Tacit Collusion in the Presence of Cyclical Demand and Endogenous Capacity Levels

We analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long-run scale decisions; …rms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices. Our focus is on the nature of prices. We …nd that two types of price wars may exist. In one, collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars. In the other, consistent with the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) de…nition of price wars, we show that collusive prices can also become countercyclical. We also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions. If the marginal cost of capacity is high enough, holding current demand constant, prices in the boom will be generally lower than the prices in the recession; this reverses the results of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). In contrast, if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough, then prices in the boom will be generally higher than the prices in the recession. For costs in an intermediate range, numerical examples are calculated to show specifc pricing patterns.industrial

Tacit Collusion in the Presence of Cyclical Demand and Endogenous Capacity Levels

We analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long-run scale decisions; firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices. Our focus is on the nature of prices. We find that two types of price wars may exist. In one, collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars. In the other, consistent with the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) definition of price wars, we show that collusive prices can also become countercyclical. We also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions. If the marginal cost of capacity is high enough, holding current demand constant, prices in the boom will be generally lower than the prices in the recession; this reverses the results of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). In contrast, if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough, then prices in the boom will be generally higher than the prices in the recession. For costs in an intermediate range, numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns.

Oligopoly Intermediation, Relative Rivalry, and the Mode of Competition

Policy design in oligopolistic settings depends critically on the mode of competition between firms. We develop a model of oligopoly intermediation that reveals the mode of competition to be an equilibrium outcome that depends on the relative degree of rivalry between firms in the upstream and downstream markets. We examine two forms of sequential pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The equilibrium outcomes of the model range between Bertrand and Cournot depending on the relative degree of rivarly between firms in the upstream and downstream markets. Prices are strategic complements and the equilibrium prices coincide with the Bertrand outcome when the markets are equally rivalrous, while prices are strategic substitutes when the degree of rivalry is sufficiently high in one market relative to the other. Cournot outcomes emerge under circumstances in which prices are strategically independent in either the upstream or downstream market. We derive testable implications for the mode of competition that depend only on primitive conditions of supply and demand functions

Oligopoly Intermediation, Relative Rivalry, and the Mode of Competition

Policy design in oligopolistic settings depends critically on the mode of competition between firms. We develop a model of oligopoly intermediation that reveals the mode of competition to be an equilibrium outcome that depends on the relative degree of rivalry between firms in the upstream and downstream markets. We examine two forms of sequential pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The equilibrium outcomes of the model range between Bertrand and Cournot depending on the relative degree of rivarly between firms in the upstream and downstream markets. Prices are strategic complements and the equilibrium prices coincide with the Bertrand outcome when the markets are equally rivalrous, while prices are strategic substitutes when the degree of rivalry is sufficiently high in one market relative to the other. Cournot outcomes emerge under circumstances in which prices are strategically independent in either the upstream or downstream market. We derive testable implications for the mode of competition that depend only on primitive conditions of supply and demand functions

Fully Enclosed Microfluidic Paper-Based Analytical Devices

This article introduces fully enclosed microfluidic paper-based analytical devices (microPADs) fabricated by printing toner on the top and bottom of the devices using a laser printer. Enclosing paper-based microfluidic channels protects the channels from contamination, contains and protects reagents stored on the device, contains fluids within the channels so that microPADs can be handled and operated more easily, and reduces evaporation of solutions from the channels. These benefits extend the capabilities of microPADs for applications as low-cost point-of-care diagnostic devices

Correction to Fully Enclosed Microfluidic Paper-Based Analytical Devices

There is an error in the units of the concentrations of potassium iodide and trehalose described in the experimental details on page 1581. The correct concentrations are 0.6 M potassium iodide and 0.3 M trehalose

Standards for Analysis of Ce, La, Pb, Rb, Se, Sr, Y, AND Zr in Rock Samples Using Laser-induced Breakdown Spectroscopy and X-ray Fluorescence

Analytical geochemistry has long depended on the availability of robust suites of rock standards with well-characterized compositions. Standard rock powders for wet chemistry and x-ray fluorescence were initially characterized and supplied to the community by the U.S. Geological Survey, which continues to distribute a few dozen standards. Many other rock standards have subsequently been developed by organizations such as the Centre de Recherches Ptrographiques et Gochimiques (CRPG) and Brammer Standard Company, Inc

Identification of Cellular Infiltrates during Early Stages of Brain Inflammation with Magnetic Resonance Microscopy

A comprehensive view of brain inflammation during the pathogenesis of autoimmune encephalomyelitis can be achieved with the aid of high resolution non-invasive imaging techniques such as microscopic magnetic resonance imaging (μMRI). In this study we demonstrate the benefits of cryogenically-cooled RF coils to produce μMRI in vivo, with sufficient detail to reveal brain pathology in the experimental autoimmune encephalomyelitis (EAE) model. We could visualize inflammatory infiltrates in detail within various regions of the brain, already at an early phase of EAE. Importantly, this pathology could be seen clearly even without the use of contrast agents, and showed excellent correspondence with conventional histology. The cryogenically-cooled coil enabled the acquisition of high resolution images within short scan times: an important practical consideration in conducting animal experiments. The detail of the cellular infiltrates visualized by in vivo μMRI allows the opportunity to follow neuroinflammatory processes even during the early stages of disease progression. Thus μMRI will not only complement conventional histological examination but will also enable longitudinal studies on the kinetics and dynamics of immune cell infiltration

Cell-Surface Marker Signatures for the Isolation of Neural Stem Cells, Glia and Neurons Derived from Human Pluripotent Stem Cells

Neural induction of human pluripotent stem cells often yields heterogeneous cell populations that can hamper quantitative and comparative analyses. There is a need for improved differentiation and enrichment procedures that generate highly pure populations of neural stem cells (NSC), glia and neurons. One way to address this problem is to identify cell-surface signatures that enable the isolation of these cell types from heterogeneous cell populations by fluorescence activated cell sorting (FACS).We performed an unbiased FACS- and image-based immunophenotyping analysis using 190 antibodies to cell surface markers on naïve human embryonic stem cells (hESC) and cell derivatives from neural differentiation cultures. From this analysis we identified prospective cell surface signatures for the isolation of NSC, glia and neurons. We isolated a population of NSC that was CD184(+)/CD271(-)/CD44(-)/CD24(+) from neural induction cultures of hESC and human induced pluripotent stem cells (hiPSC). Sorted NSC could be propagated for many passages and could differentiate to mixed cultures of neurons and glia in vitro and in vivo. A population of neurons that was CD184(-)/CD44(-)/CD15(LOW)/CD24(+) and a population of glia that was CD184(+)/CD44(+) were subsequently purified from cultures of differentiating NSC. Purified neurons were viable, expressed mature and subtype-specific neuronal markers, and could fire action potentials. Purified glia were mitotic and could mature to GFAP-expressing astrocytes in vitro and in vivo.These findings illustrate the utility of immunophenotyping screens for the identification of cell surface signatures of neural cells derived from human pluripotent stem cells. These signatures can be used for isolating highly pure populations of viable NSC, glia and neurons by FACS. The methods described here will enable downstream studies that require consistent and defined neural cell populations

Performance Measurement in Military Operations: Information versus Incentives

We explore the impact of success measurement on military organizations. In particular, we develop a model to understand how imperfect measures of success may have deleterious externalities by creating unintended incentive structures for an agent. We show that the informational properties of the measurements are based on how the measure di¤ers from operational success while the incentive properties of the measurement are based on di¤er- ences in the marginal sensitivity of both the measure and operational success. Further, we show that undervaluing incentive properties of measurement will lead to systematic posi- tive bias of information. We use the examples of the Second World War and the Vietnam War to illustrate variation in the di¢ culty of measurement from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our analysis to the current con ict in Afghanistan. Blanken