The West's rude awakening : lessons after the first year of war

Po nielegalnej aneksji Krymu przez Rosję w 2014 r. społeczność euroatlantycka podjęła kilka prób rekalibracji swojej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Jednak dopiero po szoku 24 lutego 2022 r. i jego następstwach większość zachodnich państw i społeczeństw doświadczyła bezpardonowego przebudzenia. Dopiero wtedy partnerzy transatlantyccy zdali sobie sprawę, że nie tylko Ukraina, ale także większość kontynentu europejskiego jest zagrożona przez rosyjską wojnę. Zjednoczona reakcja państw europejskich, USA i Kanady musiała zszokować Władimira Putina, który najprawdopodobniej liczył na to, że Ukraina zostanie pozostawiona sama sobie, ponieważ Zachód będzie dążył do kolejnej fali ustępstw. Ta błędna kalkulacja, jedna z wielu rosyjskich prognoz politycznych dotyczących tej wojny, drogo kosztowała Rosję, ponieważ sojusznicy euroatlantyccy odpowiedzieli na inwazję na pełną skalę, zapewniając Ukrainie pomoc gospodarczą i humanitarną oraz wsparcie wojskowe.After the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, the Euro-Atlantic community made several attempts to recalibrate its security and defence policies. However, it was only after the shock of February 24th 2022 and its aftermath that most western states and societies experienced a rude awakening. It was only then when the transatlantic partners realised that not only Ukraine but also a majority of the European continent was being put in danger by Russia’s war of conquest. The united response from European states, the US and Canada must have shocked Vladimir Putin, who most likely counted on Ukraine being left to fend for itself as the West would push for another wave of appeasement. This miscalculation, one of many Russian political predictions made with regard to this war, cost Russia dearly, as the Euro-Atlantic allies responded to the full-scale invasion by providing economic and humanitarian assistance and military support to Ukraine

A clash of narratives

W starciu narracji między Rosją a państwami NATO Moskwa wyraźnie zyskała przewagę. Rosyjski sukces wynika nie tylko z faktu, że Kreml był w stanie wysłać znacznie jaśniejszy i bardziej spójny komunikat niż Sojusz, ale także z tego, że państwa NATO nie mają jednej narracji lub kontrnarracji. Jednym z głównych problemów przy analizie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego i jego historii jest to, jak wyjaśnić pewne wydarzenia i ich wpływ na politykę międzynarodową. Dla decydentów politycznych i społeczeństw kluczowe jest określenie "kim jesteśmy" i "jakiego porządku świata chcemy".In the clash of narratives between Russia and NATO states, Moscow has clearly gained an upper hand. Russian success stems not only from the fact that the Kremlin has been able to send a much clearer and more coherent message than the Alliance, but also because NATO states do not have one narrative, or counter-narrative. One of the central concerns when analysing international security and its history is how to explain certain events and their impact on international politics. For policy-makers and societies it is crucial to define "who we are" and "what kind of world order we want"

Russia's new strategic calculus in the Middle East

Wokół najnowszej polityki Rosji na Bliskim Wschodzie narosło wiele niejasności, zwłaszcza co do jej przyczyn, zakresu i konsekwencji. Niektórzy twierdzą, że Moskwa "nie ma wielkiej strategii dla Bliskiego Wschodu, ale ma jasny pogląd na swoje interesy w konkretnych sytuacjach w regionie", które służą wyższym i szerszym celom Kremla, czyli przywróceniu Rosji pozycji jednego z kluczowych aktorów na arenie międzynarodowej. Niniejszy artykuł dowodzi, że dyplomatyczne, wojskowe i gospodarcze działania Moskwy na Bliskim Wschodzie stanowią przykład zachowań strategicznych, które wykraczają daleko poza doraźne korzyści taktyczne.There has been a lot of ambiguity concerning Russia's recent policy in the Middle East, especially about its causes, scope and consequences. While some say that Moscow "does not have a Grand Strategy for the Middle East it has a clear view of its interests in specific situations within the region" that serves the Kremlin's higher and broader goals of reestablishing Russia as one of the key actors in international affairs. This article argues that Moscow's diplomatic, military and economic actions in the Middle East represent an example of a type of grand strategic behavior that goes far beyond ad hoc tactical gains

The US withdrawal and the scramble for Syria

Amerykańska strategia wojskowa w Syrii podlegała w tym równaniu dwóm zmiennym niezależnym: prezydentom Trumpowi i Erdoğanowi. Ten drugi był niezmiennie zdeterminowany, by zlikwidować Rojavę i w miarę możliwości rozszerzyć granice Turcji zgodnie z "Paktem Narodowym", a ten pierwszy, wierny doktrynie "America First", opowiadał się za wycofaniem z "niekończących się wojen" na Bliskim Wschodzie.The US military strategy in Syria was subjected to two independent variables in this equation: presidents Trump and Erdoğan. The latter was stead- fastly committed to dismantling Rojava and, if possible, expanding the borders of Turkey according to the "National Pact." And the former, loyal to the "America Firs"” doctrine, favored disengagement from the "endless wars" in the Middle East

Towards the "frontline states" concept : understanding the responses to Russia's war against Ukraine

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has had significant consequences, including for NATO’s Eastern Flank’s regional security architecture. Following decades of peace in the region, NATO members neighbouring Russia and Ukraine, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic states, have found themselves on the border of an active war zone. The focus in this paper rests on the "frontline states" concept and its explanatory power. The states selected here (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Romania) for a brief analysis do not constitute a coherent group within “frontline states” category, but rather are selected on a basis of their diversity: Estonia and Latvia (former Soviet republics) are small countries with a high proportion of ethnic Russians and native Russian-speakers; Poland is a regional power in terms of military strength and (relatively) international standing; Romania, bordering both Ukraine and Russia-wary Moldova, has the largest population and territory on the western coast of the Black Sea; while Hungary with its anti-EU and often pro-Russian stance seems to be an outlier among this group of "frontline states". The reactions of these states to Russian aggression have been influenced by the existing regional architecture, as well as their respective "troubled" histories of relations with Russia. Hence, the aim of this policy brief is to discuss to what extent the concept of "frontline states" can be applied to understand the reactions and responses of these countries to Russia’s invasion on Ukraine on 24 February 2022

A sea change? The impact of the US presidential election on central and south-eastern European security and defence

This LSE IDEAS report assesses the likely impact of the new Biden administration on security and defence in the Black Sea, Balkan and Central European regions. The report finds grounds for optimism but also for managing expectations. President Biden's support for multilateral security approaches is likely to strengthen NATO and regional cooperation, particularly on Russia, but the region cannot expect to be the US' top priority. A return to values-based diplomacy under Biden, too, may put pressure on democratically-backsliding allies to whom his predecessor turned a blind eye

"Stare" i "nowe" media w kontekście kampanii politycznych i sprawowania władzy

Praca recenzowana / peer-reviewed paperPublikacja składa się z piętnastu tekstów autorów reprezentujących ważne ośrodki akademickie kraju. Podzielona została na dwie części. Pierwszą stanowią teksty ukazujące wieloaspektowość funkcjonowania mediów w przestrzeni publicznej. Druga część publikacji to zróżnicowane przykłady zastosowania nowoczesnych mediów w funkcjonowaniu współczesnej polityki światowej i krajowej

Strategic compass for Poland and the EU : how to manage the complexity of Sino-American rivalry and Russian aggression against Ukraine

The prevailing challenge for Poland lies in the defining of a long-term strategic goal. The fundamental question Warsaw faces is whether Poland prefers to pursue its national interests based on the liberal world order, or in a neutral yet completely unknown global order. Thus far, the American-led international order has been proven beneficial for Poland’s economic progress and national security. It is highly unlikely that a Chinese-led order with no emphasis on universal values would turn out better for Poland

Problem of dysfunctional states in South Asia and Middle East : the case study of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen

Concepts of failed, collapsed, weak and fragile states have often been used as a useful - although not perfect - tool to explain and describe political, economic and societal conditions in some of the most-troubled states in contemporary international relations. This paper adopts a very similar concept of state dysfunctionality to analyze how states in South Asia and Middle East - some of the most confl ict-torn regions in the world - have been sliding into chaos, civil unrest, confl icts and ultimately permanent crisis. The problems of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen are addressed here, by implementing a comparative case study of both external and internal situations of these states. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, it has become more diffi cult to defend the notion that state collapse, dysfunctionality etc. in remote regions of the world will not aff ect security of state and non-state actors in other places of the globe. The paper concentrates on security-based aspects of these selected cases of state dysfunctionality. Moreover, it attempts to draw conclusions about the strategic implications that the above-mentioned dysfunctionality has for these states but also for regional and global security environment