Moral & incentives : should corruption whistleblowing be rewarded?

Tendo como objeto o Projeto de Lei n. 857/2012, aprovado pela Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal em 2013, este artigo analisa o princípio da compensação pecuniária ao cidadão que denuncia a corrupção, sob a ótica da Teoria de Desenhos de Mecanismos e do Direito. Um modelo de Teoria da Decisão estabelece um potencial conflito para o cidadão entre a satisfação com o benefício monetário auferido pela denúncia (“incentivo pecuniário”) e a insatisfação com o sentimento de estar sendo pago para exercer seu dever cívico (“desincentivo moral”). Mostra-se que, quando há heterogeneidade na sociedade, o efeito do incentivo pecuniário predomina e a introdução da compensação é benéfica para a sociedade. Além disso, propomos uma alteração no PL que transforma o desincentivo moral em incentivo à dedicação ao controle da corrupção. Finalmente, por meio da análise de leis e de estudos de casos, confirmamos que, além de compatível com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, esse mecanismo já é efetivamente aplicado em diferentes situações no país.This article presents an applied mechanism design and a legal analysis of a Bill proposed into law by the Brazilian Federal District House of Representatives in 2013. The Bill offers monetary rewards for citizens that denounce corruption. In our decision-theoretic model, corruption control may give the citizens utility due to their civic responsibility feeling. The main trade-off brought about by the reward mechanism is that, by receiving compensation, citizens’ civic impulse to dedicate effort to curb corruption may be reduced. However, our model shows that if society is heterogeneous enough, the monetary reward motive prevails and the Bill fosters social involvement. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism that transforms the moral dissatisfaction of receiving money into a moral incentive to dedicate to corruption control. Finally, a careful analysis of the Law and of a series of case studies in Brazil suggest that such a mechanism does not violate the Constitution and, furthermore, has actually been used under different forms in the Brazilian legal system

Comment on Market Discipline and Monetary Policy by Carl Walsh

This paper aims at correcting flaws in the way expectations are set in a paper by Walsh (2000) in order to assess with precision the impact of complex market rigidities and market expectations in the optimal choices of inflation in a monetary game between society and central bankers. After setting the expectations right, one of the results achieved indicates that the optimal inflation under any type of central banker is higher than that obtained in the original paper, suggesting that the time inconsistency phenomenon plays a more important role in explaining an inflationary bias than originally interpreted by Walsh (2000). However, if society organizes itself towards shorter tenure wage contracts, inflation will be lower. The results obtained for the output gap of the economy also differ from those achieved by Walsh in the sense that a central banker who is highly committed to previously announced inflation targets will have more opportunities to generate output growth above equilibrium rates and still commit. Finally, the stability of the premises regarding the contractual structure of the economy proposed by Walsh is tested under a game theoretic approach. The outcome of the test is that stability can be guaranteed only under strong assumptions and high symmetry in the sectoral distribution of firms. By using a social welfare function in which price surprises in any direction lead to welfare loss, the results indicate that society is better off by choosing longer tenure wage contracts, moving away from shorter tenure ones, at the cost of higher inflation.

Resenha bibliográfica

Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo S.; Rodrigues, Mauro. Sob alupa do economista - uma análise econômica sobre bruxaria, futebol,terrorismo, bilheterias de cinema e outros temas inusitados.São Paulo: Campus/Elsevier, 2009. 248 p

Incentivos à corrupção e à inação no serviço público : uma análise de desenho de mecanismos

O artigo analisa os incentivos criados pelo marco legal brasileiro ao desempenho e à gestão inovadora no funcionalismo público. Um modelo de teoria da decisão sugere que servidores de carreira tendem a não inovar em sua gestão para não serem acusados de comportamento ilícito, dado o Princípio Constitucional da Legalidade. Já gestores temporários em cargos comissionados tendem a ser mais inovadores, resultando em benefício para a sociedade, no caso dos gestores com elevada consciência social, ou malefício, no caso de gestores que se corrompem. Um estudo econométrico preliminar em painéis envolvendo os ministérios de 2002 a 2013 sugere haver maior evidência de corrupção em ministérios com maior percentual de cargos de confiança ocupados por gestores temporários. Uma análise de desenho de mecanismos indica como o marco institucional pode ser alterado de forma a alinhar os incentivos dos gestores, induzindo a inovação geradora de bem-estar social e reduzindo a corrupção.The present paper analyzes the institutional incentives public managers face in Brazil. A decision-theoretic model suggests that the constitutional principle of "Legality" induces tenured civil servants to adopt a non-innovative, bureaucratic management. On the other hand, temporary appointed managers tend to be more active, which could either generate higher social returns, in the case of socially inclined managers, or lower social return, in the case of managers involved in corrupt activities. A preliminary panel data econometric analysis spanning from 2002 to 2013 suggests that Ministries with higher percentages of temporary appointed managers tend to present higher levels of corruption. A mechanism design approach shows how institutions could be adjusted in order to stimulate socially-beneficial innovative management while curbing corrupt practices in the country

A progressividade do imposto de renda da pessoa física no Brasil

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo avaliar a progressividade do Imposto de Renda da Pessoa Física no Brasil, no período de 2006 a 2012, utilizando números índices que permitem sua comparação com outros países. Dentre as medidas de progressividade efetiva ou global, foram calculados os índices de desvio da proporcionalidade de Kakwani e Suits, além dos índices de capacidade redistributiva de Reynolds-Smolensky, Musgrave-Thin e Pfähler. Mostra-se que o tributo brasileiro apresenta índices de progressividade bastante altos em comparação a países da América Latina e países desenvolvidos. Entretanto, sua capacidade redistributiva é limitada pela baixa representatividade da arrecadação do imposto em relação à renda bruta total do país, problema semelhante a muitos países com renda per capita similar à do Brasil. Efetuou-se também a decomposição da progressividade da estrutura do imposto, verificando-se que, no caso brasileiro, o efeito alíquota é responsável por toda a progressividade, enquanto o efeito base é proporcional.The goal of this work is evaluate the progressivity of Brazilian personal income tax from 2006 to 2012, using index numbers that allows comparisons with other countries. Among measures of effective or global progression, this paper calculates the Kakwani's and Suit's indexes of departure from proportionality and the Reynolds-Smolensky's, Musgrave-Thin's and Pfähler's indexes of redistributive capacity. The results show that the Brazilian personal income tax exhibits high progressivity compared with Latin American and developed countries. On the other hand, the redistributive capacity of the personal income tax is limited due to its low revenue compared with national gross income, a problem also faced by countries with per capita income similar to Brazil's. The paper also calculates the progressivity decomposition of personal income tax structure, and finds that the tax-rate effect is responsible for the entire progressivity while the base effect is proportional

PACTO DE ESTABILIDADE E CRESCIMENTO NA UNIÃO EUROPÉIA: HÁ INCENTIVOS AO SEU CUMPRIMENTO?

The objective of this paper is to analyze, with the instruments of Game Theory, the incentives that can lead a Member State of the European Union to disregard the Stability and Growth Pact, and thus, to keep an excessive deficit, although aware of the political and financial risk associated with the non-compliance. Some games are analyzed: complete and incomplete information between a country and the European Union and incomplete information between the Union and two countries. This last case brings about an equilibrium that involves formation of reputation. The main conclusion is that the European Union must be strong and demand the fulfillment of the agreed, even if this imposes a high cost. If there were a signaling, as is already happening, that the European Union does not detain enough power to compel their members to adjust their deficits, there probably will be a general and in-cascade non-compliance of the Stability and Growth Pact, what will lead to the downfall of the Economic and Monetary Union.