The All Affected Principle, and the Weighting of Votes

In this article we defend the view that, on the All Affected Principle of voting rights, the weight of a person’s vote on a decision should be determined by and only by the degree to which that decision affects her interests, independently of her voting weights on other decisions. Further, we consider two recent alternative proposals for how the All Affected Principle should weight votes, and give reasons for rejecting both

Effect of Levamisole on the Incidence of Spontaneous Mammary Tumors in C3H Mice

Spontaneous mammary carcinoma in C3H mice is preceded by premalignant hyperplastic alveolar nodules. When a primary tumor is evident, examination of the other mammae will reveal a number of microscopic precancerous lesions in various stages of transformation to overt malignant tumors. In an effort to inhibit the development of additional malignant tumors after surgical removal of the first apparent tumor, we treated female C3H/HeJ mice with subcutaneous injections of levamisole (0.6 mg per kg of body weight) on a twice weekly regimen. All further tumors were surgically excised when they became palpable. The surgical excision of bulk tumor burden, immunorestoration by levamisole, and the presence in the tumor cells of immunogenic surface antigens related to the virus all might be expected to enhance immunodulation of tumor cell growth or immunorejection of tumor cells. Immune activity measured by assaying macrophage migration inhibition factor, extractable from splenocytes, was significantly greater in the levamisole-treated mice than in the controls throughout the experiment. Although fewer tumors developed in the treated animals during the first eight weeks, this apparent effect of immunopertubation was only transitory. By the end of 14 weeks, there was no longer a statistically significant difference in cumulative tumor index between the two groups

Gut inflammation provides a respiratory electron acceptor for Salmonella.

Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S. Typhimurium) causes acute gut inflammation by using its virulence factors to invade the intestinal epithelium and survive in mucosal macrophages. The inflammatory response enhances the transmission success of S. Typhimurium by promoting its outgrowth in the gut lumen through unknown mechanisms. Here we show that reactive oxygen species generated during inflammation react with endogenous, luminal sulphur compounds (thiosulphate) to form a new respiratory electron acceptor, tetrathionate. The genes conferring the ability to use tetrathionate as an electron acceptor produce a growth advantage for S. Typhimurium over the competing microbiota in the lumen of the inflamed gut. We conclude that S. Typhimurium virulence factors induce host-driven production of a new electron acceptor that allows the pathogen to use respiration to compete with fermenting gut microbes. Thus the ability to trigger intestinal inflammation is crucial for the biology of this diarrhoeal pathogen

Should We Relinquish or Distribute the Benefits of Injustice?

In what follows, I will raise some critical questions pertaining to the beneficiary-oriented version of the BP. I start in the next section by distinguishing between different renderings of the principle. In section 3 and 4, I critically assess two such renderings (that I take to be representative). The last section concludes

John Rawls : A Critical Examination of the Relationship between Political Liberalism and the Law of Peoples

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the domestic (Political Liberalism) and the international (Law of Peoples) theories of John Rawls, paying special attention to the concepts of tolerance and human rights. In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that we are to tolerate persons, and groups of persons, within a liberal society as long as they adhere to comprehensive doctrines that affirm democratic essentials. In The Law of Peoples, however, he claims that we should tolerate a certain kind of illiberal states, labeled decent hierarchical societies, granted they meet certain conditions. Most notably, they observe what Rawls refers to as universal human rights. Drawing on some of Rawls's critics (Pogge, Tan, Tesón), I attempt to show that there are important differences between tolerating an illiberal doctrine within the borders of a liberal state, and tolerating illiberal states as such, and that Rawls is incorrect in viewing the two cases as analogous (at least with regard to tolerance). Tolerating the kind of illiberal states defined in The Law of Peoples will put unreasonable burdens on the shoulders of dissenters in these societies. As it turns out, Rawls's universal human rights are not very extensive. Most strikingly, the freedom of speech is lacking from his list. This raises the question of how we are to conceive the moral significance of human beings if we legitimate the hardships invoked on persons that oppose the dominating doctrine within decent hierarchical societies. On this background, I challenge the moral conception of the person that Rawls applies, and present a wider such conception, claiming that all individuals ought to be secured a richer list of human rights, containing minimally the freedom of speech. Further, I argue that Rawls's answer to how we are to understand individual freedom and equality seems to imply that liberal and decent hierarchical societies are equal, in moral terms, and that no case is made for liberalism. This argument, if successful, implies at least two things: a) the argument can be seen as part of a broader attack against cultural relativism in the human rights debate, and, more specifically, b) the argument will challenge the credibility of Rawls's conclusions. To put it another way: If my argument is sound, I see no way that Rawls's position lies within the confines of liberal tolerance. My conclusion is that the notion of tolerance that Rawls relies on is self-defeating in that it allows for a limitation of human rights on the part of members of hierarchical societies (most notably its dissenters) that seems unacceptable, at least to committed liberals. Tolerance as interpreted by Rawls, seems to rest on a moral conception of the person that implies that individuals are not free and equal in a wide, liberal sense. The extent of their freedom parallels (at best) the limited notion of universal human rights. Freedom and equality in Political Liberalism is seen as contingent on a preexisting fact of democracy. Members of other societies are not free and equal because their society is not democratic. Therefore, Rawls's liberal contractual argument seems to have a restricted scope. Due to this, it seems that the theory is more likely to legitimate regression in liberal societies, than improvement in hierarchical ones. This being said, I have no problems seeing that Rawls has a major point when he stresses the importance of understanding among peoples. The problem is that mutual understanding and respect, on his view, implies tolerating decent hierarchical societies in which human beings are deprived of rights that we ourselves value. The question is whether or not Rawls's goal overrides a liberal aim of achieving freedom and equality for all

The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Luck Egalitarianism

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Huseby, R. (2016), The Beneficiary Pays Principle and Luck Egalitarianism. Journal of social philosophy, 47: 332–349, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12154. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact that Some are Worse Off than Others?

According to luck egalitarianism it is bad or unjust if someone is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. This article argues that there is a tension in standard luck egalitarian theory between justifying absolute and comparative welfare levels. If a person responsibly acts in a way that brings her welfare level below that of others, this is justified according to the theory. However, even if we can say that the person's new welfare level is justified in absolute terms, it is less clear that her now being worse off than others, is justified (a similar idea is explored by Susan Hurley). The reason is that while she has in one sense chosen her (new) welfare level, she has not chosen to be worse off than others. Her relative standing, something with which egalitarians ought to be concerned, is determined by her choices in conjunction with the choices of all others. But no individual controls the choices of all others. Hence, for any one individual it is the case that her relative standing is beyond her control. Some responses to this problem are available. It is doubtful, however, that these are entirely successful. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Huseby, R. (2016), Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact that Some are Worse Off than Others?. J Appl Philos, 33: 259–269, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12122. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

Sufficiency and the Threshold Question

In this paper I address the objection to sufficientarianism posed by Paula Casal and Richard Arneson, that it is hard to conceive of a sufficiency threshold such that distribution is highly important just below it, and not required at all just above it. In order to address this objection, I elaborate on the idea that sufficientarianism structurally can be seen to require two separate thresholds, which may or may not overlap. I then argue that a version of such a view is plausible. Lastly, I distinguish this view from related proposals in the literature