Emotions and Precedent

The philosophy of emotion raises complications for theories of precedent. This chapter argues that it is productive to think of the effect of some precedents as facets of legal reasoning that are related to the use and understanding of legal concepts as thick concepts. In legal reasoning, precedents are routinely invoked to explicate, and/or clarify the content of legal concepts that are at issue in a case. This chapter develops an argument by Bernard Williams, i.e., that one must avoid the risk of over-generalizing the relationship of emotions to thick concepts, by placing it in the context of legal reasoning. It argues that the several distinctive ways that emotions might interact with thick legal concepts pose challenges for any general theoretical account of precedent in legal reasoning. A focus on these different roles that emotions can play in judicial uses of precedent illuminates some of the more subtle ways in which these uses reveal held values, ways of seeing, and political commitments. The chapter finds that in at least some cases where a precedent is invoked to thicken the understanding of a legal concept at issue in a case, variations in the emotional architecture associated with that invocation will come in direct tension with the legal concept under examination, or with other legal values and principles that pertain to equality, and equal treatment under law

Notes toward a supreme (legal) fiction

Maksymilian Del Mar’s new book, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication offers a finely drawn map of various ways of reasoning in and through law. The book is about the ways that thoughts, values, commitments and ways of seeing, move, take hold, settle, startle and – at times – release grip, reorient, and/or transmute. It is a book that is teeming with references. There are threads to pull at everywhere

Replaying the Past: Roles for Emotion in Judicial Invocations of Legislative History, and Precedent

Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind), which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation of a constitutional right

Introduction to the Edward Elgar Research Handbook on Law and Emotion

The role of emotion in law has long been shrouded in mystery. The legal system is built on assumptions about human behavior, including assumptions about emotion. Thus, unavoidably, understanding emotion is an essential part of building a fairer, more effective system. Yet the emergence and growth of Law and Emotion as a field of study has been slowed by the belief that merely by acknowledging emotion, scholars and jurists would undermine the rule of law. It has been further hampered by the suspicion that emotions are too ephemeral or subjective to be understood in any systematic way. For too long, the result has been a strange, unproductive stasis: a legal system buffeted by emotional influences it refuses to investigate—or even to name

Process account of curiosity and interest: a reward-learning perspective

Previous studies suggested roles for curiosity and interest in knowledge acquisition and exploration, but there has been a long-standing debate about how to define these concepts and whether they are related or different. In this paper, we address the definition issue by arguing that there is inherent difficulty in defining curiosity and interest, because both curiosity and interest are naïve concepts, which are not supposed to have a priori scientific definitions. We present a reward-learning framework of autonomous knowledge acquisition and use this framework to illustrate the importance of process account as an alternative to advance our understanding of curiosity and interest without being troubled by their definitions. The framework centers on the role of rewarding experience associated with knowledge acquisition and learning and posits that the acquisition of new knowledge strengthens the value of further information. Critically, we argue that curiosity and interest are the concepts that they subjectively construe through this knowledge-acquisition process. Finally, we discuss the implications of the reward-learning framework for education and empirical research in educational psychology

Safety and efficacy of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine (AZD1222) against SARS-CoV-2: an interim analysis of four randomised controlled trials in Brazil, South Africa, and the UK.

BACKGROUND: A safe and efficacious vaccine against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), if deployed with high coverage, could contribute to the control of the COVID-19 pandemic. We evaluated the safety and efficacy of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine in a pooled interim analysis of four trials. METHODS: This analysis includes data from four ongoing blinded, randomised, controlled trials done across the UK, Brazil, and South Africa. Participants aged 18 years and older were randomly assigned (1:1) to ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine or control (meningococcal group A, C, W, and Y conjugate vaccine or saline). Participants in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group received two doses containing 5 × 1010 viral particles (standard dose; SD/SD cohort); a subset in the UK trial received a half dose as their first dose (low dose) and a standard dose as their second dose (LD/SD cohort). The primary efficacy analysis included symptomatic COVID-19 in seronegative participants with a nucleic acid amplification test-positive swab more than 14 days after a second dose of vaccine. Participants were analysed according to treatment received, with data cutoff on Nov 4, 2020. Vaccine efficacy was calculated as 1 - relative risk derived from a robust Poisson regression model adjusted for age. Studies are registered at ISRCTN89951424 and ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT04324606, NCT04400838, and NCT04444674. FINDINGS: Between April 23 and Nov 4, 2020, 23 848 participants were enrolled and 11 636 participants (7548 in the UK, 4088 in Brazil) were included in the interim primary efficacy analysis. In participants who received two standard doses, vaccine efficacy was 62·1% (95% CI 41·0-75·7; 27 [0·6%] of 4440 in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group vs71 [1·6%] of 4455 in the control group) and in participants who received a low dose followed by a standard dose, efficacy was 90·0% (67·4-97·0; three [0·2%] of 1367 vs 30 [2·2%] of 1374; pinteraction=0·010). Overall vaccine efficacy across both groups was 70·4% (95·8% CI 54·8-80·6; 30 [0·5%] of 5807 vs 101 [1·7%] of 5829). From 21 days after the first dose, there were ten cases hospitalised for COVID-19, all in the control arm; two were classified as severe COVID-19, including one death. There were 74 341 person-months of safety follow-up (median 3·4 months, IQR 1·3-4·8): 175 severe adverse events occurred in 168 participants, 84 events in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group and 91 in the control group. Three events were classified as possibly related to a vaccine: one in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group, one in the control group, and one in a participant who remains masked to group allocation. INTERPRETATION: ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 has an acceptable safety profile and has been found to be efficacious against symptomatic COVID-19 in this interim analysis of ongoing clinical trials. FUNDING: UK Research and Innovation, National Institutes for Health Research (NIHR), Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Lemann Foundation, Rede D'Or, Brava and Telles Foundation, NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, Thames Valley and South Midland's NIHR Clinical Research Network, and AstraZeneca

Safety and efficacy of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine (AZD1222) against SARS-CoV-2: an interim analysis of four randomised controlled trials in Brazil, South Africa, and the UK

Background A safe and efficacious vaccine against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), if deployed with high coverage, could contribute to the control of the COVID-19 pandemic. We evaluated the safety and efficacy of the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine in a pooled interim analysis of four trials. Methods This analysis includes data from four ongoing blinded, randomised, controlled trials done across the UK, Brazil, and South Africa. Participants aged 18 years and older were randomly assigned (1:1) to ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine or control (meningococcal group A, C, W, and Y conjugate vaccine or saline). Participants in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group received two doses containing 5 × 1010 viral particles (standard dose; SD/SD cohort); a subset in the UK trial received a half dose as their first dose (low dose) and a standard dose as their second dose (LD/SD cohort). The primary efficacy analysis included symptomatic COVID-19 in seronegative participants with a nucleic acid amplification test-positive swab more than 14 days after a second dose of vaccine. Participants were analysed according to treatment received, with data cutoff on Nov 4, 2020. Vaccine efficacy was calculated as 1 - relative risk derived from a robust Poisson regression model adjusted for age. Studies are registered at ISRCTN89951424 and ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT04324606, NCT04400838, and NCT04444674. Findings Between April 23 and Nov 4, 2020, 23 848 participants were enrolled and 11 636 participants (7548 in the UK, 4088 in Brazil) were included in the interim primary efficacy analysis. In participants who received two standard doses, vaccine efficacy was 62·1% (95% CI 41·0–75·7; 27 [0·6%] of 4440 in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group vs71 [1·6%] of 4455 in the control group) and in participants who received a low dose followed by a standard dose, efficacy was 90·0% (67·4–97·0; three [0·2%] of 1367 vs 30 [2·2%] of 1374; pinteraction=0·010). Overall vaccine efficacy across both groups was 70·4% (95·8% CI 54·8–80·6; 30 [0·5%] of 5807 vs 101 [1·7%] of 5829). From 21 days after the first dose, there were ten cases hospitalised for COVID-19, all in the control arm; two were classified as severe COVID-19, including one death. There were 74 341 person-months of safety follow-up (median 3·4 months, IQR 1·3–4·8): 175 severe adverse events occurred in 168 participants, 84 events in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group and 91 in the control group. Three events were classified as possibly related to a vaccine: one in the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 group, one in the control group, and one in a participant who remains masked to group allocation. Interpretation ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 has an acceptable safety profile and has been found to be efficacious against symptomatic COVID-19 in this interim analysis of ongoing clinical trials

On Emotions and the Politics of Attention in Judicial Reasoning

Legal doctrine regularly requires judges to both understand and use emotions in different ways. This chapter explores the role of emotions in fixing and sustaining judicial attention on the impact of a law on the constitutional rights of an individual or group. That certain forms of wrong or harm, including forms of political and social exclusion, are difficult to detect in the absence of focused attention is, I think, what Elizabeth Bishop’s poem ‘Man-Moth’, excerpted here in epigraph, intends to express. This chapter explores the role of emotions in setting up the serious, sustained inquiry into the impact of a law on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of an individual or group that is required under various legal regimes. When named, this emotional aspect of legal reasoning is often relayed as a call for judicial empathy, but, as this chapter aims to show, this is neither a sufficient nor apt description of the emotionally-laden, political practice of fixing one’s attention on a subject. Drawing on the philosophy of emotion, we can sketch, for example, various ways in which judicial attempts to pay attention to the claimant might go awry such that they prove anathema to core legal values, or fail to comport with the professional demands on the practicing judge in the adjudication of a constitutional rights case. This chapter aims to bring this aspect of legal reasoning more clearly into focus by delineating a series of ill versions of judicial attention, and so too by recognising some persistent problems with the related concept of judicial empathy, which can be roughly defined as the attempt to enter either the mind or situation of the person before the court.Iris Murdoch called the process of imagining a ‘moral discipline of the mind’, an effort comparable to that ‘of “composing” and “holding” a difficult work of art in one’s attention’. The focus of this chapter is on precisely these kinds of efforts of attention that are involved in legal reasoning, and its principal task is to explore how emotions motivate and facilitate the kind of attention necessary to ascertain whether a legal commitment to a right has been violated. Emotions play an integral role in the form of attention that judges must, as a matter of law, pay to the claimant in a rights case. For, as the chapter concludes, certain forms of constitutional reasoning require from judges a certain politics of attention (meaning here the conscientious and effortful attempt to both pay attention and effectuate a principled distribution of attention) in which emotions play indispensable roles

Emotions and Precedent

The philosophy of emotion raises complications for theories of precedent. This chapter argues that it is productive to think of the effect of some precedents as facets of legal reasoning that are related to the use and understanding of legal concepts as thick concepts. In legal reasoning, precedents are routinely invoked to explicate, and/or clarify the content of legal concepts that are at issue in a case. This chapter develops an argument by Bernard Williams, i.e., that one must avoid the risk of over-generalizing the relationship of emotions to thick concepts, by placing it in the context of legal reasoning. It argues that the several distinctive ways that emotions might interact with thick legal concepts pose challenges for any general theoretical account of precedent in legal reasoning. A focus on these different roles that emotions can play in judicial uses of precedent illuminates some of the more subtle ways in which these uses reveal held values, ways of seeing, and political commitments. The chapter finds that in at least some cases where a precedent is invoked to thicken the understanding of a legal concept at issue in a case, variations in the emotional architecture associated with that invocation will come in direct tension with the legal concept under examination, or with other legal values and principles that pertain to equality, and equal treatment under law

Notes toward a supreme (legal) fiction

Maksymilian Del Mar’s new book, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication offers a finely drawn map of various ways of reasoning in and through law. The book is about the ways that thoughts, values, commitments and ways of seeing, move, take hold, settle, startle and – at times – release grip, reorient, and/or transmute. It is a book that is teeming with references. There are threads to pull at everywhere