The dependence of health insurance availability on years left before Medicare

We study the dependence of health insurance availability of near-elderly inpatients in the United States with respect to their ages. We show that the likelihood that near-elderly inpatients are uninsured continuously declines until the early ages of 60 but the trend is reversed for the last few years preceding Medicare coverage. In addition, compared to those covered by Medicaid or private insurance, the uninsured patients are more likely to be admitted into hospitals as emergency cases.Health insurance; Medicare

Protectionist demands in globalization

We construct a game theoretic model that offers to explain the increase in trade protectionism as a rational reaction of the voters to their increased concern that the policy choices of their governments are being influenced by international actors. More specifically, we construct a small open economy in which the citizens declare their most preferred tariff rate on an import good to their government. While the government has incentive not to deviate too much from the publicly demanded tariff rate, its final decision is determined after bargaining with a foreign lobby which offers benefits to the government in return of lowered tariffs. We show that the expectation of such foreign influence affects the citizens’ voting behavior. Namely, they tend to vote for more protectionist policies. Moreover, this behavior leads to an increase in benefits by the foreign lobby to the government

Protectionist demands in globalization

We construct a game theoretic model that offers to explain the increase in trade protectionism as a rational reaction of the voters to their increased concern that the policy choices of their governments are being influenced by international actors. More specifically, we construct a small open economy in which the citizens declare their most preferred tariff rate on an import good to their government. While the government has incentive not to deviate too much from the publicly demanded tariff rate, its final decision is determined after bargaining with a foreign lobby which offers benefits to the government in return of lowered tariffs. We show that the expectation of such foreign influence affects the citizens’ voting behavior. Namely, they tend to vote for more protectionist policies. Moreover, this behavior leads to an increase in benefits by the foreign lobby to the government

Altering effects of caffeic acid phenethyl ester (CAPE) and ischemia/reperfusion injury: an experimental study in a rat TRAM flap model

Gurdal, Mehmet/0000-0003-1226-1737; Yegin, Mehmet Emre/0000-0001-5788-0705WOS: 000534210500001Background Many studies have been performed since the discovery of ischemia-reperfusion injury (I/R) to find substances that reverse its effects on flaps. However, because of minor or major side effects these substances are mostly failed to be put in clinical practice. in this study, the mitigation effects of caffeic acid phenethyl ester (CAPE) were investigated for its protective effects on flap necrosis in a rat model. Methods Forty-two randomized male Sprague-Dawley rats weighing between 250 and 300 g were assigned to the regular flap (G1) (n = 14), ischemic flap (G2) (n = 14), and ischemic flap + CAPE (G3) (n = 14) groups. Bilateral pedicled TRAM flaps were designed for the first seven rats of each group,; bilateral-free TRAM flaps were designed for the remaining rats in each group and referred as subgroup 1 and 2 (S1 and S2), respectively. in G1, flaps were returned to their original locations without clamping or injection. in G2 and G3, a 2-h ischemia was performed. Before the ischemic process, intraperitoneal saline and CAPE solution was administered intraperitoneally in the second and third groups, respectively. on day 7 after the operation, all flaps were harvested and subjected to biochemical (malondialdehyde, superoxide dismutase, and catalase levels) and histological examinations (hematoxylin & eosin, Mallory-Azan, anti-VEGF, anti-BAX, anti Bcl-2, and anti-iNOS stainings), respectively. Enzyme levels and the Verhofstadt scores showed a statistically significant difference in flaps among the groups. Less injury was noted in G3 than in G2 (p < 0.01). Conclusions in this experimental model, CAPE was effective in protecting tissues against ischemia-reperfusion injury. Level of evidence: no ratableEge University Directory, Scientific Research BureauEge UniversityThis project was funded by the Ege University Directory, Scientific Research Bureau

An experimental study of the investment implications of bankruptcy laws

We use an experimental design to analyze and compare actual investor behavior under two well-known allocation rules proposed by the theoretical literature on bankruptcy problems: Equal Losses Rule (EL) and Proportional Rule (PRO). More specically, we experimentally test the following hypotheses, forwarded by the theoretical work of Kibris and Kibris (2013): (i) total investment is higher under EL than under PRO; (ii) under both rules, a decrease in the rm's probability of bankruptcy (i.e. an increase in its success rate) serves to increase both individual and total investment levels; (iii) under both rules, more risk averse agents choose lower investment levels; (iv) under EL, agents with more risk averse partners invest more, (v) under PRO, an agent's investment choices are independent of his partner's risk attitude. Our findings support all hypotheses except (iv). We find that a switch from PRO to EL or an increase in the success rate induces higher investment choices and that more risk averse subjects invest less in general. We do not observe a signicant effect of partner's risk aversion on a subject's investment choices. Finally, we also find that the bankruptcy rule in play has a signicant effect on a subject's likelihood of choosing an extreme (that is, zero or full) investment level

A Game Theoretic Approach to Peer Review of Grant Proposals

This paper studies the grant peer review process employed by the Turkish regional development agencies, which is adapted from a review procedure of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency of the European Union. To model this process, we consider a Bayesian strategic-form game played by three reviewers who observe both a common and a private score signal about an evaluated project and assign their scores to minimize the sum of their disutilities from the false acceptance and false rejection of the project. We numerically compute the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game and conduct several comparative statics exercises, after calibrating the model parameters accordingly. We also introduce two simpler review processes and compare their performances to that of the calibrated process in terms of outcome statistics, involving pass and fail rates of the evaluated projects, and manipulation statistics, involving the reviewers' manipulation rate and size of scores