate change beliefs (i.e., conservatives’ scepticism about climate change and its severity) remain underexplored. In the present research, we propose that there are differences in the consideration of future consequences, as well as the perception of climate change in time, between conservatives and liberals which, in part, contribute to this gap. Across three studies (total N = 654) in the Netherlands and the UK, we demonstrate that, compared to liberals, conservatives tend to consider future consequences of their behaviour less and perceive the effects of climate change as further away in the future. Furthermore, we find that temporal distance to climate change, and, to a lesser extent, consideration of future consequences, can partially account for higher levels of scepticism about climate change on the conservative side of the ideological spectrum. Besides contributing to a better understanding of this ideology bias, these results have implications for climate change communication

The ideological basis of antiscientific attitudes: Effects of authoritarianism, conservatism, religiosity, social dominance, and system justification

Serious concerns about public distrust of scientific experts and the spread of misinformation are growing in the US and elsewhere. To gauge ideological and psychological variability in attitudes toward science, we conducted an extensive analysis of public opinion data based on a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults ( N = 1,500) and a large replication sample ( N = 2,119). We estimated the unique effects of partisanship, symbolic and operational forms of political ideology, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and general system justification (GSJ), after adjusting for demographic factors. Multiverse analyses revealed that (a) conservatism and SDO were significant predictors of distrust of climate science in > 99.9% of model specifications, with conservatism accounting for 80% of the total variance; (b) conservatism, RWA, religiosity, (male) sex, (low) education, (low) income, and distrust of climate science were significant predictors of skepticism about science in general (vs. faith) in > 99.9% of model specifications; (c) conservatism, RWA, (low) education, and distrust of climate science were significant predictors of trust in ordinary people (over scientific experts) > 99.9% of the time; and (d) GSJ was a significant predictor of trust in scientific experts (over ordinary people) 81% of the time, after adjusting for all other demographic and ideological factors. Implications for the role of science in democratic society are discussed

Ambivalence and decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: feeling tense before jumping off the fence

"It has long been assumed that people experience evaluative conflict or ambivalence as unpleasant. In three studies we provide direct evidence for the assumption that ambivalence is unpleasant, but only when one has to commit to one side of the issue. In those situations ambivalence will be related to outcome uncertainty and feelings of discomfort. We examined this prediction using both self-reports and physiological measures. In a first study we manipulated ambivalence and whether or not participants had to take a clear stand vis-a vis the attitudinal issue and choose a position for or against it. Results indicate ambivalence was only related to physiological arousal when a choice had to be made. Feeling ambivalent about an issue without the necessity to choose did not result in higher levels of arousal. A second study replicated and extended these findings by including a measure of subjective uncertainty about the decision. Results showed the same pattern as in Study 1, and indicate that the relation between ambivalence and arousal is mediated by uncertainty about decisional outcomes. In the third and final study these findings are corroborated using self-report measures; these indicated that ambivalence-induced discomfort is related to specific (negative) emotions." [author's abstract

Not all skepticism is equal: Exploring the ideological antecedents of science acceptance and rejection

Many topics that scientists investigate speak to people’s ideological worldviews. We report three studies—including an analysis of large-scale survey data— in which we systematically investigate the ideological antecedents of general faith in science and willingness to support science, as well as of science skepticism of climate change, vaccination, and GM. The main predictors are religiosity and political orientation, morality, and science understanding. Overall, science understanding is associated with vaccine and GM food acceptance, but not climate change acceptance. Importantly, different ideological predictors are related to the acceptance of different scientific findings. Political conservatism best predicts climate change skepticism. Religiosity, alongside moral purity concerns, best predicts vaccination skepticism. GM food skepticism is not fueled by religious or political ideology. Finally, religious conservatives consistently display a low faith in science and an unwillingness to support science. Thus, science acceptance and rejection have different ideological roots, depending on the topic of investigation

Attitudes Towards Science

As science continues to progress, attitudes towards science seem to become ever more polarized. Whereas some put their faith in science, others routinely reject and dismiss scientific evidence. The current chapter provides an integration of recent research on how people evaluate science. We organize our chapter along three research topics that are most relevant to this goal: ideology, motivation, and morality. We review the relations of political and religious ideologies to science attitudes, discuss the psychological functions and motivational underpinnings of belief in science, and describe work looking at the role of morality when evaluating science and scientists. In the final part of the chapter, we apply what we know about science evaluations to the current crisis of faith in science and the open science movement. Here, we also take into account the increased accessibility and popularization of science and the (perceived) relations between science and industry

Science skepticism across 24 countries

Efforts to understand and remedy the rejection of science are impeded by lack of insight into how it varies in degree and in kind around the world. The current work investigates science skepticism in 24 countries (N = 5973). Results show that while some countries stand out as generally high or low in skepticism, predictors of science skepticism are relatively similar across countries. One notable effect was consistent across countries though stronger in WEIRD nations: General faith in science was predicted by spirituality, suggesting that it, more than religiosity, may be the ‘enemy’ of science acceptance. Climate change skepticism was mainly associated with political conservatism, especially in North America. Other findings were observed across WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations: Vaccine skepticism was associated with spirituality and scientific literacy, GM skepticism with scientific literacy, and evolution skepticism with religious orthodoxy. Levels of science skepticism are heterogeneous across countries, but predictors of science skepticism are heterogeneous across domains

Spiritual skepticism? Heterogeneous science skepticism in the Netherlands

Recent work points to the heterogeneous nature of science skepticism. However, most research on science skepticism has been conducted in the United States. The current work addresses the generalizability of the knowledge acquired so far by investigating individuals from a Western European country (The Netherlands). Results indicate that various previously reported findings hold up: Mirroring North American patterns, climate change skepticism is associated with political conservatism (but only modestly), and scientific literacy does not contribute to skepticism, except about genetic modification (Study 1 only) and vaccine skepticism (Study 2 only). Results also reveal a crucial difference: Religiosity does not consistently contribute to science skepticism, except about evolution. Instead, spirituality is found to most consistently predict vaccine skepticism and low general faith in science-which in turn predicts willingness to support science. Concerns about societal impact play an additional role. These findings speak to the generalizability of previous findings, improving our understanding of science skepticism