Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations

We investigate the equilibrium selection problem in n-person binary coordination games by means of adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993). The size and the depth of a particular type of basins of attraction are found to be the main factors in determining the selection outcome. The main result shows that if a strategy has the larger basin of attraction, and if it is deep enough, then the strategy constitutes a stochastically stable equilibrium. The existence of games with multiple stochastically stable equilibria is an immediate consequence of the result. We explicitly address the qualitative difference between selection results in multi-dimensional stochastic evolution models and those in single dimensional models, and shed some light on the source of the difference.Equilibrium selection, stochastic stability, unanimity game, coordination game

Multiplicity and Sensitivity of Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games

We investigate the equilibrium selection problem in n-person binary coordination games by means of the adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993). We show that whenever the difference between the deviation losses of respective equilibria is not overwhelming, the stochastic stability exhibits a notable dependence on payoff parameters associated with strategy profiles where the numbers of players for the respective strategies are nearly equal. This feature necessitates the existence of games that possess multiple stochastically stable equilibria.Equilibrium selection, stochastic stability, unanimity game, coordination game

Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games

In an (n,m)-coordination game, each of the n players has two alternative strategies. A strategy generates positive payoff only if there are at least m-1 others who choose the same, where m>n/2. The payoff is nondecreasing in the number of such others so that there are exactly two strict equilibria. Applying the adaptive play with mistakes (Young 1993) to (n,m)-coordination games, we point out potential complications inherent in many-person games. Focusing on games that admit simple analysis, we show that there is a nonempty open set of (n,m)-coordination games that possess multiple stochastically stable equilibria, which may be Pareto ranked, if and only if m>(n+3)/2, which in turn is equivalent to the condition that there is a strategy profile against which every player has alternative best responses.Equilibrium selection, stochastic stability, unanimity game, coordination game, collective decision making

Group Formation and Heterogeneity in Collective Action Games

We present a simple model of voluntary groups in a collective action problem where individuals differ in their willingness to cooperate. The heterogeneity of individuals' preferences generally yields multiple equilibrium groups with different levels of cooperation. Voluntary participation in a binding contract to cooperate does not necessarily lead to the full cooperation. Applications to voluntary provision of public goods and cartel formation in oligopolistic markets are discussed.group formation, collective action, heterogeneous preferences, voluntary participation

Global Collaborative Team Performance for the Revision of the International Classification of Diseases: A Case Study of the World Health Organization Field Studies Coordination Group

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.Background/Objective: Collaborative teamwork in global mental health presents unique challenges, including the formation and management of international teams composed of multicultural and multilingual professionals with different backgrounds in terms of their training, scientific expertise, and life experience. The purpose of the study was to analyze the performance of the World Health Organization (WHO) Field Studies Coordination Group (FSCG) using an input-processes-output (IPO) team science model to better understand the team's challenges, limitations, and successes in developing the eleventh revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Method: We thematically analyzed a collection of written texts, including FSCG documents and open-ended qualitative questionnaires, according to the conceptualization of the input-processes-output model of team performance. Results: The FSCG leadership and its members experienced and overcame numerous barriers to become an effective international team and to successfully achieve the goals set forth by WHO. Conclusions: Research is necessary regarding global mental health collaboration to understand and facilitate international collaborations with the goal of contributing to a deeper understanding of mental health and to reduce the global burden of mental disorders around the world