56 research outputs found
Structured Encryption and Controlled Disclosure
We consider the problem of encrypting structured data (e.g., a web graph or a social network) in such a way that it can be efficiently and privately queried. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of structured encryption which generalizes previous work on symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) to the setting of arbitrarily-structured data. In the context of cloud storage, structured encryption allows a client to encrypt data without losing the ability to query and retrieve it efficiently. Another application, which we introduce in this work, is to the problem of controlled disclosure, where a data owner wishes to grant access to only part of a massive dataset.
We propose a model for structured encryption, a formal security definition and several efficient constructions. We present schemes for performing queries on two simple types of structured data, specifically lookup queries on matrix-structured data, and search queries on labeled data. We then show how these can be used to construct efficient schemes for encrypting graph data while allowing for efficient neighbor and adjacency queries.
Finally, we consider data that exhibits a more complex structure such as labeled graph data (e.g., web graphs). We show how to encrypt this type of data in order to perform focused subgraph queries, which are used in several web search algorithms. Our construction is based on our labeled data and basic graph encryption schemes and provides insight into how several simpler algorithms can be combined to generate an efficient scheme for more complex queries
Bayesian Leakage Analysis: A Framework for Analyzing Leakage in Encrypted Search
Sub-linear encrypted search algorithms (ESA) are highly efficient search algorithms that operate on end-to-end encrypted data. ESAs can be built using a variety of cryptographic primitives and can achieve different trade-offs between efficiency, expressiveness and leakage. Since the introduction of ESAs, cryptographers have focused on both minimizing and attacking their leakage but an important open problem in the field has been to provide a theoretical framework with which leakage can be analyzed and better understood.
In this work, we propose such a framework. We model leakage profiles as Bayesian networks and capture leakage attacks as statistical inference algorithms on these networks. We then formalize a notion we call coherence which, roughly speaking, captures the quality of the inference given some observed leakage and an auxiliary distribution. In this work, we focus on partial and full query recovery attacks, though our framework can be extended to capture data recovery attacks as well.
We then use our framework to study the coherence of two common leakage patterns---the query equality pattern and the volume pattern---against two well-known and powerful statistical inference techniques. In each case, we provide generic bounds on the coherence in the sense that they apply to arbitrary query and auxiliary distributions and concrete analyses for specific pairs of query and auxiliary distributions
Adversarial Level Agreements for Two-Party Protocols
Adversaries in cryptography have traditionally been modeled as either semi-honest or malicious. Over the years, however, several lines of work have investigated the design of cryptographic protocols against rational adversaries. The most well-known example are covert adversaries in secure computation (Aumann & Lindell, TCC \u2707) which are adversaries that wish to deviate from the protocol but without being detected. To protect against such adversaries, protocols secure in the covert model guarantee that deviations are detected with probability at least which is known as the deterrence factor.
In this work, we initiate the study of contracts in cryptographic protocol design. We show how to design, use and analyze contracts between parties for the purpose of incentivizing honest behavior from rational adversaries. We refer to such contracts as adversarial level agreements (ALA). The framework we propose can result in more efficient protocols and can enforce deterrence in covert protocols; meaning that one can guarantee that a given deterrence factor will deter the adversary instead of assuming it.
We show how to apply our framework to two-party protocols, including secure two-party computation (2PC) and proofs of storage (PoS). In the 2PC case, we integrate ALAs to publicly-verifiable covert protocols and show, through a game-theoretic analysis, how to set the parameters of the ALA to guarantee honest behavior. We do the same in the setting of PoS which are two-party protocols that allow a client to efficiently verify the integrity of a file stored in the cloud
Parallel and Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) enables a client to outsource a collection of encrypted documents in the cloud and retain the ability to perform keyword searches without revealing information about the contents of the documents and queries. Although efficient SSE constructions are known, previous solutions are highly sequential. This is mainly due to the fact that, currently, the only method for achieving sub-linear time search is the inverted index approach (Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky, CCS ’06) which requires the search algorithm to access a sequence of memory locations, each of which is unpredictable and stored at the previous location in the
sequence.
Motivated by advances in multi-core architectures, we present a new method for constructing sub-linear SSE schemes. Our approach is highly parallelizable and dynamic. With roughly a logarithmic number of cores in place, searches for a keyword w in our scheme execute in o(r) parallel time, where r is the number of documents containing keyword w (with more cores, this bound can go down to O(log n), i.e., independent of the result size r). Such time complexity outperforms the optimal \theta(r) sequential search time - a similar bound holds for the updates.
Our scheme also achieves the following important properties: (a) it enjoys a strong notion of security, namely security against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks; (b) compared to existing sub-linear dynamic SSE schemes (e.g., Kamara, Papamanthou, Roeder, CCS ’12), updates in our scheme do not leak any information, apart from information that can be inferred from previous search tokens; (c) it can be implemented efficiently in external memory (with logarithmic I/O overhead). Our technique is simple and uses a red-black tree data structure; its security is proven in the random oracle model
Encrypted Multi-Maps with Computationally-Secure Leakage
We initiate the study of structured encryption schemes with computationally-secure leakage. Specifically, we focus on the design of volume-hiding encrypted multi-maps; that is, of encrypted multi-maps that hide the response length to computationally-bounded adversaries. We describe the first volume-hiding STE schemes that do not rely on naive padding; that is, padding all tuples to the same length. Our first construction has efficient query complexity and storage but can be lossy. We show, however, that the information loss can be bounded with overwhelming probability for a large class of multi-maps (i.e., with lengths distributed according to a Zipf distribution). Our second construction is not lossy and can achieve storage overhead that is asymptotically better than naive padding for Zipf-distributed multi-maps. We also show how to further improve the storage when the multi-map is highly concentrated in the sense that it has a large number of tuples with a large intersection.
We achieve these results by leveraging computational assumptions. Not just for encryption but, more interestingly, to hide the volumes themselves. Our first construction achieves this using a pseudo-random function whereas our second construction achieves this by relying on the conjectured hardness of the planted densest subgraph problem which is a planted variant of the well-studied densest subgraph problem. This assumption was previously used to design public-key encryptions schemes (Applebaum et al., STOC \u2710) and to study the computational complexity of financial products (Arora et al., ICS \u2710)
Boolean Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Worst-Case Sub-Linear Complexity
Recent work on searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) has focused on increasing its expressiveness. A notable example is the OXT construction (Cash et al., CRYPTO \u2713 ) which is the first SSE scheme to support conjunctive keyword queries with sub-linear search complexity. While OXT efficiently supports disjunctive and boolean queries that can be expressed in searchable normal form, it can only handle arbitrary disjunctive and boolean queries in linear time. This motivates the problem of designing expressive SSE schemes with worst-case sub-linear search; that is, schemes that remain highly efficient for any keyword query.
In this work, we address this problem and propose non-interactive highly efficient SSE schemes that handle arbitrary disjunctive and boolean queries with worst-case sub-linear search and optimal communication complexity. Our main construction, called IEX, makes black-box use of an underlying single keyword SSE scheme which we can instantiate in various ways. Our first instantiation, IEX-2Lev, makes use of the recent 2Lev construction (Cash et al., NDSS \u2714 ) and is optimized for search at the expense of storage overhead. Our second instantiation, IEX-ZMF, relies on a new single keyword SSE scheme we introduce called ZMF and is optimized for storage overhead at the expense of efficiency (while still achieving asymptotically sub-linear search). Our ZMF construction is the first adaptively-secure highly compact SSE scheme and may be of independent interest. At a very high level, it can be viewed as an encrypted version of a new Bloom filter variant we refer to as a Matryoshka filter. In addition, we show how to extend IEX to be dynamic and forward-secure.
To evaluate the practicality of our schemes, we designed and implemented a new encrypted search framework called Clusion. Our experimental results demonstrate the practicality of IEX and of its instantiations with respect to either search (for IEX-2Lev) and storage overhead (for IEX-ZMF)
Encrypted Distributed Dictionaries
End-to-end encrypted databases have been heavily studied in the last two decades. A crucial aspect that previous work has neglected, however, is that real-world databases are distributed in the sense that data is partitioned among a cluster of nodes---as opposed to being stored on a single node. In this work, we initiate the study of encrypted distributed data structures which are end-to-end encrypted variants of distributed data structures; themselves fundamental to the design of distributed databases. In particular, we design and analyze encrypted variants of distributed dictionaries (EDDX), which are an important building block in distributed system design and have applications ranging from content delivery networks to off-chain storage networks for blockchains and smart contracts.
We formalize the notion of an encrypted DDX and provide simulation-based security definitions that capture the security properties one would desire from such an object. We propose an EDDX construction that uses a distributed hash table (DHT) as a black box. Interestingly, we show that our construction leaks information probabilistically, where the probability is a function of how well the underlying DHT load balances its data. We also show that in order to be securely used with our construction, a plaintext DHT needs to satisfy a form of programmability , a property that usually only emerges in the context of cryptographic primitives. To show that these properties are indeed achievable in practice, we study the balancing properties of the Chord DHT---arguably one of the most influential DHT---and show that it is also programmable. Finally, we consider the problem of encrypted DDXs in the context of transient networks, where nodes can be arbitrarily added or removed from the network
Injection-Secure Structured and Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Recent work on dynamic structured and searchable symmetric encryption has focused on achieving the notion of forward-privacy. This is mainly motivated by the claim that forward-privacy protects against adaptive file injection attacks (Zhang, Katz, Papamanthou, Usenix Security, 2016). In this work, we revisit the notion of forward-privacy in several respects. First, we observe that forward-privacy does not necessarily guarantee security against adaptive file injection attacks if a scheme reveals other leakage patterns like the query equality. We then propose a notion of security called correlation security which generalizes forward privacy. We then show how correlation security can be used to formally define security against different kinds of injection attacks. We then propose the first injection-secure multi-map encryption encryption scheme and use it as a building block to design the first injection-secure searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme; which solves one of the biggest open problems in the field. Towards achieving this, we also propose a new fully-dynamic volume-hiding multi-map encryption scheme which may be of independent interest
Breach-Resistant Structured Encryption
Motivated by the problem of data breaches, we formalize a notion of security for dynamic structured encryption (STE) schemes that guarantees security against a snapshot adversary; that is, an adversary that receives a copy of the encrypted structure at various times but does not see the transcripts related to any queries. In particular, we focus on the construction of dynamic encrypted multi-maps which are used to build efficient searchable symmetric encryption schemes, graph encryption schemes and encrypted relational databases. Interestingly, we show that a form of snapshot security we refer to as breach resistance implies previously-studied notions such as a (weaker version) of history independence and write-only obliviousness.
Moreover, we initiate the study of dual-secure dynamic STE constructions: schemes that are forward-private against a persistent adversary and breach-resistant against a snapshot adversary. The notion of forward privacy guarantees that updates to the encrypted structure do not reveal their association to any query made in the past. As a concrete instantiation, we propose a new dual-secure dynamic multi-map encryption scheme that outperforms all existing constructions; including schemes that are not dual-secure. Our construction has query complexity that grows with the selectivity of the query and the number of deletes since the client executed a linear-time rebuild protocol which can be de-amortized.
We implemented our scheme (with the de-amortized rebuild protocol) and evaluated its concrete efficiency empirically. Our experiments show that it is highly efficient with queries taking less than 1 microsecond per label/value pair
Revisiting Leakage Abuse Attacks
Encrypted search algorithms (ESA) are cryptographic algorithms that support search over encrypted data. ESAs can be designed with various primitives including searchable/structured symmetric encryption (SSE/STE) and oblivious RAM (ORAM). Leakage abuse attacks attempt to recover client queries using knowledge of the client’s data. An important parameter for any leakage-abuse attack is its known-data rate; that is, the fraction of client data that must be known to the adversary.
In this work, we revisit leakage abuse attacks in several ways. We first highlight some practical limitations and assumptions underlying the well-known IKK (Islam et al. NDSS ’12) and Count (Cash et al., CCS ’15) attacks. We then design four new leakage-abuse attacks that rely on much weaker assumptions. Three of these attacks are volumetric in the sense that they only exploit leakage related to document sizes. In particular, this means that they work not only on SSE/STE-based ESAs but also against ORAM-based solutions. We also introduce two volumetric injection attack which use adversarial file additions to recover queries even from ORAM-based solutions. As far as we know, these are the first attacks of their kind.
We evaluated all our attacks empirically and considered many experimental settings including different data collections, query selectivities, known-data rates, query space size and composition. From our experiments, we observed that the only setting that resulted in reasonable recovery rates under practical assumptions was the case of high-selectivity queries with a leakage profile that includes the response identity pattern (i.e., the identifiers of the matching documents) and the volume pattern (i.e., the size of the matching documents). All other attack scenarios either failed or relied on unrealistic assumptions (e.g., very high known-data rates). For this specific setting, we propose several suggestions and countermeasures including the use of schemes like PBS (Kamara et al, CRYPTO ’18), VLH/AVLH (Kamara and Moataz, Eurocrypt ’19 ), or the use of padding techniques like the ones recently proposed by Bost and Fouque (Bost and Fouque, IACR ePrint 2017/1060)
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