Evolutionary games in the multiverse

Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may in fact take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here, we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions do no longer hold. For two player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players $\boldsymbol{d}$ with any number of strategies n, there can be at most (d-1)^(n-1) isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied for specific cases, e.g. public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts

Reward and Punishment in Minigames

Minigames capturing the essence of Public Goods experiments show that even in the absence of rationality assumptions, both punishment and reward will fail to bring about prosocial behavior. This holds in particular for the well-known Ultimatum Game, which emerges as a special case. But reputation can induce fairness and cooperation in populations adapting through learning or imitation. Indeed, the inclusion of reputation effects in the corresponding dynamical models leads to the evolution of economically productive behavior, with agents contributing to the public good and either punishing those who don't, or rewarding those who do. Reward and punishment correspond to two types of bifurcation with intriguing complementarity. The analysis suggests that reputation is essential for fostering social behavior among selfish agents, and that it is considerably more effective with punishment than with rewards

The Dynamics of Public Goods

We analyze the replicator equation for two games closely related with the social dilemma occurring in public goods situation. In one case, players can punish defectors in their group. In another case, they can choose not to take part in the game. In both cases, interactions are not pairwise and payoffs are nonlinear. Nevertheless, the qualitative dynamics can be fully analyzed. The games offer potential solutions for the problem of the emergence of cooperation in sizeable groups of non-related individuals - a basic question in evolutionary biology and economics

Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By ‘‘qualitatively valid’’ we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies n. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for n§8, which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection

Carrier relaxation in GaAs v-groove quantum wires and the effects of localization

Carrier relaxation processes have been investigated in GaAs/AlGaAs v-groove quantum wires (QWRs) with a large subband separation (46 meV). Signatures of inhibited carrier relaxation mechanisms are seen in temperature-dependent photoluminescence (PL) and photoluminescence-excitation (PLE) measurements; we observe strong emission from the first excited state of the QWR below ~50 K. This is attributed to reduced inter-subband relaxation via phonon scattering between localized states. Theoretical calculations and experimental results indicate that the pinch-off regions, which provide additional two-dimensional confinement for the QWR structure, have a blocking effect on relaxation mechanisms for certain structures within the v-groove. Time-resolved PL measurements show that efficient carrier relaxation from excited QWR states into the ground state, occurs only at temperatures > 30 K. Values for the low temperature radiative lifetimes of the ground- and first excited-state excitons have been obtained (340 ps and 160 ps respectively), and their corresponding localization lengths along the wire estimated.Comment: 9 pages, 8 figures, submitted to Phys. Rev. B Attempted to correct corrupt figure

Les arènes de la normalisation internationale à l'épreuve de la participation de la société civile : résultats du projet INTERNORM

Les normes internationales occupent une place de plus en plus importante dans la gouvernance des marchés et ont souvent une incidence directe sur la santé, la sécurité et l'environnement. Mais la société civile est le plus souvent absente des procédures de normalisation. Il est recommandé de favoriser la participation des acteurs de la société civile dans la normalisation par une mise en forme des travaux de normalisation à même d'encourager leur mobilisation selon les thèmes et enjeux abordés et par l'organisation de l'expertise plurielle requise pour une participation effective à même de leur conférer une certaine influence

Laser Repair of Superalloy Single Crystals with Varying Substrate Orientations

The casting and repair of single-crystal gas turbine blades require specific solidification conditions that prevent the formation of new grains, equiaxed or columnar, ahead of the epitaxial columnar dendrites. These conditions are best determined by microstructure modeling. Present day analytical models of the columnar-to-equiaxed transition (CET) relate the microstructure to local solidification conditions (temperature gradient and interface velocity) without taking into account the effects of (1) a preferred growth direction of the columnar dendrites and (2) a growth competition between columnar grains of different orientations. In this article, the infiuence of these effects on the grain structure of nickel-base superalloy single crystals, which have been resolidified after laser treatment or directionally cast, is determined by experiment and by analytical and numerical modeling. It is shown that two effects arise for the case of a nonzero angle between the local heat flux direction and the preferred dendrite growth axis: (1) the regime of equiaxed growth is extended and (2) a loss of the crystal orientation of the substrate often occurs by growth competition of columnar grains leading to an "oriented-to-misoriented transition” (OMT). The results are essential for the definition of the single-crystal processing window and are important for the service life extension of expensive components in land-based or aircraft gas turbine