

BUSH'S BRAND-NEW DOCTRINE – SHAPING THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH, 2001

**Wojciech
Michnik**

The day of September 11th, 2001 will never be forgotten. First of all because of the tragic deaths of thousands of people but secondly because that day ended one era and began another. The terrorist attacks on America forced the Bush administration to think things over and to change the course of U.S. foreign policy. Paradoxically, terrorists contributed to the creation of the strategy which American foreign policy-makers had so desperately been looking for since the end of the Cold War. However, the birth of the Bush Doctrine wasn't a matter of one day, and although it began on September 11th, it took nearly one year to evolve. From the presidential Address to Joint Sessions of Congress and the American People (20th September 2001), the State of the Union Address (January 29th, 2002), the Graduation Speech at West Point (June 1st, 2002) until September 17th, 2002 when the Bush administration released The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President Bush step by step unveiled the new doctrine. How was this doctrine expanded? What are its main dimensions? Is the Bush Doctrine going to be a long-term strategy that will guide U.S. foreign policy decision-makers for the years to come (like the "Containment Strategy" once did), or is it just a temporary answer to the 09/11 attacks? What are the results and costs of this doctrine? These are the key aspects to be dealt with in this paper.¹

THE NEW FACE OF WAR

Attacks on New York and Washington caused redefinition of world diplomacy and international relations. They started the first war of the new century. They also turned upside-down the dispute over the U.S. military role in the post-Cold War world. The war on terrorism has become a top priority of American foreign policy and it's very likely that it will remain one of the most important issues in the foreseeable future.²

¹ There are a lot of obstacles in trying to analyse events while they're in the making. It's even more difficult when the subject is modern international relations, or diplomacy where some documents haven't been published yet and the outcomes of matters remain uncertain. This could be the case of the United States' foreign policy after September 11th, 2001. For this reason, it is underlined that this paper deals with the problem mainly by means of presidential documents available on the internet (The website contains all of the presidential speeches and National Security documents that have been used in this paper). The other helpful tools have been: "think tanks" concerning U.S. foreign policy, scientific magazines and newspapers.

² M. Mandelbaum, *In War of Ideas, the Western Way Has Triumphed*, "Newsday," 11 September 2002, (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.newsday.com/>; last accessed 28 September

Just after the September 11th attacks, the United States found itself on the edge of war. But this warfare was not going to be typical and old-fashioned one. Instead, the war on terrorism would take more than simply attacking hostile states, bombing and invading territory. This conflict emerged as a new kind of fight without traditional front lines, since enemies often remain invisible, operating in many different countries all over the world.³ The duration of such a war can not be predicted. And above all, this conflict was going to cost the United States lives of its people dying not only on American soil (as already happened on September 11th), but in some remote places as well (as has been going on in Iraq).⁴

However, after the chaos of September 11th, the United States, its society and its allies needed a guideline in order to conduct war on terrorism and to carry its burden. And the Bush administration delivered it in a series of speeches and documents released between September 11th, 2001 and September 17th, 2002. It quickly became known as the Bush Doctrine and its key elements and transformations are shown below.

BUSH TEAM

Though President George Bush will be remembered for the doctrine which was named after him, he didn't create it solely by himself. When the president took office he wasn't perceived as a politician with a strong background in foreign policy. But he balanced it and surrounded himself with people who had been in diplomacy for a long time. The Bush Doctrine and the shape of the United States' foreign policy are to some extent reflexions of the "supporting cast" of the President. The top Bush administration officials aren't rookies. Moreover, some of them worked for his father during his presidency. Secretary of State Colin Powell used to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the first black officer to hold America's highest military post, and National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld served in the Ford Administration as Chairman of transition to the presidency of Gerald Ford, Chief of Staff of the White House and as the youngest Secretary of Defense in history (1975–1977). Vice President Dick Cheney was Secretary of Defense in George H. Bush's administration and White House Chief of Staff under President Gerald Ford. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice became (1989) director of Soviet and East European Affairs for the National Security Council

2003. The reasons behind and results of terrorist attacks on the United States are presented [in:] F.J. Hoge, jr., G. Rose (eds), *11 Września 2001. Jak to się stało i co dalej?*, Amber, Warszawa 2001.

³ F.J. Hoge, jr., G. Rose (eds), *11 Września 2001. Jak to się stało i co dalej?*, Amber, Warszawa 2001, pp. 7–9.

⁴ "On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. (...) This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat." President George Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 19 September 2001 [in:] [http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/); last accessed 27 August 2003.

in the administration of George H. Bush.⁵ Additionally, other officials who play a key role in shaping the foreign policy of the Bush administration are: Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Lewis Libby, Cheney's Chief of Staff; Eric Edelman, a senior foreign affairs adviser (these three, together with Cheney and Rumsfeld, are often described as conservatives in Bush administration); Richard Hass, Director of Policy Planning for the State Department (he is much more moderate than the previous group, and he, along with Richard Armitage, is Colin Powell's main aide in the State Department).⁶

The differences between the State Department and the Pentagon can easily be seen in the argument concerning the form of military intervention (reaction) after the September 11th attacks. Although both departments agree on the need of such action, they don't share a common vision in carrying it out. On the one hand, the traditionally hawkish Department of Defense prefers conducting a unilateral action to exerting diplomatic cooperation. On the other hand, the Department of State favours coalition-building over acting alone.⁷

THE FIRST SPEECH, THE FIRST STEPS

In his first speech to the American nation after the terrorist attacks, Bush declared: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."⁸ These words were only the forecast of what soon became known as the Bush Doctrine. Nine days later, on the 20th of September, President Bush repeated it once again from Capitol Hill, and this time his rhetoric sounded much more threatening and precise:

"And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."⁹

The president identified terrorists from al Qaeda as those who were responsible for the attacks. And he also warned Taliban to give terrorists up or they would share in their fate.¹⁰ After this speech it was quite obvious who would be considered

⁵ Information taken from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/>; last accessed 10 September 2003.

⁶ N. Lemann, *The Next World Order*, The New Yorker (electronic edition) [in:] http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?020401fa_FACT1; last accessed 10 September 2003.

⁷ W. LaFeber, *The Bush Doctrine* [in:] "Diplomatic History," vol. 26, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 550. For more on the Bush administration and differences within it read: J. Fallows, *The Unilateralist, A Conversation with Paul Wolfowitz, The Atlantic Monthly, March 2002* (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/03/Fallows.hum> last accessed 10 September 2003; M. Hirsch, *Bush and the World*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002 (electronic edition), last accessed 10 September 2003.

⁸ Statement by the president in Address to the Nation, 11 September, 2001 [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>; last accessed 10 September 2003.

⁹ G.W. Bush, Address to Joint Sessions of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov last accessed 10 June 2003.

¹⁰ Ibidem.

as a foe and who as an ally. According to the address, there was no middle position for any country. The Bush Doctrine in that form was an extremely firm step. But it soon appeared that it would be very difficult to carry these declarations into effect.

Generally, just after articulating the Bush Doctrine, the most crucial problem for the administration to deal with was to create a coalition of countries against terrorism. Afghanistan became the first target of the U.S. military operation, but before action could take place, the United States needed to obtain support from the international community and above all from Afghanistan's neighbors.¹¹ One of the most crucial states in this region was Pakistan. The United States required the cooperation of this country in order to isolate and then to attack the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Pakistani diplomatic relations before September 11th, had been far from perfect. General Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in 1999, wasn't treated by Washington with appreciation. Musharraf's regime, which often was accused of being authoritarian was one of the two largest countries that had recognized the Taliban state. And since the United States has held the image of a country promoting democracy all over the world, the U.S. and Pakistan were at odds.¹² But after the attacks on New York and Washington, this situation had to be changed. Powell and Armitage from the Department of State were delegated to deal with Pakistan. Powell told President Bush that there was no American action possible without cooperation and help given from the Pakistani side. The president gave Powell the green light to do everything it would take to accomplish the aim. Powell, together with Armitage prepared seven demands for Pakistan. Generally, those claims came down to this: The United States asks Pakistan for help in destroying the Taliban regime, which Pakistani intelligence used to support not so long ago.¹³ American side stressed that demands were non-negotiable. And, to Powell surprise Musharraf replied that Pakistan would fulfil them. In gratitude for the assistance, the Bush administration waived various economic sanctions, added financial aid of \$600 million in 2002, and restored U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation.¹⁴

The case of Pakistan is one of the best examples of how September 11th and the early Bush Doctrine shifted U.S. foreign policy means and goals. As Walter Lafeber wrote, "Pakistan had been the target of U.S. economic sanctions and condemnation through the 1990s... After September 11th, however Pakistan's military regime became the most important American partner in the war against the Taliban."¹⁵ Parallel, though not so apparent, changes also appeared in the United States relations with Russia, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Those were

¹¹ See: B. Woodward, *Wojna Busha*, Wydawnictwo Magnum, Warszawa 2003.

¹² There was also the matter of the Pakistani nuclear weapon project, which the U.S. strongly opposed.

¹³ B. Woodward, *Wojna Busha*, Wydawnictwo Magnum, Warszawa 2003, pp. 48–49. Those seven demands can be read on these pages.

¹⁴ T. Carothers, *Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003 (electronic edition), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html>; last accessed 15 September 2003.

¹⁵ W. LaFeber, *The Bush Doctrine* [in:] "Diplomatic History," vol. 26, no. 4, fall 2002, p. 547.

the first lessons for the post-September 11th world, and if the Bush administration wished to win the war on terrorism they would have to make some adjustments.

FROM THE "AXIS OF EVIL" TO UNILATERALISM

The second major speech after September 11th, was the State of the Union Address, delivered by President Bush delivered on the 29th of January. In the first part of the address the president talked about American success in the operation in Afghanistan against the al Qaeda and Taliban regime, and then focused on the key principles of the U.S. strategy in the war on terror. The first objective was to suppress terrorists who attacked the U.S., while the second was to take countersteps against countries who sponsor or harbour terrorists and who could endanger America and its allies with weapons of mass destruction.¹⁶ This second goal appeared to be the most criticized and the most widely discussed element of the speech. All over the world diplomats, journalists and pundits were commenting on so-called "axis of evil," a term which Bush had used to describe Iran, Iraq and North Korea:

"States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. (...)They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."¹⁷

It has become quite clear that the president used his doctrine to isolate Iran, Iraq and North Korea by describing them as an "axis of evil," which was meant to remind the international community of the previous axis of Germany, Italy and Japan during the second world war. But it's also entirely obvious that this comparison fell short, firstly because there is no axis between these states and, secondly, almost no other country thinks of Iraq, Iran and North Korea in this way. Of course, these countries could be extremely dangerous for the international system, especially if they are allowed to obtain nuclear weapons. However, calling these states an "axis of evil" was a far-fetched analogy. It is significant that Bush didn't use this term later, either in the West Point Speech (June 1, 2002) or in the National Security Strategy (September 2003). It proves that the term "axis of evil" was a mistake, and as John Lewis Gaddis remarked in his article in "Foreign Policy": "It was an ill-advised effort to make the president sound, simultaneously, like Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, and it's now been given a quiet burial. This administration corrects its errors, even if it doesn't admit them."¹⁸

¹⁶ The president said: "Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world." G.W. Bush: State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002, [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>; last accessed 10 September 2003.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ J.L. Gaddis, *A Grand Strategy*, Foreign Policy (electronic edition) [in:] http://www.foreign-policy.com/issue_novdec_2002/gaddis.html; last accessed 15 September 2003. See also: K.M. Albright, *Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003 (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-bombs-or-bluster.html>; last accessed 15 September 2003.

A half year later on the 1st of June, 2002, the president spoke to the soliders at West Point, where he left no doubt that, if necessary, the United States would act alone in the war on terrorism. Bush seemed to be tired of the “coalition of the willing” when he warned: “Other nations oppose terror, but tolerate the hatred that leads to terror – and that must change. We will send diplomats where they are needed, and we will send you, our soldiers, where you’re needed.”¹⁹ The president went even further in the unilateralist approach when he declared that the United States, as the world leader in the Reagan-like battle of good versus evil, “has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless.”²⁰ Anyway, it wasn’t the last word of this administration.

THE NSS: THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AND U.S. HEGEMONY

“The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.”

– National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002²¹

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 the president of the United States is required to deliver to Congress and the American people regular reports on the National Security Strategy (NSS).²² The National Security Strategy released on September 17, 2002, became an exclamation point of the Bush Doctrine and the landmark of the United States’ foreign policy after September 11th. Although it consists of nine parts, each dealing with different issues, only the one which was titled “*Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction*” caught the greatest attention. George W. Bush unveiled the preemptive strike as a means which the United States would implement to deter “rogue states” from threatening the security of America and its allies.

The NSS of 2003, as many scholars underline, could be the single most important United States foreign policy document (statement) since NSC 68 – “the 1950 paper”

¹⁹ G.W. Bush: Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1, 2002 [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>; last accessed 10 September 2003.

²⁰ “We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it.” Ibidem.

²¹ M. Corbin, *The Bush National Security Strategy: A First Step* [in:] Center for Defense Information, <http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/washington.cfm>; last accessed 15 September 2003.

²² J.L. Gaddis, *A Grand Strategy*, Foreign Policy (electronic edition) [in:] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_novdec_2002/gaddis.html; last accessed 15 September 2003. It is worth pointing out, that though the National Security Council is legally expected to release an annual document called “the National Security Strategy”, the Bush administration didn’t present it in 2001, as the Clinton administration did in its first year. See: N. Lemann, *The Next World Order*, The New Yorker (electronic edition) [in:] http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/020401fa_FACT1; last accessed 10 September 2003.

that codified the containment doctrine.²³ The strategy which seemed to be the final puzzle of the Bush Doctrine was designed to redefine the United States' foreign policy, its global role as the only superpower and to set new standards in international law. Hence, from the beginning, the NSS and its implementation have become both a great chance and challenge to the Bush administration. For the purpose of this paper, the author will concentrate on two key aspects of the NSS: the case of preemptive strikes against potential threats to the United States, and the maintaining of American hegemony.

Firstly, the central issue of the NSS was a preemption. The United States will no longer stand the situation that any country could attack the U.S. first, as happened on September 11th. Therefore the NSS states: "We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country."²⁴ The term which was used in the NSS was "preemptive," while many of journalists and pundits interchangeably use the "preventive" as a description of the strike. There is a slight, though significant difference between these two terms. As Alan Dowd argues in his article *In Search of Monsters to Destroy: The Causes and Costs of the Bush Doctrine*, the term "preemptive" means "marked by the seizing of the initiative," and "preventive," on the other hand, means "undertaken to forestall anticipated hostile action."²⁵ In fact, the Bush administration doesn't try to regain initiative, but rather seeks to decrease the threat of being attacked by striking ahead. Thus the administration talks about prevention rather than preemption, but by having blurred these two words it leaves itself a broader freedom to act on the international scene. And this means that, no matter what the critics say, the United States will exercise its military power in places around the globe where it recognizes vital danger.

"The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To fore-

²³ M. Boot, *Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada'*, "Washington Post", 14 October 2002 [in:] *Council on Foreign Relations*, Washington, D.C. Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/>; last accessed 5 October 2003.

²⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released on 17 September 2002 [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>; last accessed 24 June 2003. Also on the NSS and preemption strike see: R.L. Bartley, *Bush: Foreign Policy to Take Seriously*, 9 December, 2002, Opinion Journal from the Wall Street Journal editorial page [in:] <http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/rbartley/?id=110002743>; last accessed 5 October 2003.

²⁵ W.A. Dowd, *In Search of Monsters to Destroy: The Causes and Costs of the Bush Doctrine*, Hudson Institute [in:] http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2202; last accessed 10 September 2003. Differences between "prevention" and "preemption" are also discussed [in:] R. Jarvis, *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, "Political Science Quarterly", vol. 118, no. 3, Fall 2003; L. Freedman, *Prevention not Preemption*, "The Washington Quarterly", vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 2003.

stall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."²⁶

Moreover, the NSS underlines that the real threats for the U.S. are not only "rogue states" but also their "terrorist clients" who could obtain biological and/or nuclear weapons. So, once more, the administration focuses on the issue of assuring security for the U.S. and its allies. However, soon after the NSS was released, the Bush administration was heavily bashed all over the world, including some criticism from scholars in the United States. The critics of the preemptive strikes didn't agree with Bush's strategy, especially when it appeared that Iraq would be the first in line.²⁷ For example, Michael Walzer, a social scientist and author of *Just and Unjust Wars*, asked whether Iraq became more dangerous after September 11th than before, to be attacked preemptively. Similar doubts were expressed by professor Joseph Nye who claimed that although there might have been some good causes to use force against Iraq to prevent it from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, North Korea was and still is a much more immediate threat to the United States.²⁸ Another great objection against the Bush administration's preemptive strike concept was that it could carry the enormous risk of becoming a serious precedent for other countries in future international relations. On the other hand, it must be stated that the preemptive or preventive strikes weren't invented recently and had been conducted a long time before the Bush administration mentioned it. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the "six day war" of Israel versus Arab states or the United States and NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999, are only a few of the situations where the principles of preventive war were used. And finally, if the United States is the policeman of the world, it should set the substantial task of the police: to prevent.

The second aspect of the Bush administration's NSS is the case of American hegemony. This issue wasn't as broadly discussed, as preemption was, and didn't receive as much attention either, though it really deserved it. The NSS announced that the United States would maintain military supremacy over the rest of the world: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a mili-

²⁶ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released on 17 September 2002 [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>; last accessed 24 June 2003.

²⁷ For criticism of the preemptive strike see: W.P. Schroeder, *Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War*, *The American Conservative*, 21 October 2002 issue [in:] http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html; last accessed 15 September 2003; I. Eland, *Top 10 Reasons Not to "Do" Iraq*, *Cato Institute* [in:] <http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-19-02.html>; S. McConell, *The Madness of Empire*, *The American Conservative*, 24 February 2003 issue [in:] http://www.amconmag.com/02_24_03/cover.html; last accessed 10 September 2003; A. Schlesinger, Jr, *The Immorality of Preventive War*, *History News Network* [in:] <http://hnn.us/articles/printfriendly/924.html>; last accessed 10 September 2003 K.M. Albright, *Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?*, "Foreign Affairs", September/October 2003, (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay/82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-bombs-or-bluster.html>; last accessed 15 September 2003.

²⁸ See: M. Boot, *Who Says We Never Strike First?*, *New York Times*, 4 October 2002; *The U.S. National Security Strategy: A Debate with: Joseph Nye, Laurence Korb, and Neut Gingrich*, 25 September 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. [in:] <http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6309>; last accessed 29 September 2003.

tary build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."²⁹ If there had been some doubts about the direction of the Bush administration's foreign policy, this declaration would have dispelled them. Although American dominance is a well-known fact around the world, having announced it loudly and stressing the importance of the military factor is something much more different. As Joseph Nye noticed, quoting Theodore Roosevelt's famous words: "if you have a big stick, for God's sake, speak softly."³⁰

The imperial character of this part of the NSS could result in at least three major consequences for the United States. Firstly, on the international level, the United States, as a lonely empire, will be less popular among other nations, or, bluntly speaking, it will cause much stronger anti-American resentment than ever before. Another outcome will affect the American tax-payer, as military hegemony always requires a bigger weaponry than it has. This means expanding defense budget, and leads to the third and probably most important issue. If somebody has power, sooner or later it will be used. It is very likely that the United States will exercise its military potential and enormous strength, and follow its temptation to act alone.

FOREIGN POLICY RESHAPED?

As the results of September 11th, George W. Bush has had to change a lot of things in his presidential image and in the way he runs his office. He entered his post with little interest in foreign relations. But that was before September 11th. Later, he rose to the occasion, and with his leadership he stood tall when the state was attacked. In his presidential campaign, George W. Bush made clear that so-called "nation building" and promoting democracy would not be central issues in his agenda. And the Bush administration avoided this kind of policy, for which they had so much criticized Bill Clinton. Suddenly the September 11th attacks shocked America, and not only forced Bush to launch a new strategy, but drove him to establish "promoting democracy" as an element of the fight with terrorism.³¹

No matter how cynical it may sound, it must be stated that for the Bush administration the September 11th attacks and their aftermath were an opportunity to implement the kind of foreign policy they had only been wishing for previously. If these terrible events hadn't happened, the Administration could never have enforced

²⁹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released on 17 September 2002 [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>; last accessed 24 June 2003. President Bush proclaimed this hegemony much more directly a couple of weeks earlier in the West Point Speech: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge," G.W. Bush: Graduation Speech at West Point, 1 June 2002 [in:] [http://www.whitehouse.gov/iamanie/2004/Ad-Am-5/III %20I%20Michnik.doc.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/iamanie/2004/Ad-Am-5/III%20I%20Michnik.doc.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html); last accessed 10 September 2003.

³⁰ Quoted in: *The U.S. National Security Strategy: A Debate with: Joseph Nye, Lawrence Korb and Newt Gingrich*, 25 September, 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. [in:] <http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6309>; last accessed 29 September 2003.

³¹ T. Carothers, *Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003 (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas--carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html>; last accessed 15 September 2003.

the Bush Doctrine along with interventions in Afghanistan and in Iraq. President Bush and his team grasped the moment and with the support of revengeful American society, they unleashed the war on terrorism on an unprecedented scale. The Bush Doctrine, which initially was designed to destroy al Qaeda and its terrorists, was gradually extended to a preemptive strike concept against other nations (rogue states) and its practical dimension: the military operation in Iraq.³² And suddenly it seemed like the United States has engaged itself in a perpetual fight where the national security is always at stake: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."³³ As long as the terrorists and rogue states exist, they constitute a vital danger for America and its citizens. Therefore, the war on terrorism could last for a long time. The problem is that American society will not "rally" around the flag forever. When economic and "humane" costs of such foreign policy increase the public approval will soon disappear. According to the New York Times, this process has already started. Americans have become critical of Bush's handling of foreign policy, which since this moment has been rather seen as an advantage for most of his presidency.³⁴

Another issue which is being transformed due to a new policy of the Bush administration is the nature of military interventions. Since the end of the Vietnam War, American society has become very reluctant about the deploying of U.S. military forces abroad. One of the indications of this was the transformation of the United States' military strategy, which was called the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.³⁵ But after September 11th these rules were changed. And so were doctrines. Now there seem to be no rules at all, while according to the Bush Doctrine, engaging the United States in almost every conflict could mean that U.S. vital interests are at stake.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a lot of media hype and scholarly discussion about whether the Bush Doctrine is going to be the next containment strategy or not. Surely, on paper it looks

³² K.M. Albright, *Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?*, "Foreign Affairs", September/October 2003 (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-bombs-or-bluster.html>; last accessed 15 September 2003.

³³ G.W. Bush, Address to Joint Sessions of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov (last accessed 10 June 2003).

³⁴ "The latest survey found that 44 percent of those polled approved of Mr. Bush's overall handling of foreign policy, down from 52 percent in July, and that 47 percent approved of his handling of the situation in Iraq, down from 58 percent in July." [in:] S.T. Purdum, J. Elder, *Poll Shows Drop in Confidence on Bush's Skill in Handling Crises*, "New York Times", 3 October 2003 (electronic edition) [in:] <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/03/national/03POLL.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position;> last accessed 3 October 2003.

³⁵ B. Blechman, *The Intervention Dilemma*, "The Washington Quarterly," vol. 18, no. 3, Summer 1995 [in:] <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/blechman.htm>; last accessed 4 April 2003.

On the Weinberger-Powell doctrine see: J. Record, *Weinberger-Powell Doctrine Doesn't Cut It*, US Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2000 [in:] <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/record.htm>; last accessed 4 April 2003.

like a serious contender. But it can't be forgotten that it is one thing to present the doctrine and another to exercise it. So far, it has been announced but hasn't been fully implemented. However, there are already some flaws which could be pointed out. First, the United States can not act alone. This seems obvious, but not in the case of the Department of Defense. Second, since there is no possibility for unilateralism, the U.S. should build a coalition, though not in the reluctant style it did before interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. International organizations and pacts such as U.N. and NATO also can't be excluded from America's allies. Third, despite concentrating only on military issues, the United States should use more "soft power" and leave the preemptive strike as a last resort strategy. And fourth, the Bush administration must remember that nowadays the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has never been so blurred. Therefore its doctrine guarantees American society security, but one should remember Bill Clinton's warning: "It's the Economy stupid". If President Bush wants to avoid his father's fate and to have an opportunity to develop his doctrine in the second term, he must not forget lessons from the past.

The events of September 11th certainly ended one era of thought about American foreign policy and began a brand-new one. The United States has had to rethink its strategy and its goals in the post 09/11 world. The Bush Doctrine could be the first step on this new road. And as Thomas Paine once noticed: "We have it in our power to begin the world all over again."³⁶

REFERENCES

- Albright, K.M., *Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-bombs-or-bluster.html>
- Alterman, E., *Who Speaks for America? Why Democracy Matters in Foreign Policy*, Cornell University Press, New York 1998.
- Bartley, R.L., *Bush: Foreign Policy to Take Seriously*, Wall Street Journal, 9 December 2002 [in:] <http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/rbartley/?id=110002743>
- Blechman, B., *The Intervention Dilemma*, "The Washington Quarterly", vol. 18, no. 3, Summer 1995 [in:] <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/blechman.htm>
- Boot, M., *Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada'*, Washington Post, 14 October 2002.
- Boot, M., *Who Says We Never Strike First?* New York Times, 4 October 2002.
- Bush, W.G., *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Washington D.C., US GPO, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/index.html>
- Carothers, T., *Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html>
- Corbin, M., *The Bush National Security Strategy: A First Step* [in:] Center for Defense Information, <http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/washington.cfm>
- Dowd, W.A., *In Search of Monsters to Destroy: The Causes and Costs of the Bush Doctrine*, Hudson Institute [in:] http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2202

³⁶ Cited in: E. Alterman, *Who Speaks for America? Why Democracy Matters in Foreign Policy*, Cornell University Press, New York 1998, p. 29.

- Eland, I., *Top 10 Reasons Not to "Do" Iraq*, Cato Institute [in:] <http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-19-02.html>
- Fallows, J., *The Unilateralist, A conversation with Paul Wolfowitz*, The Atlantic Monthly, March 2002, electronic edition [in:] <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/03/fallows.htm>
- Freedman, L., *Prevention not Preemption*, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 2003.
- Gaddis, J.L., *A Grand Strategy* [in:] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_novdec_2002/gaddis.html
- Gingrich, N., Korb, L., Nye, J., *The U.S. National Security Strategy: A Debate with: Joseph Nye, Laurence Korb, and Newt Gingrich*, 25 September 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. [in:] <http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6309>
- Hirsch, M., *Bush and the World*, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002.
- Hoge, Jr.F.J., Rose, G. (eds), *11 Września 2001. Jak to się stało i co dalej?*, Amber, Warszawa 2001.
- Jarvis, R., *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, fall 2003.
- LaFeber, W., *The Bush Doctrine* [in:] "Diplomatic History", vol. 26, no. 4, fall 2002.
- Lemann, N., *The Next World Order*, The New Yorker (electronic edition) [in:] http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?020401fa_FACT1
- McConell, S., *The Madness of Empire*, The American Conservative, 24 February 2003, issue [in:] http://www.amconmag.com/02_24_03/cover.html
- Mandelbaum, M., *In War of Ideas, the Western Way Has Triumphed*, "Newsday", 11 September 2002 [in:] <http://www.newsday.com/>
- Purdum, S.T., Elder, J., *Poll Shows Drop in Confidence on Bush Skill in Handling Crises*, "New York Times", 3 October, 2003, electronic edition: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/03/national/03POLL.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position=Record>
- Record, J., *Weinberger-Powell Doctrine Doesn't Cut It*, US Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2000 [in:] <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/record.htm>
- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released on 17 September 2002 [in:] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>
- Schlesinger, A., jr, *The Immorality of Preventive War*, History News Network [in:] <http://hnn.us/articles/printfriendly/924.html>
- Schroeder, W.P., Iraq: *The Case Against Preemptive War*, "The American Conservative", 21 October 2002, issue [in:] http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html
- Woodward, B., *Wojna Busha*, Wydawnictwo Magnum, Warszawa 2003.