Context Dependence, MOPs,WHIMs and procedures Recanati and Kaplan on Cognitive Aspects in Semantics

After presenting Kripke’s criticism to Frege’s ideas on context dependence of thoughts, I present two recent attempts of considering cognitive aspects of context dependent expressions inside a truth conditional pragmatics or semantics: Recanati’s non-descriptive modes of presentation (MOPs) and Kaplan’s ways of having in mind (WHIMs). After analysing the two attempts and verifying which answers they should give to the problem discussed by Kripke, I suggest a possible interpretation of these attempts: to insert a procedural or algorithmic level in semantic representations of indexicals. That a function may be computed by different procedures might suggest new possibilities of integrating contextual cognitive aspects in model theoretic semanti

Conocimiento práctico y conocimiento del lenguaje

Para aclarar qué tipo de conocimiento requiere el lenguaje, se examina el conflicto aparente entre dos aportaciones fregeanas: la prioridad de la función comunicativa del lenguaje y una teoría del significado que parece comprometida con el psicologismo que Frege rechaza. El artículo defiende que el lenguaje es instrumento de comunicación antes que vehículo del pensamiento, examina la teoría fregeana del significado en relación con las nociones de “acto lingüístico”, “frase”, “sentido” y “fuerza”, y sostiene que los hablantes de un idioma requieren tanto una habilidad práctica (saber cómo) como un conocimiento implícito de las reglas del lenguaje.In order to clarify the kind of knowledge that language requires, this paper examines the apparent conflict between two Fregean contributions: first, the priority of the communicative role of language and second, a theory of meaning that seems to embrace the kind of psychologism rejected by Frege. The article defends that language is a tool for communication rather than a vehicle of thought, examines Frege’s theory of meaning in connection with the notions of “linguistic act,” “phrase,” “sense,” and “force,” and holds that language speakers need both practical skill (know-how) and implicit knowledge of linguistic rules

Refusing to Endorse. A must Explanation for Pejoratives.

In her analysis of pejoratives, Eva Picardi rejects a too sharp separation between descriptive and expressive content. I reconstruct some of her arguments, endorsing Eva’s criticism of Williamson’s analysis of Dummett and developing a suggestion by Manuel Garcia Carpintero on a speech act analysis of pejoratives. Eva’s main concern is accounting for our instinctive refusal to endorse an assertion containing pejoratives because it suggests a picture of reality we do not share. Her stance might be further developed claiming that uses of pejoratives not only suggest, but also promote a wrong picture of reality. Our refusal to endorse implies rejecting not only a wrong picture of reality but also a call for participation to what that picture promotes

The bearable lightness of being

How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories-such as object, property, and relation-are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical form: for example, the question whether there are numbers is the question whether there are true atomic statements in which expressions function as singular terms which, if they have reference at all, stand for numbers, and the question whether there are properties of a given type is a question about whether there are meaningful predicates of an appropriate degree and level. This approach is defended against the objection that it must be wrong because makes what there depend on us or our language. Some problems confronting the Fregean approach-including Frege's notorious paradox of the concept horse-are addressed. It is argued that the approach results in a modest and sober deflationary understanding of ontological commitments

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

The communication of first-person thoughts

A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation

Speakable in Quantum Mechanics

At the 1927 Como conference Bohr spoke the now famous words "It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." However, if the Copenhagen interpretation really holds on to this motto, why then is there this feeling of conflict when comparing it with realist interpretations? Surely what one can say about nature should in a certain sense be interpretation independent. In this paper I take Bohr's motto seriously and develop a quantum logic that avoids assuming any form of realism as much as possible. To illustrate the non-triviality of this motto a similar result is first derived for classical mechanics. It turns out that the logic for classical mechanics is a special case of the derived quantum logic. Finally, some hints are provided in how these logics are to be used in practical situations and I discuss how some realist interpretations relate to these logics

Normative Alethic Pluralism

Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance of disagreement—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to the normative function of truth is unable to vindicate the conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a promising model to account for it