Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this?

The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism — Neo-Kantianism — Neo-Neo-Kantianism — Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner

"Being Critical", Meaning What?

The article builds on the observation made by Josef Pieper, who writes about the critical attitude: “‘kritisch’ sein besage für den Philosophierenden so viel wie: sich darum bekümmern, daß nur ja nicht etwas ausgelassen wird.” Thus, the focus of the article is on the attempts to define philosophy through the prism of criticism, undertaken by some of the most significant philosophers of the first half of the 20th century, such as Leonard Nelson, Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers and Nicolai Hartmann

Neo-kantianism and Neo-hegelianism. Comments on Neo-philosophy

The article addresses the problem of neo-philosophy in the light of its relation to philosophy while constituting its renewal. The subject matter of the reflection is the analysis of neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism, whereas the result of the conducted analyses is a conviction that it is not possible to speak of a simple analogy between philosophy and neo-philosophy which relates to it. Even if this analogy were possible in the case of neo-hegalianism, certainly such a situation cannot and does not occur in the case of neo-kantianism. The latter is characterised by a lack of orthodoxy in relation to Kant’s philosophy which in fact is its characteristic feature

Herbert Schnadelbach, "Nasz nowy neokantyzm" (przekł.)

glowski poświęcony zagadnieniu Kant czy Hegel?, wówczas dla niektórych pytanie to mogło brzmieć jak pseudoalternatywa. Niestety, nie skorzystano wtedy z okazji przeprowadzenia ankiety dotyczącej tego pytania, ale możemy być pewni, że ponad dziewięćdziesiąt procent zajmujących się obecnie filozofią postawionych przed takim wyborem, odpowiedziałoby: „Naturalnie, Kant!" Kto jeszcze dzisiaj chce być heglistą? Wielu interpretuje Hegla — drobiazgowo i wytrwale, lecz ich gotowość do tego, by także uargumentować jego filozofię, pozostaje przy tym najczęściej w odwrotnym stosunku; zagadkowo oddziałuje wówczas ich zapatrzenie w Hegla

Emil Lask. W stulecie śmierci

The present article concentrates on depicting the main elements of Emil Lask’s philosophy, a distinguished Neo-Kantianist who, simultaneously, may be regarded as Heidegger’s teacher. The meaning of Lask’s work comes down to several issues, although in this article two of them have been emphasised: first, Kant should not be read in the light of Fichte’s philosophy; second, in Lask’s philosophy the primacy of practical reason in logic, characteristic for the Baden Neo-Kantianism, is questioned. In Lask’s understanding, the logic of philosophy which is the critical theory of cognition derives from the critical consideration over the Baden Neo-Kantianism

Kłopoty z filozofią

Książeczka ta została napisana z potrzeby podzielenia się z Czytelnikiem swoimi przemyśleniami dotyczącymi zagadnienia statusu filozofii we współczesnej nauce. Żadne inne racje nie są w stanie wyjaśnić powodów, które przyczyniły się do jej powstania. Jest nieudolną próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, które nieustannie powraca w świadomości próbującego filozofować, a które brzmi: czym jest filozofia, jaką uprawiam?. Czy w ogóle uprawiam filozofię, czy też – zgodnie z postulatem tych, którzy nie chcą poznać historii filozofii – historię filozofii tylko? Takiemu pytaniu towarzyszy nieuchronnie inne pytanie, które Stanisław Judycki wyraził w tytule artykułu opublikowanego na łamach „Przeglądu Filozoficznego”, a zatytułowanego Dlaczego filozofia jest trudna?. Odpowiedź na postawione pytania jest prozaiczna – filozofia jest trudna, gdyż nie jest prosta. To nieco żartobliwie – i z premedytacją – sformułowane powiedzenie można uznać za kwintesencję filozofowania

Filozof czystego poznania : rzecz o Hermannie Cohenie

Hermann Cohen remains one of the most important philosophers of the turn of the 19th century. He is known first and foremost as the founder of the Neo-Kantian Marburg School, which, alongside the Baden School, constituted the primary center of philosophical thought in Germany at that time. Nonetheless, Cohen has not been widely recognized for his contributions to the study of philosophy due to the fact that, because of his Jewish heritage, he worked at the provincial University of Marburg in Hessia. The following monograph accounts for his relative lack of recognition and thus begins with an overview of Cohen’s biography. Following that introduction, the monograph has been divided into two parts. The first part concerns theoretical philosophy, which constituted the cornerstone of Cohen’s doctrine. The Marburg Neo-Kantianism is considered to be the most radical version of anti-psychologism and logicism; nonetheless, Cohen started his career as a philosopher as a disciple of Heymann (or Chajim) Steinthal, a linguist and a philosopher, as well as Moritz (or Moses) Lazarus: the publishers of the periodical Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. In 1871, he published the first edition of Kants Theorie des Erfahrung, which was later republished in 1885 and 1918. In this part of the monograph, the author presents the evolution of Cohen’s ideas, who gradually progressed toward radical anti-psychologism. This stance is clearly reflected in his 1902 book Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, which shows Cohen as a philosopher interested in grounding the notions of philosophy and science. Cohen, then, is seen as a thinker who searches for conditions which would guarantee the objective value of cognition. Thus, his epistemological program becomes an alternative for the phenomenology school of thought, which came to prominence in the beginning of the 20th century. Cohen remains convinced that the objective value of cognition is irrevocably connected with a search for the source. The concept which becomes crucial for his philosophy is the notion of the source (Ursprung), which for Cohen signifies a search for the rules which govern cognition and which ensure its objective value. What is particularly interesting about Cohen’s theory of cognition is the fact that it constitutes an attempt at a transcendental grounding of cognition, which is sometimes referred to as “a theory of cognition without the subject” or “idealism without the subject.” This phrase, coined by Manfred Brelage, has its origins in the fact that Cohen’s idealism is a transcendental idealism par excellence. For that reason, Gerhard Lehmann calls Cohen “the archpriest of science.” The second part of the monograph is devoted to practical philosophy, and ethics in particular. This ethics is connected with the ethics of socialism, developed by the protoplast of the Marburg School, even though Cohen is interested not so much in the subject of the ethics itself, but rather in the grounding of ethics in science. He is convinced that while mathematical natural history has its grounding in logic, ethics has its groundings in jurisprudence. Next, the author proceeds with an analysis of the philosophy of law, which becomes even more interesting given the fact that Rudolf Stammler, one of the most distinguished philosophers of the law of that period, also belonged to the Marburg School. Thus, the author discusses the conception of varying content of the law of nature. Moreover, it should also be noted that—as Claudius Müller argues in his book— during the time of the Nazi regime, libraries in Germany discarded all books by Hermann Cohen, who was Jewish, as well as those of Karl Vorländer, who was a socialist and one of Cohen’s students. Moreover, the author focuses on the philosophy of religion—crucial due to Cohen’s Judaism—as well as aesthetics and psychology. The monograph constitutes an overview of Cohen’s views, painting the thinker as a scholar determined to discover the foundation in which he could ground his science. This process was so crucial for the founder of the Marburg School that his philosophy is often equated with constant critique. Martin Heidegger—involved with Marburg in 1923–1928—in his book Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20), uses the figure of Rudolf Hermann Lotze, but doesn’t directly refer to that fact. Meanwhile, Lotze, in his critique of the common practice of grounding philosophy in the theory of cognition, writes, “[…] such tasks are forced to find solutions: the constant sharpening of knives is boring when there is nothing to be cut.” This sharpening of the knives is, indeed, what seems to lie at the core of Cohen’s philosophy. Nonetheless, what this monograph aims to emphasize is the meaningfulness of the task

Folia Philosophica, T. 29 (2011), s. 111-151

The starting point of the analysis provided in this paper is a discussion of how philosophical method is understood by Leonard Nelson who draws upon the lines of Jakob Friedrich Fries. From this perspective Nelson points out two ways of argumentation, two methods or standpoints: metaphysical and anthropological, objective- one and subjective-one, critical and genetic, epistemological and psychological or transcendental and psychological. These distinctions find their justification in concepts by philosophers with which Nelson polimicizes defending Fries’ standpoint: Kuno Fischer, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf and Max Scheler. On the ground of analysis of their conceptions Nelson argues that admittedly they follow Kant, yet Kant — unlike Fries — has not included the psychological aspect of cognition

Spór o pewność wiedzy. Recenzja książki Aleksandra R. Bańki: ”Désiré Merciera ogólna teoria pewności”. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2008

Recenzja książki Aleksandra R. Bańki: ”Désiré Merciera ogólna teoria pewności”. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 200

Początki filozofii Cohena a problem psychologii

Hermann Cohen, twórca neokantowskiej szkoły marburskiej, jest uznawany za jed-nego z najbardziej radykalnych reprezentantów antypsychologizmu. Okazuje się jednak, że stanowisko to jest rezultatem procesu, w którym ujawniają się trzy ważne elementy, a mianowicie spór o psychologię, spór o Platona i spór o Kanta. W pierwszym wypadku Cohen okazuje się związany z psychologicznie zorientowanymi językoznawcami, a mianowicie Heymannem Steinthalem i Moritzem Lazarusem. W drugim wypadku Cohen okazuje się interpretatorem Platona, przy czym początkowo ujmuje go w duchu psychologizmu, od którego się później dystansuje. I wreszcie, w trzecim wypadku, z tego wynika późniejszy obraz filozofii Kanta.Achelis Th., Moritz Lazarus, Book on Demand, Hamburg 1900. Bratuscheck E., Adolf Trendelenburg, Henschel, Berlin 1873. Cohen H., Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, t. 2, neubearbeitete Aufl., Dümm-lers Verlagsbuchhandlung, Harrwitz und Gossmann, Berlin 1885. Cohen H., Kants Begründung der Ethik, Dümmler, Berlin 1877. Cohen H., Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, Dümmler, Berlin 1871. Cohen H., Die dichterische Phantasie und der Mechanismus des Bewußtseins, „Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft” 1869, t. 6, F. Dümmler. Cohen H., Mythologische Vorstellungen von Gott und Seele psychologisch ent-wickelt II, „Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft” 1869, t. 6, F. Dümmler. Cohen H., Mythologische Vorstellungen von Gott und Seele psychologisch ent-wickelt, „Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft” 1868, t. 5, F. Dümmler. Cohen H., Die platonische Ideenlehre, psychologisch entwickelt, „Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft” 1866, t. 4, F. Dümmler. Cohen H., Philosophorum de antinomia necessitatis et contingentia doctrinae, particula I, Hermann, Halae 1865. Die sprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm’s von Humboldt, red. H. Steinthal, F. Dümmler, Berlin 1883–1884.Leicht A., Moritz Lazarus (15. September 1824 – 13. April 1903), Mittler, Berlin 1908. Lembeck K.-H., Platon in Marburg. Platonrezeption und Philosophiege-schichtsphilosophie bei Cohen und Natorp, Königshausen u. Neumann, Würzburg 1994. Meyer J. B., Kant’s Psychologie, Hertz, Berlin 1870. Natorp P., Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, Mohr, Tübingen 1912. Natorp P., Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, Mohr, Frei-burg i.B. 1888. Schmidt W. de, Psychologie und Transzendentalphilosophie. Zur Psychologie-Rezeption bei Hermann Cohen und Paul Natorp, Bouvier, Bonn 1976. Sieg U., Aufstieg und Niedergang des Marburger Neukantianismus. Die Ge-schichte einer philosophischen Schulgemeinschaft, Königshausen u. Neumann, Würzburg 1994. Steinthal W., Die Sprachwissenschaft Wilh. v. Humboldt’s und die Hegel’sche Philosophie, Heymann, Berlin 1848