Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to ?rst best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We ?nd that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.

Improving consumer mobility in the mobile voice services market: a comprehensive set of remedies

Switching costs increase the rigidity of consumers demand and lessen competition between firms, effects that are particularly relevant in the mobile voice services market. This paper characterizes the most important mobility restrictive factors for consumers in this market, presenting specific examples and discussing their impact on competition. In addition, a survey was conducted to obtain data on consumption decisions by mobile voice customers in Portugal. The survey results suggest that switching costs represent more than 13 euros or 57% of the average monthly expenditure with these services. The disclosure of a new mobile phone number is the most difficult task in the switching process. Customers also showed high concern with respect to the possibility of losing quality of service. Compatibility costs also impose high restrictions to customer mobility. Following the identification of these restrictive factors, the adoption by policy makers of remedies to address the different search and switching costs is discussed and their implementation prioritized according to mobile customers' needs. --Switching costs,search costs,remedies

The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges ?rms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay ?rst investment. While ?rst-best investment cannot be achieved with a ?xed access tari¤, simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve e¢ ciency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We find that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.N/

Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to first best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.N/

Investment, dynamic consistency and the sectoral regulator's obective

We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns a wholesaler and a retailer. The entrant owns a retailer. Either retailer needs access to the input produced by the wholesaler to operate. The incumbent can make an investment that improves the quality of the input produced by the wholesaler. The regulator sets the access price and is unable to commit. The legislator sets the regulator's objective function and is able to commit. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator's objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment. --Investment,Dynamic Consistency,Regulator's Objective

Can Vertical Separation Reduce Non-Price Discrimination and Increase Welfare?

We investigate if vertical separation reduces non-price discrimination and increases welfare. Consider an industry consisting of a vertically integrated firm and an independent retailer, which requires access to the vertically integrated firm's wholesaler services. The wholesaler can degrade the quality of input it supplies to either of the retailers. Discrimination occurs if one of the retailers is supplied an input of lower quality than its rival. We show that separation of the vertically integrated firm reduces discrimination against the independent retailer, although it does not guarantee no-discrimination. Furthermore, with separation, the wholesaler may discriminate against the vertically integrated firm's retailer. Vertical separation impacts social welfare through two e¤ects. First, through the double-marginalization effect, which is negative. Second, through the quality degradation effect, which can be positive or negative. Hence, the net welfare impact of vertical separation is negative or potentially ambiguous.Vertigal integration; Vertical separation; Non-price discrimination.

The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment. While first-best investment cannot be achieved with a fixed access tariff, simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve efficiency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.N/

21st European Regional ITS Conference

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Switching costs increase the rigidity of consumers demand and lessen competition between firms, effects that are particularly relevant in the mobile voice services market. This paper characterizes the most important mobility restrictive factors for consumers in this market, presenting specific examples and discussing their impact on competition. In addition, a survey was conducted to obtain data on consumption decisions by mobile voice customers in Portugal. The survey results suggest that switching costs represent more than 13 euros or 57% of the average monthly expenditure with these services. The disclosure of a new mobile phone number is the most difficult task in the switching process. Customers also showed high concern with respect to the possibility of losing quality of service. Compatibility costs also impose high restrictions to customer mobility. Following the identification of these restrictive factors, the adoption by policy makers of remedies to address the different search and switching costs is discussed and their implementation prioritized according to mobile customers' needs. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JEL codes: D18, L51, L9