Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized in SpringerLink

Book Title	Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History		
Series Title			
Chapter Title	Refusing to Endorse: A Must Explanation for Pejoratives		
Copyright Year	2018		
Copyright HolderName	The Author(s)		
Corresponding Author	Family Name	Penco	
	Particle		
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	Prefix		
	Suffix		
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Abstract	In her analysis of pejoratives, Eva Picardi rejects a too sharp separation between descriptive and expressive content. Carlo Penco reconstructs some of her arguments, endorsing Eva's criticism of Williamson's analysis of Dummett and developing a suggestion by Manuel Garcia Carpintero on a speech act analysis of pejoratives. Eva's main concern is accounting for our instinctive refusal to endorse an assertion containing pejoratives because it suggests a picture of reality we do not share. Her stance might be further developed claiming that uses of pejoratives not only suggest, but also promote a wrong picture of reality. Our refusal to endorse implies rejecting not only a wrong picture of reality but also a call for participation to what that picture promotes.		

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Refusing to Endorse: A Must Explanation for Pejoratives

Carlo Penco

1 Introduction

Since David Kaplan's "The Meaning of 'Ouch' and 'Oops'", there has been a wide amount of discussions on every side of pejorative expressions or slurs, with different kinds of interpretations and new topics, like the problem of appropriation and perspectival shift.¹ Picardi (2006, 2007) presents a set of suggestions concerning the use of pejoratives and their relation to the content of what is said. Her stance is antagonist towards a too easy "pragmatic" view of the matter, according to which a pejorative doesn't touch or is totally independent of what is said and only pertains to the level of implicatures or presuppositions. On the contrary, Eva claims that the use of a pejorative cannot be reduced to something always independent of the assertive content, and that the use of pejoratives may pertain to the truth of the matter, given that it predicates something false of the class to which it refers. Therefore, she would be classified as belonging to the "semantic stance" proposed for instance by Hom (2008, 2010, 2012). According to the semantic stance, the

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derogatory content is part of the meaning of the pejorative (e.g. "nigger" *means* something like "black and despicable because of it"), and therefore a sentence containing a slur attributes an empty property to the individual in question (Picardi 2006: 72), making the sentence either false or deprived of truth value. Although she claims that the derogative aspect of pejoratives is "part of a word's literal meaning", I think the morale of her papers points towards a wider view on the role of pejoratives than the semantic one. I will follow Eva's analysis of multi-proposition view (§1), her attempt to make derogative terms impinge on truth conditions (§2), her reaction of Tim Williamson's criticism of Michael Dummett (§3), her dubious attitude towards a presuppositional analysis (§4) and eventually, in (§5), I conclude with a solution that seems to prompt from her discontent with most answers to the problem of derogatory terms.

2 Sense, Tone and Accompanying Thoughts: A Multiple Propositions Analysis

In order to distinguish what a pejorative expression add to what is said, Kaplan (1999) distinguishes descriptives and expressives: the first describe what is or is not the case; the second display what is or is not the case under a certain perspective or attitude (two expressions may have the same information content and different expressive content). According to Kaplan himself, this distinction is not so distant from the Fregean analysis on the different contribution to content made by sense and tone. Picardi (2006, 2007) discusses the Fregean distinction in relation to the use of derogatory words. Frege considered tone or colouring as of pragmatic significance and not pertaining to the truth-conditional content of an assertion (the assertoric content). Frege's distinction antedates the distinction made by Paul Grice between what is said (truth-conditional meaning) and what is meant (conventional or conversational implicatures), as Picardi (2001) was one of the first to remark. A standard example is given in Frege (1897) analysing the difference between:



- 1. "That dog howled the whole night"
- 2. "That cur howled the whole night"

According to Frege, the two sentences express the same truth-conditional content: if the first is true, then the second also is true. Frege

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claims that (2), although expressing the disapproval of the speaker, cannot be false if (1) is true. In fact, if we thought that the aversion of the speaker was part of the content, the sentence should be analysed as a conjunction of (1) "that dog howled the whole night" and something like (3) "all dogs are despicable and ugly". Assuming that (3) is false, the conjunction of (1) and (3) would be false. Therefore, we could not accept the truth of sentence (2) given that it is an expression of a complex proposition whose truth-value is false. But we cannot assume that (2) is false while (1) is true, given that they refer to the same state of affair. Supported by this argument, Frege distinguished between thoughts whose assertion is expressed and thoughts that are not expressed, but only hinted at or "suggested", in order to influence the audience. Suggesting something using a particular piece of the lexicon to refer to an individual does not concern the problem of truth and belongs to the realm of colouring or tone, which pertains to pragmatic aspects of language (Frege 1879, 1897, §3). The solution to the analysis of pejoratives seems straightforward: conveying something suggested and not explicitly asserted, a sentence with a pejorative does not concern what is said, but what is meant, or the conventional implicature. Picardi is not happy with this solution and tries different ways to go beyond it.

First of all, Picardi criticises Frege for assuming too easily that "dog" and "cur" are coreferential. If so, the two terms should require substitutability *salva veritate*, but there are counter examples:

To his neighbor's utterance 'That cur howled all night', the owner of the dog may retorts, 'That dog is not a cur', but plainly he is not asserting that his dog is not a dog. Possibly, all curs are dogs, but not all dogs are curs. All that Frege is entitled to say is that there are contexts of utterance in which the difference in meaning between "cur" and "dog" makes no difference to truth-conditions of what is said, whereas there are other contexts in which the difference is salient. (Picardi 2006: 62)

The main claim given by this example is that we cannot take it for granted that a neutral term and a pejorative have always the same extension. However the disagreement between two speakers here does not grant the conclusion; in fact the two expressions (the neutral one and the derogative one) have the same extension in the mind of the dog hater, and when they are used to refer, the reference is normally successful because the interlocutor easily gets what the speaker has in mind. Saying



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that it is false that all dogs are curs is an expression of disagreement on the different uses of the words, not on the factual truth of the assertion of the speaker (whether the animal—in whichever way you want to refer to it—howled all night). It seems to me therefore that this argument is not strong enough to avoid the conclusion that assertions containing pejoratives have the same truth-conditional content than assertions with neutral terms, insofar the pejoratives are used to refer and are understood as such.

What about a multi propositional analysis? Relying on a long tradition of research (Kent Bach, Robyn Carston, Francois Recanati), Picardi claims that the difference between "what is said" and "what is conventionally implicated" is not sharp enough to decide without doubts when something belongs to the content of an assertion and when it does not, given that the choice may depend on the *point* of the assertion. A possible solution might be to translate the sentence (2) with an explicature (or a free enrichment), as:

4. "That dog, which is despicable and ugly because of it, howled all night".

With this peculiar rendering, we might answer to the Fregean strategy for which it is counterintuitive to take (2) as false considered as a conjunction ("that dog howled and all dogs are despicable and ugly"). In fact, with (4) interpreted as an explicature of (2) we would really have a different proposition from (1) and we may admit—in this case—that the truth of the content of the main assertion (that the dog howled all night) is affected by the truth-value of the relative clause. This might be a possible "multi-propositional" solution of the relevance of pejoratives to what is said.

We may claim therefore that the use of the pejorative is intended to imply that the fact that dogs are despicable is a *reason* or a cause why they howl all night or vice versa. This last point seems the best way to explain Picardi's criticism of Kaplan's analysis of Frege's accompanying thoughts (*Nebengedanke*) with which she shares much, but not all. The discussion starts with Frege's example:

5. "Napoleon, who recognized the danger to his right flank, personally led his guards against the enemy position"



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
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6. "the recognition of the danger is a reason why Napoleon led his attack".

In this case, it becomes apparent that the accompanying thought may be part of what is said, given that it impinges on the truth-condition of the composed sentence. Picardi really makes a case about that. The conclusion is that a pejorative may be treated as prompting a further proposition that cannot be conceived just as a conventional implicature, but as an explicature—that is part of what is said—presenting a point, such as individuating the reason explaining the content of the main clause: seeing the danger of his side is a reason for Napoleon to attack, or being uglv and despicable is a cause for the dog to howl all night-maybe because despicable animals just do that.

Although this is a possible analysis of pejoratives that makes justice of the idea that an assertion containing a pejorative may be just false, Picardi eventually rejects it. In fact she claims that the idea of a specific completion of a sentence because of a pejorative is not sound; following Sainsbury (2001), she claims that what is relevant with a sentence with expressive content is its *lacking of specificity*, and therefore the sentence "should not be construed as directed to an elliptical proposition that awaits to be spelled out in full" (Picardi 2006: 54).

Do Pejorative Really Impinge on Truth Conditions?

Without the help of explicatures or free enrichment, however, it becomes difficult to claim that pejoratives pertain to the assertoric content, to what is said. Yet Eva, criticising Kaplan's too sharp separation between expressives and descriptives, attacks the rendering of this distinction made by Potts (2005, 2008), who considers expressives as conventional implicatures. According to Potts the expressive meaning of a lexical item



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is *independent* of its descriptive meaning and therefore plays no role in determining the truth conditions. The main point of disagreement with the above distinction concerns the claim of independence of the expressive content. Eva's criticism of the idea of independence of expressives works on a basic question:

How can we consider the *correctness* of a reported speech in case the original speech contained a pejorative?

At first sight, reporting an utterance with a pejorative like "that cur howled all night", a lover of dogs would probably make a report of the kind: "x said that that dog howled all night", abstaining to use the pejorative term, but still thinking to have made a correct report of what happened, preserving at least the truth of the matter. But not everybody would agree of the correctness of the report. Eva refers to Bach (1999) A04 whose argument for claiming that conventional implicatures belong to what is said is that they fail the indirect speech test; if you report John's having said "Mary is pretty but intelligent" as "John said that Mary is pretty and intelligent", Bach doubts that you have made a correct report. In the reported speech we should make it clear that the speaker intended a contraposition between the first and the second property. We should have an enriched proposition that could make explicit the content of the contrast. We have seen however that this is not the path followed by Eva. Which means are still available to fight a analysis of pejoratives based on the idea of conventional implicature?

Instead of following the multi-propositional analysis, Eva pinpoints another possible problem: the relevance of what is the "at-issue" content or the question under discussion (QUD). On this point she makes an example purporting to show the difficulty of sharply separating the assertoric content from the implicated content:

Whether my leaving out this piece of information renders my report wrong or simply inaccurate depends on what was the main point of the utterance on the given occasion. And this, in its turn, depends on the audience I am addressing and on the focus of the conversation: in the course of an investigation that aims at discovering the culprit of evil deeds against dogs in a certain neighbourhood it may be useful to give a literal report of what the people involved say concerning dogs. In a different context, the report may be less accurate, if, for instance, our interlocutor simply wants to find out what a notoriously nagging neighbour was complaining about.

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This is an ingenious effort to defend the claim that pejoratives enter the question of truth. But it seems to me that here we have two questions: one question concerns the facts described by the report, another question concerns the facts concerning the psychology of the speaker: if we are looking for a devious assassin of dogs, reporting the specific lexical item impinges on the latter. We might have evidence, although inconclusive, of the speaker's tendency to perform crimes against dogs. Here, therefore, a literal report may be of fundamental importance to denounce the speaker. However, again, derogatory conceptualizations do not change the "strict" truth-conditional content of a description of a state of affairs. In fact, in this case, the truth evaluation concerns (the fact of) which words the speaker used, not which facts have been reported about the behavior of dogs.

In fact, "that cur" is a complex demonstrative, whose main role in the sentence is the identification of the referent; we may think that it presents the referent in a wrong way and, from this perspective, is not too dissimilar to a misdescription. A speaker may make a referential use of an inaccurate definite description assuming the hearer may understand the intended referent although the description is false of it, or at least defective (see also Penco 2010, 2017). From the point of view of truth conditions, both misdescriptions and pejoratives may be considered defective but still able to make the hearer correctly understand the referential intentions.



Picardi (2006: 67) is well aware of the problem, and she refers to Donnellan on this point. Her use of the similarity with Donnellan's cases helps to point out the difference between the case of misdescriptions and the case of pejoratives. In case of misdescriptions like "the man drinking champagne" (while he is drinking mineral water), there is no harm in using a defective or inaccurate or wrong definite description if your referential intentions are understood. On the contrary this does not happen with pejoratives. While with misdescriptions we are in front of a factual mistake, whose correction is easy to accept ("the person you are referring is not drinking chanpagne but mineral water"), in front of a derogatory term you cannot simply change the term and be happy, because you are facing a strong disagreement: what is wrong from the point of view of dog lovers, may be strongly believed by the dog hater, who would not recede from his conceptualization of that class (dogs are despicable because of being dogs and blacks are inferior because of being black). Besides, given certain circumstances, I may easily report what a speaker

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said using the same misdescription to make myself understood, but this is not so with pejoratives. In fact I might feel uncomfortable using a pejorative term, on whose grounds and consequences I don't agree. But this does not mean that I don't *understand* what the speaker said and I have to distinguish between the facts of the matter described and the point of view and attitude of the speaker.

As Dummett (2007: 527) says, commenting of Picardi's paper, "the use of a pejorative expression certainly cannot be said to affect the truth-value of an utterance; it affects its property. But, for the same reason, it also cannot simply be explained as affecting the tone of the utterance, or as attaching an implicature to it." The offensive character of certain terms, Dummett claims, should be accounted for by "the license they give their user to draw inappropriate consequences". In conclusion, we cannot use the test of reported speech to claim that pejorative impinge on the truth of the matter, although we may still take our awareness on "the tacit commitments we would undertake in accepting a certain way of referring to people or actions" as a ground to refuse to endorse an assertion (Picardi 2007: 507).

The question seems to shift from the truth-value of an assertion concerning a state of affair (what did the dog do during the night?) to the justifications and consequences of assertions containing a pejorative. If truth conditions are not affected, pejoratives certainly affect assertibility conditions. Different lexical items are connected with different justification and consequences, and using them obliges us to explain why we have used them and commits us to the consequences of what they mean. We are entering another kind of problem, that touches upon the meaning of pejoratives: while it seems that truth conditions are affected only by the *referents* of pejoratives, assertibility conditions may be affected by their *meanings*. On the meaning of pejoratives, Picardi is very near to Dummett's classical analysis and contrasts Williamson's criticism of this analysis.

4 Pejoratives as Dealing with Truth/Assertibility Conditions

Picardi (2006, 2007) looks back at Dummett's discussion on the logic of pejoratives. Dummett was interested in the logical role of pejoratives and in the logical motivations to reject their use. His claim was clear and

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simple: a pejorative like "Boche"—used to refer to Germans implying that Germans are more prone to cruelty than other Europeans—would produce a non conservative extension of the language where the word was not present: the use of "Boche" would permit inferences and conclusions that would not be permitted in the language missing the pejorative (Dummett 1981: 454).

Dummett gives Introduction rules and Elimination rules for the term and shows how they permit conclusions impossible to be derived without the term. The Introduction Rule for "Boche" (or its condition of application) would simply be something like

x is German

x is Boche

But the consequences of application embed the following inference (that might be considered the Elimination rule for "Boche"):

x is Boche

x is more prone to cruelty than other Europeans

Now, if we accept the Introduction and Elimination rules for *Boche* we should derive something of the following: Angela Merkel is German therefore is *Boche*, and if Angela Merkel is *Boche*, therefore, she is more prone to cruelty than other Europeans. We could not to derive this conclusion from our lexicon only if, following the elegant attitude of Oscar Wilde, we did not include the lexical item "Boche" in our dictionary.

Williamson launches an attack on radical inferentialism and defends a radical referentialist framework (although he recognizes that there are intermediary positions that might escape his criticism). He criticizes Boghossian (2003: 241–42) according to whom "plausibly, a thinker possesses the concept *Boche* just in case he is willing to infer according to [Dummett's rules]", with the following short argument:

Since understanding the word 'Boche' (with its present meaning) is presumably sufficient (although not necessary) for having the concept that 'Boche' expresses, it follows that a willingness or disposition to reason according to Dummett's rules is equally unnecessary for having that concept. (Williamson 2009: 8–9)

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the same class:

This claim is correct, and maybe Boghossian went a bit too far. Let us assume that understanding a concept is understanding its introduction and elimination rules. Mastering those rules is not to be identified with willingness to follow them, but with an implicit knowledge of them. Understanding the meaning is understanding what it is or what it would be using that inference, even without explicitly doing so or even rejecting to endorse it. Williamson may accept that, but then-he would ask—which is the difference between an inferentialist and a referentialist account of understanding as a "practical" ability if we cut off the actual disposition to reason according to the rules? The answer is that, although there is no difference in "practical" ability, inferentialists are not content of getting the referent right: they require making the inferential connections explicit. Explicitly rejecting to use a term is exactly the point of the difference between a referentialist and an inferentialist view. You refuse to use a term because you reject the possible consequences of its use; referential rules on the other hand just point out that the reference of "German" is the same of the reference of "Boche"; the two classes are

differences between 'Boche' and 'German' apparently play no role in determining reference, and so make no difference to the way in which the terms contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur, a Fregean might even count 'Boche' and 'German' as having the same sense. Frege himself gives just such an account of another pejorative term (1979: 140): 'cur' has the same sense and reference as 'dog' but a different tone. (122)



Here we are. Again on Frege, and our examples of pejoratives for "dogs"! As we have seen, the main role of pejoratives does not concern just the role of reference fixing, as in case of definite descriptions, but their role in suggesting inferences to be accepted (conventional implicatures). On this point, Williamson himself concedes the idea that conventional implicatures (something derivable and therefore linked to an inferential structure) of expressions like "Boche" are "part of their meaning in a broad sense of meaning". But, if we accept an idea of (broad) meaning as dealing with the inferences connected with an expression, then Dummett's proposal is not incompatible with a view of pejorative as triggering a conventional implicature or a presupposition.

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A way to interpret Dummett's treatment of pejoratives is then to consider it as a clarification of the rules behind what is expressed and not stated, rules that should be followed if one accepts the conventional implicature connected with the use of the pejorative. Accepting a pejorative, we accept a network of inferences, a set of beliefs that the pejorative brings with it. Using an assertion with a pejorative is not only saying something true with a bad psychological surrounding: it is accepting the consequences connected to the inferential meaning of the expression. We are back to the conclusion of the previous discussion: we understand the intended referents of singular terms or complex demonstratives like "that dog" or "that cur", and we understand to which classes predicates like "German" or "Boche" refer; although sentences containing them may have, by substitution of coreferentials, the same truth conditions, they certainly haven't the same assertibility conditions; in fact, to have the same assertibility conditions they should also have the same ground for justification, and we may claim, from our perspective, that nobody is justified to use "cur" or "Boche" given that those terms imply consequences that we disagree about.

5 Problems of Pejoratives as Presupposition Triggers

If a conventional implicature can be considered part of the "broad" meaning of an expression, then it seems that Picardi (2007: 508) herself makes a too strong contrast between "the decision to construe the explicit derogatory ingredient as a conventional implicature" on one hand and the idea of construing the derogatory ingredient "as constitutive of word meaning" on the other. The two aspects are not antagonist: considering the derogatory ingredient as conventional implicature implies that its broad meaning is connected with the inferences that are derivable by its use and are suggested as "calculable" implicature.

However, speaking of inferences syntactically plugged into the lexicon, conventional implicatures may not be the best solution for treating pejoratives. The other solution is treating them as triggering presuppositions. Actually conventional implicatures pass the S-Family test of presuppositions: they stand also when an assertion is made in negative, interrogative and modal form ("that cur didn't howl all night", "did that cur howl all night?", "that cur might have howled all night").

Let us then see what happens when treating pejoratives as presupposition triggers (for a defence of a presuppositional account see Schlenker



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2007; Macià 2014; Cepollaro 2015). Under this perspective, the use of a pejorative presupposes the set of beliefs that the pejorative intends to implicate. This should be coherent with the classical view of presuppositions for which an utterance of a sentence is appropriate if the presupposition is shared by the participants of a conversation (Stalnaker 1974). We may consider the use of pejorative not appropriate if we do not share the presupposition; therefore, as Picardi (2007: 507) claims "we may abstain from accepting a statement made by others because we are aware of the tacit commitments we would undertake in accepting a certain way of referring to people or actions".

This claim is perfectly adequate to a presuppositional analysis, and it seems to me that presuppositional analysis and the difference between truth conditions and assertibility conditions come hand in hand; abstaining from endorsing a statement means rejecting the justifications or the intended background for its assertion.

A presentation of a presuppositional analysis might also be framed in Kaplan's terminology. Kaplan (1999) was interested in the informational content that can be derived by expressives; in doing so he attempted to clarify the rules of correctness of expressives and the correspondence of informational content given by expressives and by descriptions: the same semantic information can be given with an expressive mode (ouch, oops, hurray) or with a descriptive mode ("I am in pain" or "I have just observed a minor mishap" or "I am in state of joyful elation"). Kaplan describes the problem of giving the rules for correct application of expressives. And we might say that the felicity condition of the use of a pejorative is that (1) the person actually believes the information content expressed by the pejorative and (2) has the correct attitude or emotion towards the class described by the pejorative. Utterances of "that Boche run away" or "that cur howled all night" are appropriate only if the speaker really believes that Germans are cruel as such or that dogs are despicable and ugly as such and has the appropriate emotion of distaste or dislike (see also Carpintero 2017). This is what presuppositional analvsis amounts to.

However, the presuppositional analysis of pejoratives leaves unanswered some questions like the following:

1. In using a slur in a re-appropriation case, people do not share the prejudice (the belief) attached to the term, yet it seems that their use is appropriate.



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- 2. When people who have racist prejudices use the derogatory term we should say that their use is perfectly "appropriate" because they share the beliefs supporting that use, yet it sounds awkward, although correct for the theory, to say that the uses of derogatory terms are somehow "appropriate".
 - 3. when a presupposition is expressed it ceases to be a presupposition and it is normally accepted while the presupposed content of a slur is typically a matter of disagreement when explicitly stated.

Leaving (1) and (2) to the reader, let us see the problem with (3). Accommodation (the process through which people accept presuppositions that do not belong to the common ground) is not as normal as it is in standard cases (where, as Lewis says, presuppositions "spring into existence making what you say acceptable after all"). A non-xenophobe, or a non-racist, or a friend of dogs, would not easily accommodate the presupposition in a sentence that uses a pejorative. He would probably say, "Hey, wait a moment! Do you think that Germans are more prone to cruelty than other Europeans? It is not true" or "hey wait a moment! Do you think that all dogs are despicable? That's false". The problem arises because the presupposition triggered by a pejorative represents a content on which there may be very strong disagreement.

The main defect of presuppositional analysis is that it leaves something out; offensive or derogatory terms does not only pertain to the *content* of their presuppositions (and eventually the emotional attitude going with it); they also involve actions and commitments undertaken in their use.

6 Pejoratives as Higher Order Utterance Modifiers

Eva makes a remark on Frege's view of the derogatory ingredient attached to the word "cur":

[according to Frege] in the given context the choice of "cur" instead of "dog" has the value of an exclamation, and, one may add, could be rendered syntactically by means of an exclamation mark, much as assertoric force is rendered by means of a vertical stroke. Frege held that assertoric force only shows itself with the help of a suitable notation, but is not located in any part of speech in particular. Its scope is the whole utterance, not a particular segment of it. The function of an interjection mark

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encapsulated, as it were, into the meaning of "cur" in the specific utterance is to disclose the attitude of the speaker towards the matter at issue. It presents the dog as ugly or unpleasant from the speaker's perspective; however, as Frege remarks, the dog itself may very well be a handsome representative of its race. But this circumstance does not render the use of the interjection incorrect, for in uttering as he did, the speaker might have wished to disclose his attitude of dislike or fear of dogs in general, not of this dog in particular. (Picardi 2006: 62–63)

Eva here refers also to Kaplan, who distinguishes between "truth *simpliciter*" and "truth with an attitude", but—as we have seen—she does not agree to treat the expressive content merely as something propositional: "tone need not be expressible by means of α , let alone *one* specific, full-fledged proposition" (Picardi 2007: 503). But which kind of non-propositional aspect can be conveyed by a derogatory expression?

Eva attributes the main reason for accepting the Fregean suggestion of colouring as higher order utterance modifier to the fact that it detaches the notion of colouring from mere psychological significance.² A pejorative may impinge on the level of speech acts, on their felicity conditions or justification (or assertibility) conditions. This is a central point to be clarified.

Eva oscillates between two alternatives often connected: a multi-propositional account and a higher order account, both of which she tends to disregard. But I think she has been too quick with disregarding the idea of higher-order account, maybe because too strictly connected with the Gricean view. Speaking of higher order account we typically tend to consider the contribution of some words (expressions like "but" or pejoratives) as parasitic on a ground floor or central speech act (Grice 1989: 361-62). But the idea of higher order modifier is not exhausted by Grice's view of implicatures (nor by the presuppositional account). An alternative view may be defined for treating pejoratives as higher order modifiers that are not just parasitic aspects. Still keeping pejoratives as connected with a set of inferences (presupposed or implicated), Carpintero (2015, 2017) tries to give them a further role in the context of dialogue. The novel point that Carpintero makes it where to insert the role of pejorative in the dialogue: not only as part of the content or as presupposed propositions, but as constraints on the context of dialogue. The main consequence of accepting derogatory expressions is the implicit acceptance of their presuppositional content, given by tacit

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network of inferences and commitment to the consequences.

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accommodation. Tacit accommodation implies tacit undertaking of a

The main point made by Carpintero is, therefore, that common ground cannot be defined only in terms of shared propositions, but also in terms of different commitments towards those propositions; that's why we feel so uncomfortable when we are included in a conversation where people use pejoratives on whose stereotypical inferences we strongly disagree. Already Stalnaker claimed that we have different attitudes towards the contents of the common ground (see Domaneschi et al. 2014). But Carpintero's point is stronger and can be summarised AQ7 by the claim that our common ground is made not only of propositions and propositional attitudes but it also concerns attitudes linked to illocutionary forces, which is a further level of pragmatic commitment.

Saying that the use of pejorative is linked to illocutionary force is a fundamental step, shared by many others. Langton (1993, 2012) calls AQ8 "speech acts of subordination" those speech acts used to classify a target class as inferior, legitimate discrimination and deprive it of rights. But her examples are basically explicit acts of subordination like "Blacks are not permitted to vote", where the act is a kind of "verdictive" and the speaker has authority to do that because he is in a social position that allows him to perform the act. Besides, in case the speaker has no authority, the accommodation of the presupposition (given by the failure to question the speaker) would confer authority to the speaker herself, as suggested by Maitra (2012) (McGowan 2004, 2009 speaks of "conversational" exercitives that, differently from Austin's, do not require uptake from the hearers).

However most of the examples of this literature concern explicit and *direct* acts of subordination (like the above quoted "Blacks are not permitted to vote"), or hate speech that is characterised, among other things, by being *directly* addressed to the individuals whom they insult (see also Hornsby 2001: 297). On the contrary our examples (following Frege's example with "cur") concern the use of derogative words in descriptions of facts or in questions, where the pejorative is part of a descriptive content of a phrase (complex demonstratives, definite descriptions) whose main function is to pick a referent. How to describe the subtler way in which the insertion of a pejorative in a normal description of facts changes—to use Lewis' terminology—the conversational score?

A first solution is to think of an indirect speech act: by putting a question such as "do you know what time is it?" I make a request; by





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describing a possible situation such as "I will not miss your date" I am making a promise. Following the analogy, we may say that by describing a situation with "that Boche run away", or asking "have you seen that Boche running away?" I hereby promote discrimination and legitimize behaviour of discrimination. We may think that the preparatory condition is not satisfied. If asked: "can you tell me the time?" I may answer: "Sorry, I have no watch", making it clear that the preparatory condition of the request is not satisfied. Analogously, if asked: "have you seen a nigger running away?" I may answer: "Sorry, for me there are no nigger", because the preparatory condition to the act of subordination requires that black people are inferior as such. But the analogy is not so clear: an indirect speech act is typically a speech act of a kind that is given by a speech act of a different kind. By a question we make a request, by a description we make a promise; in case of assertions or questions containing a derogatory term we are still making an assertion or a question. Saying: "hey, wait a moment; he run away, but he is not a nigger" (as with rejecting a presupposition), we correctly answer the main speech act; while we cannot say to a question like "do you know the time" something like, "yes, we do, but unfortunately I have no watch". The strategy of indirect speech act after all seems not to be a viable analysis.

A second possible answer, that seems to be more coherent with the main trend in contemporary discussion, is that speech acts with derogatory terms contain a peculiar adjunctive force: with the same utterance, we make two kinds of speech acts at the same time (Kissine 2013: 197): assertions, questions, commands, and other speech acts can be understood as such, and at the same time, when containing a derogatory term, they are at the same time acts of "subordination". And also, we have two contents: the (description of the) objective state of affairs (a person who runs away) and the (promotion of a) derogatory viewpoint concerning the individual and the group they belong to. Langton (2017) presented a similar idea at the ECAP Conference in Münich, speaking of "Blocking as Counter-speech" (e.g. you may assert something normal and at the same time, through a presuppositional trigger, convey something else like in "Even John could win!"). We may conclude that speech acts that contain derogatory terms (or other subtle means to give a diminishing perspective on the target) promote and legitimize subordination or other negative attitudes towards the referent class. And, most of the time,⁵ the subordination is derived by the use of a predicate that is false of the class





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in question, for instance, because "the complex properties indicated by racist words are not instantiated" (Picardi 2006: 68).

Can we be content in saying that with pejoratives we make two speech acts at the same time? The idea of a speech act of subordination is still a pointer towards an idea to be refined, and we might distinguish levels of subordination, and also other kinds of acts depending on different kinds of pejoratives or on different targets or different social roles (on which see e.g. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2017). The essential feature, besides the AQ10 actual contempt or disregard of the target, is normally taken to be that in using a pejorative we act to promote and legitimize subordination. What is not yet clear is *how* this promotion is realised.

My suggestion is that who intentionally uses derogatory terms looks for company, for sharing the prejudice and avoiding feeling alone. His speech act constitutes a call for joint responsibility, asking for sharing an attitude towards the derogatory content, indirectly creating a context of commitment to certain behaviour against the target. This is why rejecting to endorse an assertion or answering a question containing a pejorative is the fundamental reaction and avoids the trick of the use of derogatory terms; on the one hand it seems that the racist (or the dog hater) is just stating some facts and therefore we are ready to accept or reject the truth of the matter; but in stating some facts with a certain terminology the racist (or the dog hater) is desperately asking for approval of his behaviour and his way of life, and for sharing his positive endeavour to promote this behaviour and way of life.

Summarizing, the use of a derogatory term in a normal speech act gives the act a new feature, besides promoting discrimination or subordination: it is a call for joint responsibility that commits co-conversationalists to participate in the actual subordination and deprecation of the individuals or classes defined with a pejorative. Therefore, the use of pejoratives is not just a question of informational content, or of tacit presuppositions, but it is promotion and legitimization of that content through tacit joint acceptance. In accepting a presuppositional content we ourselves turn to be *promoters of* that content, and not only making as if we believe it.

This seems to me a fairly acceptable rendering of the central core of Eva's analysis concerning the relationship between assertion and endorsement:



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I may refuse to endorse an assertion because its wording suggests a picture of reality that I do not share. (Picardi 2006: 62)

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The central point of the refusal to endorse is rejecting the call for joint responsibility and leaving the racist alone. And probably, under this "illocutionary" view, we are allowed to say something stronger: the use of words not only "suggests" a picture of reality, but also actually "promotes" it.

7 Summary

The connection between the speech act and the set of inferences connected (either because of implicatures or because of presuppositions) with the pejorative expression builds up a new challenging problem on the relationship between truth conditions and assertibility conditions, and this seems to be the most relevant suggestion left by Eva's paper. Rejecting to endorse an assertion containing derogatory terms aims both at preventing the derivations of other assertions whose content would entail what we regard as false, and at preventing the promotion of what we considered wrong attitudes towards the object of contempt.⁷

Notes

- 1. A short summary of different perspective is given in Bianchi (2014), Bianchi (2015) (also with reference to experimental approaches) and Cepollaro (2015).
- 2. The main point is always to antagonize the *reductio* of the phenomenon of tone to the subjective alone, as Picardi (2007: 500) insists: "Tone is as much as conventional and objective feature of word meaning as sense is, and Frege erred in confining it to the realm of psychological association".
- 3. It is in his "Retrospective Epilog" included in Grice (1989), that Grice speaks of "Lower order" and "Higher order" Speech acts.
- 4. Thanks to Laura Caponetto for suggesting this connection.
- 5. Apparently we do not need a pejorative for an act of subordination, as in Langton's example "Blacks are not permitted to vote".
- 6. Or, at least, sharing the presuppositions connected with the derogatory terms. Some people may be unaware of the derogatory aspects of a term, either by not having another "politically correct" term or just by not knowing the derogatory aspect of a term in a context of a community. Travelling abroad may put people at risk of being considered either racist or simply unpolite just by ignorance.

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7. I would like to thank Filippo Domaneschi for his suggestions on an early draft of this paper and Paolo Leonardi for his careful reading and further suggestions, which, unfortunately, I feel to have been unable to follow properly. A special thank to Laura Caponetto for pointing out some mistakes and suggesting repair.

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
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