32 research outputs found

    Doing and Allowing Harm: the Hidden Assumptions of a Moral Distinction

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    C’è chi sostiene che è possibile stabilire una distinzione moralmente rilevante tra fare il male e permettere che il male venga fatto. Ammettere o meno l’esistenza e la rilevanza morale di tale distinzione ha profonde ripercussioni sia a livello teorico che pratico. Nelle prossime pagine riproporrò e criticherò il contributo più recente e cospicuo a favore della differenza tra fare e permettere il male (d’ora in avanti DFP). Sosterrò che – nonostante sia in linea di principio plausibile tracciare tale distinzione –il cardine della discussione sta nel comprenderne la rilevanza morale. In che senso si possa parlare di rilevanza morale è infatti una questione controversa. Sostenere che la DFP sia moralmente rilevante, ad esempio, legittima gli agenti a disporre liberamente delle proprie risorse. Ma questa legittimazione non è priva di problemi: andranno affrontate sia questioni legate all’ingiustizia implicita nella DFP che all’accezione conservatrice di identità personale sostenute dai fautori della DFP. Per quanto riguarda il problema dell’ingiustizia sosterrò che quando ci si confronta con problemi pratici – come l’obbligatorietà di dare denaro in beneficienza – i sostenitori della DFP sembrano sostenere implicitamente che i più sfortunati si meritino di trovarsi in condizioni di miseria e povertà. Tale posizione – come si vedrà – è fortemente problematica sia da un punto di vista etico che metafisico. Successivamente – sulla scia della psicoanalisi freudiana – sosterrò che la DFP permette all’agente di preservare e giustificare una concezione dell’identità personale ben specifica. Legittimare il diritto di proprietà di un agente sulle proprie risorse è importante poiché gli permette di perseguire quei progetti che costituiscono e formano il proprio ideale dell’Io; la DFP incoraggia l’agente a divenire il tipo di persona cui già aspirava, a prescindere da una qualunque riflessione critica. Questa prospettiva è sintomatica di una concezione dell’etica particolarmente conservatrice cui ci si può ragionevolmente opporre. Si può, per esempio, sostenere che il ruolo dell’etica dovrebbe essere quello di incoraggiare gli agenti a mettere alla prova la propria identità e cercare di adattarla al sopraggiungere di nuovi problemi, abbandonando dunque la tendenza a preservare e cristallizzare il proprio ideale dell’Io.Is there a morally relevant distinction between cases in which the agent harms someone and cases in which she merely allows someone to be harmed? Holding that such distinction exists and is morally relevant has implications on both theoretical and practical grounds.   In my paper, I discuss one of the most conspicuous defences of the existence of the distinction between doing and allowing harm (from now on, DAH). I argue that – provided that it be possible to establish such a distinction – what really matters is whether and how this distinction would be morally relevant. The moral relevance of such distinction is, in fact, much controversial. The main reason why the DAH should be morally relevant is that it legitimizes the agents’ authority over their own resources. I address two main issues: the problem of injustice within the DAH and the conservative account of personal identity held by the advocates of DAH. Regarding the problem of injustice, I argue that when confronted with a practical problem such as the obligation to give money to charity, the DAH seems to imply that those in miserable conditions deserve it. Such a position seems to be untenable from both an ethical and a metaphysical point of view.  I then discuss the notion of personal identity that would benefit from the DAH in the light of some psychoanalytic concepts. The fact of legitimizing the agents’ ownership of their own resources does matters because it allows them to fulfil those projects that constitute their Ego-Ideal. In other words, the DAH encourages the agents to become the person they already aspire to be. Such perspective delineates a particularly conservatory way of thinking about ethics which may be rejected for several reasons. One could, for instance, argue that ethics should encourage agents not to stick to their old identity but rather to question it and adapt it when new problems arise

    Gebrauch biologischer Insektizide im Kampf gegen den Scaphoideus titanus, den Vektor von Flavescence dorée

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    Flavescence dorée and the mandatory control of its vector Scaphoideus titanus pose important problems in organic vineyards. The goal of our field studies conducted in the Ticino was to develop a pest control strategy conform to the guidelines of organic production. Insecticides containing pyrethrin were the only organic products showing an efficacy higher than 90% against the immature stages of S. titanus. However, these products had no effect on adult leafhoppers. Repeated applications of pyrethrin proved to be toxic against the predatory mite species Amblyseius andersoni. Despite this toxicity, the only efficient and recommended control strategy in organic vineyards is their application. Pyrethrin should be applied three times at an interval of ten days after the first appearance of individuals of the 3rd nymphal stage. Symptomatic plants must be eradicated from the vineyard to remove the phytoplasma inoculum

    Interdisciplinary Animal Research Ethics - Challenges, Opportunities, and Perspectives

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    Can nonhuman animals be used for the benefit of humans in a scientifically and morally justified manner and, if yes, how? Based on our own experiences as scholars from various academic backgrounds, we argue that this question can only be answered as an interdisciplinary and international endeavor, considering insights from research ethics and animal ethics as well as scientific and legal aspects. The aim of this article is to contribute to the foundation of the emerging field of animal research ethics. In doing so, we describe the following seven phases of animal research experiments: ethical, legal and social presumptions (phase 0), planning (phase I), review (phase II), conduct of experiments (phase III), publication/dissemination (phase IV), further exploitation of results (phase V), and evaluation (phase VI). In total, 20 key ethical, legal, and practical challenges that an ethical framework for the use of animals in research needs to address are identified and analyzed. Finally, we characterize the following four meta-challenges and opportunities associated with animal research ethics as a field: (1) moral pluralism, (2) the integration of views and positions outside the laboratory, (3) international plurality of conduct, standards, and legal norms, and (4) interdisciplinary education

    Bestiario, una rubrica

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    Introduzione alla rubrica curata da Erich Linder (UniversitĂ  di Vienna)

    What Is Wrong with Eating Pets? Wittgensteinian Animal Ethics and Its Need for Empirical Data

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    Wittgensteinian approaches to animal ethics highlight the significance of practical concepts like \u27pet\u27, \u27patient\u27, or \u27companion\u27 in shaping our understanding of how we should treat non-human animals. For Wittgensteinian animal ethicists, moral principles alone cannot ground moral judgments about our treatment of animals. Instead, moral reflection must begin with acknowledging the practical relations that tie us to animals. Morality emerges within practical contexts. Context-dependent conceptualisations form our moral outlook. In this paper, we argue that Wittgensteinians should, for methodological reasons, pay more attention to empirical data from the social sciences such as sociology, psychology or anthropology. Such data can ground Wittgensteinians\u27 moral inquiry and thereby render their topical views more dialectically robust

    The Press, Volume 7, Special Issue, February 26, 1971

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    The Press, Volume 7, Special Issue includes: Mrs. W. Mallory from Barrie, Ontario plans to petition in St. Catharines to show the people who do not want marijuana to be legalized; Stupidity in the Drug Laws: Canada’s current policy on marijuana is a “massive display of stupidity.”; Get a Fix on Reality: We must help drug users to help the greater society, and understand why young people are turning to hard drugs; Eriche Goode, Associate Professor of Sociology at the SUNY, explains that marijuana is a recreational drug, and does not lead to heroin use or psychological dependence in most cases; Timothy Leary writes a letter advocating drugs and condemning the system
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