93 research outputs found
Expressive Power of Hybrid Systems with Variables, Parameters and Arrays
AbstractA hybrid system consists of a finite number of locations, variables and transitions. Different classes are considered in the literature. In this paper we study the different expressive power of these classes
Equational Reasonings in Wireless Network Gossip Protocols
Gossip protocols have been proposed as a robust and efficient method for
disseminating information throughout large-scale networks. In this paper, we
propose a compositional analysis technique to study formal probabilistic models
of gossip protocols expressed in a simple probabilistic timed process calculus
for wireless sensor networks. We equip the calculus with a simulation theory to
compare probabilistic protocols that have similar behaviour up to a certain
tolerance. The theory is used to prove a number of algebraic laws which
revealed to be very effective to estimate the performances of gossip networks,
with and without communication collisions, and randomised gossip networks. Our
simulation theory is an asymmetric variant of the weak bisimulation metric that
maintains most of the properties of the original definition. However, our
asymmetric version is particularly suitable to reason on protocols in which the
systems under consideration are not approximately equivalent, as in the case of
gossip protocols
A Formal Approach to Cyber-Physical Attacks
We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to
reason about Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and cyber-physical attacks. We focus
on %a formal treatment of both integrity and DoS attacks to sensors and
actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of these attacks. Our
contributions are threefold: (1) we define a hybrid process calculus to model
both CPSs and cyber-physical attacks; (2) we define a threat model of
cyber-physical attacks and provide the means to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack; (3) we formalise how to
estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible
quantifications of the success chances of an attack. We illustrate definitions
and results by means of a non-trivial engineering application
A Semantic Theory of the Internet of Things (extended abstract)
We propose a process calculus for modelling and reasoning on systems in the Internet of Things paradigm. Our systems interact both with the physical environment, via sensors and actuators, and with smart devices, via short-range and Internet channels. The calculus is equipped with a standard notion of labelled bisimilarity which represents a fully abstract characterisation of a well-known contextual equivalence. We use our semantic proof-methods to prove run-time properties of a non-trivial case study as well as system equalities
On the decidability of linear bounded periodic cyber-physical systems
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of distributed computing systems with physical processes via a networking with actuators and sensors, where feedback loops among the components allow the physical processes to affect the computations and vice versa. Although CPSs can be found in several complex and sometimes critical real-world domains, their verification and validation often relies on simulation-test systems rather then automatic methodologies to formally verify safety requirements. In this work, we prove the decidability of the reachability problem for discrete-time linear CPSs whose physical process in isolation has a periodic behavior, up to an initial transitory phase
A process calculus approach to correctness enforcement of PLCs
We define a simple process calculus, based on Hennessy and Regan\u2019s Timed Process Language, for specifying networks of communicating programmable logic controllers (PLCs) enriched with monitors enforcing specifications compliance. We define a synthesis algorithm that given an uncorrupted PLC returns a monitor that enforces the correctness of the PLC, even when injected with malware that may forge/drop actuator commands and inter-controller communications. Then, we strengthen the capabilities of our monitors by allowing the insertion of actions to mitigate malware activities. This gives us deadlock-freedom monitoring: malware may not drag monitored controllers into deadlock states
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