An Economic Theory of Self-Control

Although many economists, most notably Strotz, have discussed dynamic inconsistency and precommitment, none have dealt directly with the essence of the problem: self-control. This paper attempts to fill that gap by modeling man as an organization. The Strotz model is recast to include the control features missing in his formulation. The organizational analogy permits us to draw on the theory of agency. We thus relate the individual's control problems with those that exist in agency relationships.

Signal processing with Levy information

Levy processes, which have stationary independent increments, are ideal for modelling the various types of noise that can arise in communication channels. If a Levy process admits exponential moments, then there exists a parametric family of measure changes called Esscher transformations. If the parameter is replaced with an independent random variable, the true value of which represents a "message", then under the transformed measure the original Levy process takes on the character of an "information process". In this paper we develop a theory of such Levy information processes. The underlying Levy process, which we call the fiducial process, represents the "noise type". Each such noise type is capable of carrying a message of a certain specification. A number of examples are worked out in detail, including information processes of the Brownian, Poisson, gamma, variance gamma, negative binomial, inverse Gaussian, and normal inverse Gaussian type. Although in general there is no additive decomposition of information into signal and noise, one is led nevertheless for each noise type to a well-defined scheme for signal detection and enhancement relevant to a variety of practical situations.Comment: 27 pages. Version to appear in: Proc. R. Soc. London

Belief heterogeneity and survival in incomplete markets

In complete markets economies (Sandroni [16]), or in economies with Pareto optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [10]), the market selection hypothesis holds, as long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders who survive must have beliefs that merge with the truth. We show that in incomplete markets, regardless of traders’ discount factors, the market selects for a range of beliefs, at least some of which do not merge with the truth. We also show that impatient traders with incorrect beliefs can survive and that these incorrect beliefs impact prices. These beliefs may be chosen so that they are far from the truth

Why have asset price properties changed so little in 200 years

We first review empirical evidence that asset prices have had episodes of large fluctuations and been inefficient for at least 200 years. We briefly review recent theoretical results as well as the neurological basis of trend following and finally argue that these asset price properties can be attributed to two fundamental mechanisms that have not changed for many centuries: an innate preference for trend following and the collective tendency to exploit as much as possible detectable price arbitrage, which leads to destabilizing feedback loops.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figure

Analogy making and the structure of implied volatility skew

An analogy based option pricing model is put forward. If option prices are determined in accordance with the analogy model, and the Black Scholes model is used to back-out implied volatility, then the implied volatility skew arises, which flattens as time to expiry increases. The analogy based stochastic volatility and the analogy based jump diffusion models are also put forward. The analogy based stochastic volatility model generates the skew even when there is no correlation between the stock price and volatility processes, whereas, the analogy based jump diffusion model does not require asymmetric jumps for generating the skew

Noise trading and the management of operational risk; firms, traders and irrationality in financial markets

Efficient market models cannot explain the high level of trading in financial markets in terms of asset portfolio adjustment. It is presumed that much of this excessive trading is irrational 'noise' trading. A corollary is that there must either be irrational traders in the market or rational traders with irrational aberrations. The paper reviews the various attempts to explain noise trading in the finance literature concluding that the persistence of irrationality is not well explained. Data from a study of 118 traders in four large investment banks are presented to advance reasons why traders might seek to trade more frequently than financial models predict. The argument is advanced that trades do not simply occur in order to generate profit, but it does not follow that such trading is irrational. Trading may generate information, accelerate learning, create commitments and enhance social capital, all of which sustain traders' long term survival in the market. The paper treats noise trading as a form of operational risk facing firms operating in financial markets and discusses approaches to the management of such risk