Genetic Screening and Price Discrimination in Insurance Markets

Basing insurance prices on the results of an imperfect screening test to identify risk types can reduce or increase aggregate discrimination across insureds. We present a powerful and general new framework of analysis to examine this issue, rawing upon recent work which uses decomposable inequality indices to measure vertical and horizontal inequity in taxation. We find that, whilst improved test performance inevitably reduces vertical discrimination (in the average prices faced by different risk types), even very accurate tests can lead to substantial horizontal discrimination (within risk types) and enhanced overall discrimination. These conclusions are shown to be robust to a range of different value judgements about how to aggregate individual discriminatory effects and to be particularly relevant to the case of genetic screeninginsurance, genetic information, discrimination

The Gender Imbalance in Participation in Canadian Universities (1977-2005)

More females than males have been attending Canadian universities over the past decade and this gender imbalance in university participation has been increasing. We use the Linear Probability and Logit models to investigate the determinants of attending university and explore the reasons for the increasing gender imbalance. We find that, in gender-specific equations, the values of the coefficients attached to variables and the values of the variables themselves are both important in explaining the rising level of the university participation rate for women and men. The important variables include a time trend to capture the evolving societal norms, the dynamic influence of parental education, the earnings premium for a university degree, tuition fees and real income. The increasing gap between the female and male participation rates (15 percentage points by 2005) can be accounted for equally by differences in the coefficients in female and male participation equations and the widening gap in the university premium for women and men.university, participation, gender imbalance

A MODEL OF AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE IN EVALUATING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEMS

The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the form of moral hazard and adverse selection results in sizeable efficiency losses. These costs are passed back to producers in the form of excessively high premium rates and also passed back to the government via the crop insurance subsidy program. A secondary motivation stems from a recent debate in the literature regarding the specific effects of moral hazard on agricultural input use. Conventional wisdom suggests that moral hazard will induce producers to reduce input usage. A competing hypothesis has emerged which suggests that moral hazard may induce producers to increase their usage or risk increasing inputs. The main objective of this paper was to develop a model of agricultural insurance to understand why asymmetric information problems might exist and to compute and evaluate the relative program costs of agricultural insurance that can be attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection. These objectives are achieved by developing a theoretical model of agricultural insurance, and by conducting numerical simulations of the model. Simulation results indicated that insured farmers use less agricultural inputs than uninsured farmers in an attempt to maximize expected indemnities. Moral hazard was fould to be a significant problem only at higher coverage levels. Expected returns (in term of expected indemnities) to agricultural insurance were found to vary substantially between productivity (i.e., risk) types, and farmers were shown to recognize and respond to these differences. These results suggest that crop insurance is confronted with an adverse selection problem. Simulation results further indicated that program costs to a myopic insurer attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection could be substantial.Risk and Uncertainty,

The Determinants of University Participation in Canada (1977−2003)

The decision to attend university is influenced by the balance of the expected returns and costs of attending university, by liquidity constraints and capital market imperfections that may modify these calculations and, hence, by the family income of prospective students. Family circumstances also play a role. We examine the secular increase in the propensity of children from Canadian families, evident in annual surveys spanning two and a half decades, to attend university. We quantify the importance of these factors taking account of the greater propensity by young women than men to attend university and controlling for secular trends in socioeconomic norms that impinge on these decisions.university participation, parental education, university premium, gender, tuition, income, societal trends

The Gender Imbalance in Participation in Canadian Universities (1977-2005)

More females than males have been attending Canadian universities over the past decade and this gender imbalance in university participation has been increasing. We use the Linear Probability and Logit models to investigate the determinants of attending university and explore the reasons for the increasing gender imbalance. We find that, in gender-specific equations, the values of the coefficients attached to variables and the values of the variables themselves are both important in explaining the rising level of the university participation rate for women and men. The important variables include a time trend to capture the evolving societal norms, the dynamic influence of parental education, the earnings premium for a university degree, tuition fees and real income. The increasing gap between the female and male participation rates (15 percentage points by 2005) can be accounted for equally by differences in the coefficients in female and male participation equations and the widening gap in the university premium for women and men.University participation, individuals, gender, Canada