Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.Comment: 7 pages, 7 figure

Cooperation and its evolution in growing systems with cultural reproduction

We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the topological structure and the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic. We show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural selection intensity. When the system starts to grow, cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as soon as the system reaches a small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of natural selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems whose individuals have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1111.247

Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity

The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory

The Q2Q^2-dependence of the generalised Gerasimov-Drell-Hearn integral for the deuteron, proton and neutron

The Gerasimov-Drell-Hearn (GDH) sum rule connects the anomalous contribution to the magnetic moment of the target nucleus with an energy-weighted integral of the difference of the helicity-dependent photoabsorption cross sections. The data collected by HERMES with a deuterium target are presented together with a re-analysis of previous measurements on the proton. This provides a measurement of the generalised GDH integral covering simultaneously the nucleon-resonance and the deep inelastic scattering regions. The contribution of the nucleon-resonance region is seen to decrease rapidly with increasing $Q^2$. The DIS contribution is sizeable over the full measured range, even down to the lowest measured $Q^2$. As expected, at higher $Q^2$ the data are found to be in agreement with previous measurements of the first moment of $g_1$. From data on the deuteron and proton, the GDH integral for the neutron has been derived and the proton--neutron difference evaluated. This difference is found to satisfy the fundamental Bjorken sum rule at $Q^2 = 5$ GeV$^2$.Comment: 12 pages, 10 figure