Concepts and Reference: Defending a Dual Theory of Natural Kind Concepts

In this thesis I argue that the psychological study of concepts and categorisation, and the philosophical study of reference are deeply intertwined. I propose that semantic intuitions are a variety of categorisation judgements, determined by concepts, and that because of this, concepts determine reference. I defend a dual theory of natural kind concepts, according to which natural kind concepts have distinct semantic cores and non-semantic identification procedures. Drawing on psychological essentialism, I suggest that the cores consist of externalistic placeholder essence beliefs. The identification procedures, in turn, consist of prototypes, sets of exemplars, or possibly also theory-structured beliefs. I argue that the dual theory is motivated both by experimental data and theoretical considerations. The thesis consists of three interrelated articles. Article I examines philosophical causal and description theories of natural kind term reference, and argues that they involve, or need to involve, certain psychological elements. I propose a unified theory of natural kind term reference, built on the psychology of concepts. Article II presents two semantic adaptations of psychological essentialism, one of which is a strict externalistic Kripkean-Putnamian theory, while the other is a hybrid account, according to which natural kind terms are ambiguous between internalistic and externalistic senses. We present two experiments, the results of which support the strict externalistic theory. Article III examines Fodor’s influential atomistic theory of concepts, according to which no psychological capacities associated with concepts constitute them, or are necessary for reference. I argue, contra Fodor, that the psychological mechanisms are necessary for reference

Mielen ja aineen välisestä kuilusta seuraa sittenkin jotain tärkeää

Pentti Määttänen (Tieteessä tapahtuu 3/2020, 65–69) tarttuu esittämääni väitteeseen, että ”[m]ieltä pidetään […] yleensä läpeensä subjektiivisena, yksityisenä ja mahdottomana havaita empiirisesti”. (Tieteessä tapahtuu 2/2020, 13–20.) Hän pitää tätä ”melkoisena yleistyksenä” ja esittää, että toisinkin on ajateltu. Tämä pitää paikkansa, ja alkuperäinen artikkelini olikin juuri tällaista toisinajattelua. Esitin nimenomaan, että subjektiivinen kokemus on konkreettinen fysikaalinen prosessi, joka voidaan periaatteessa havainnoida ja mallintaa tieteellisesti – tosin vain mallintaa, koska tieteellä ei ole pääsyä mallien ja havaintojen taakse. Määttänen myös väittää, että tekemäni vastakkainasettelu tieteen ja subjektiivisuuden välillä on ”keinotekoinen” ja jatkaa hyökkäämällä dualismia vastaan. Olen aivan samaa mieltä Määttäsen kanssa, että perinteinen substanssi- tai ominaisuusdualismi (väite, että mieli ja materia ovat täysin eri asioita) ei ole hyväksyttävä kanta. Episteemistä tai selityksellistä dualismia ei sen sijaan voi sivuuttaa olankohautuksella; se on yksi keskeisimpiä nykyajan mielenfilosofian ongelmia

Miten psykologia on mahdollista ja voiko tietoisuutta havaita?

Tietoisuutemme on meille yhtäältä tutuin asia maailmassa ja toisaalta suurin mysteeri. Yhtäältä tietoisuus on luonnonilmiö, josta subjektiivinen olemassaolomme koostuu, toisaalta se on luonnonilmiö, jonka luonne on vaikea ymmärtää tieteellisesti. Psykologia on tieteenala, joka koskee mieltä tai tietoisuutta, mutta miten mieltä voi tutkia tieteellisesti

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.</p

Does language switching behavior rely on general executive functions?

The assumption that everyday language switching trains bilinguals’ executive functions (EF) presupposes that language switching engages domain-general EF. This study examined associations between three types of tasks in a group of Finnish-English late bilinguals: everyday language switching frequency assessed with Ecological Momentary Assessment, language switching performance on a cued bilingual naming task, and EF as measured with Simon, Flanker, and Number-letter tasks. Cued switching performance showed mainly positive associations with EF performance, but the associations between everyday language switching and cued switching performance, and between everyday switching and the EF tasks were largely against our hypotheses. The findings indicate that participants with lower monitoring capacity make more everyday language switches. This speaks against the idea that everyday language switching would facilitate executive functioning. The results suggest that associations between language switching and general EF are more complex than current models assume.</p

Incidental disgust does not cause moral condemnation of neutral actions

Emotivism in moral psychology holds that making moral judgements is at least partly an affective process. Three emotivist hypotheses can be distinguished: the elicitation hypothesis (that moral transgressions elicit emotions); the amplification hypothesis (that disgust amplifies moral judgments); and the moralisation hypothesis (that affect moralises the non-moral). Even though the moralisation hypothesis is the strongest and most radical form of emotivism, it has not been systematically experimentally tested. Most previous studies have used as stimuli morally wrong actions, and thus they cannot answer whether disgust is sufficient to moralise an otherwise neutral action. In Experiment 1 (N = 87) we tested the effect of incidental disgust on morally neutral scenarios, and in Experiment 2 (N = 510) the differential effect of disgust on neutral and wrong scenarios. The results did not support either the moralisation or the amplification hypothesis. Instead, Bayesian analyses provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis that incidental disgust does not affect moral ratings. The results are in line with a recent meta-analysis suggesting that disgust has no effect on moral ratings.</p

Sociodemographic differences and experienced effects of young adults who use cannabis mainly for self-medication versus recreationally in Finland

Purpose Cannabis use continues to increase worldwide, and a number of nation states are changing their cannabis policies. Policy changes require research into key populations, namely, people who use cannabis. This study aims to examine sociodemographic differences of young Finns who reported using cannabis mainly for self-medication versus mainly recreationally, as well as their reported effects of cannabis use. Design/methodology/approach The data come from an anonymous online survey (N = 247, 70.0% males, 25.9% females, 4.1% other) that was analysed using multiple logistic regression. The authors focused on whether various demographic indicators differed between those who reportedly used cannabis mainly for recreational purposes and mainly for self-medicinal purposes. The authors also qualitatively examined the respondents’ experienced effects of cannabis, both desired and undesired. Findings Being older and female, living in a smaller city and earlier age of initiation of cannabis use were statistically significant in predicting the medicinal use of cannabis. The majority of recreational effects were related to themes such as relaxation and pleasure, but many participants also reported desired medical effects. Similarly, many participants reported several undesired effects. Research limitations/implications Understanding especially young people’s motivations to use cannabis, which include using it for various medical effects, can improve the design of harm reduction and treatment programmes as well as enhance the well-being of people who use cannabis. Originality/value This study gives a nuanced account of sociodemographic factors and motivations of young people who use cannabis in Finland as well as the reported effects it has on them, which complements data from national drug surveys.Peer reviewe

Beginning of the pandemic: COVID-19 elicited anxiety as a predictor of working memory performance

Increasing evidence indicates that the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is associated with adverse psychological effects, including heightened levels of anxiety. This study examined whether COVID-19-related anxiety levels during the early stage of the pandemic predicted demanding working memory (WM) updating performance. Altogether, 201 healthy adults (age range, 18-50) mostly from North America and the British Isles were recruited to this study via the crowdsourcing site www.prolific.co. The results showed that higher levels of COVID-19-related anxiety during the first weeks of the pandemic outbreak were associated with poorer WM performance as measured by the n-back paradigm. Critically, the unique role of COVID-19-related anxiety on WM could not be explained by demographic factors, or other psychological factors such as state and trait anxiety or fluid intelligence. Moreover, across three assessment points spanning 5-6 weeks, COVID-19-related anxiety levels tended to decrease over time. This pattern of results may reflect an initial psychological "shock wave" of the pandemic, the cognitive effects of which may linger for some time, albeit the initial anxiety associated with the pandemic would change with habituation and increasing information. Our results contribute to the understanding of cognitive-affective reactions to a major disaster.</p

Bilingualism and working memory performance: Evidence from a large-scale online study

The bilingual executive advantage (BEA) hypothesis has attracted considerable research interest, but the findings are inconclusive. We addressed this issue in the domain of working memory (WM), as more complex WM tasks have been underrepresented in the previous literature. First, we compared early and late bilingual vs. monolingual WM performance. Second, we examined whether certain aspects of bilingual experience, such as language switching frequency, are related to bilinguals' WM scores. Our online sample included 485 participants. They filled in an extensive questionnaire including background factors such as bilingualism and second language (L2) use, and performed 10 isomorphic verbal and visuospatial WM tasks that yielded three WM composite scores (visuospatial WM, verbal WM, n-back). For verbal and visuospatial WM composites, the group comparisons did not support the BEA hypothesis. N-back analysis showed an advantage of late bilinguals over monolinguals and early bilinguals, while the latter two groups did not differ. This between-groups analysis was followed by a regression analysis relating features of bilingual experience to n-back performance, but the results were non-significant in both bilingual groups. In sum, group differences supporting the BEA hypothesis were limited only to the n-back composite, and this composite was not predicted by bilingualism-related features. Moreover, Bayesian analyses did not give consistent support for the BEA hypothesis. Possible reasons for the failure to find support for the BEA hypothesis are discussed

The Pursuit of Effective Working Memory Training: a Pre-registered Randomised Controlled Trial with a Novel Varied Training Protocol

Working memory (WM) training, typically entailing repetitive practice with one or two tasks, has mostly yielded only limited task-specific transfer effects. We developed and tested a new WM training approach where the task paradigm, stimulus type, and predictability of the stimulus sequence were constantly altered during the 4-week training period. We expected that this varied training protocol would generate more extensive transfer by facilitating the use of more general strategies that could be applied to a range of WM tasks. Pre-post transfer effects following varied training (VT group, n = 60) were compared against traditional training (TT group, training a single adaptive WM task, n = 63), and active controls (AC, n = 65). As expected, TT evidenced strong task-specific near transfer as compared to AC. In turn, VT exhibited task-specific near transfer only on one of the measures, and only as compared to the TT group. Critically, no evidence for task-general near transfer or far transfer effects was observed. In sum, the present form of VT failed to demonstrate broader transfer. Nevertheless, as VT has met with success in other cognitive domains, future studies should probe if and how it would be possible to design WM training protocols that promote structural learning where common features of specific tasks would be identified and utilised when selecting strategies for novel memory tasks. </p