Activists, Parties, and the Expansion of Trans Rights in Bolivia

Bolivia prohibits discrimination based on gender identity and passed a ground-breaking gender identity law. These laws had little support among voters and passed along with heteronormative measures. Why did activists succeed in proposing and passing legislation that most voters did not support? Why were Bolivia’s advances in LGBTQ+ rights accompanied by heteronormative laws? We argue that parties with deep ties to social movements are more likely to advance legislation that expands LGBTQ+ rights than other parties and that contradictory laws emerge where both organized religion and LGBTQ+ activists are party constituents. We describe how Bolivian trans activists leveraged their access to ruling party legislators, using interviews with activists and officials, and briefly discuss the cases of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Colombia

Compounding Crises: Bolivia in 2020

Bolivia began 2020 in the midst of a political crisis, with an interim administration led by Jeanine Añez, who assumed power during the political crisis that ended the administration of Evo Morales in November 2019. On March 10th, the government identified Bolivia's first COVID-19 case. The administration's swift initial response was marred by corruption, a strained public health system, and resistance from citizens and politicians. This essay focuses on the unprecedented character of a double crisis in Bolivia: a health crisis preceded and aggravated by a political crisis. The crises put the Bolivian government under intense pressure. The thrice-rescheduled presidential elections on October 18th returned the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) to power with a decisive victory under the leadership of former finance minister Luis Arce Catacora and former foreign minister David Choquehuanca. We review the consequences of the year's events on human and economic development and conclude by anticipating future challenges

Legitimacy and Policy during Crises: Subnational COVID-19 Responses in Bolivia

Why did some Bolivian departments have more success containing COVID-19 than others? We argue that low government legitimacy hampers coordinated responses to national crises, particularly where political polarization is severe and the crisis response becomes politicized. Low legitimacy can intensify the challenges of poverty and poor infrastructure. An original dataset of daily observations on subnational coronavirus policy and cell phone mobility data, paired with administrative data on cases and deaths, suggests that political divisions influenced governors’ policy implementation and citizens’ compliance. In departments that opposed the president, policies were more likely to deviate from the stricter national policy while mobility and protest activity were high. In departments aligned with the president, local policy followed national policy and citizens complied with policy and quarantine restrictions for a longer period of time

Poverty, precarious work, and the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons from Bolivia

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America with a gross domestic product of around US$3500 per capita, health spending of approximately$220 per capita, a labour market dominated by informal work, and a weak health system. However, in the response to COVID-19, Bolivia has fared better than other health systems in the region and provides insight with regard to the implementation of subnational non-pharmaceutical interventions and supporting workers without social protection. The Bolivian Government confirmed the first case of COVID-19 in the country on March 10, 2020, and responded quickly by cancelling events, closing schools and borders, and implementing a national lockdown on March 22, 2020. However, the Bolivian Government was under pressure to open the economy in an election season. In response, the Bolivian Government shifted responsibility for most non-pharmaceutical interventions to departmental and municipal governments on June 1, 2020. The Bolivian Government maintained a mask mandate, school and border closures, and a nightly curfew, while allowing departmental and municipal governments to set workplace, social gathering, population mobility, and public transit policies. Daily deaths from COVID-19 increased markedly from 20 on June 1, 2020, to 96 on Aug 1, 2020.1 &nbsp;</p

How Can We Explain Regime Type Differences If Citizens Don't Vote Based on Foreign Economic Policy?

Political economy research shows that more democratic governments generally have more open trade policies with more flexible exchange rate regimes, yet political behavior theory argues that citizens do not think of foreign economic policy as salient and do not cast their votes considering such issues. This note investigates the puzzle about how democracies could have different foreign economic policies than autocracies if citizens do not vote based on these international issues. Using a political model with two possible ways for societal actors to influence state policy (electoral and/or special interest pressure), it first considers how voting based on salient domestic outcomes like inflation and unemployment may lead democratic governments towards more open trade and flexible exchange rates. Second, if more societal groups are able to lobby as special interests in more democratic regimes, then governments may also be pushed toward these same foreign economic policies. Thus, there is no fundamental contradiction between the political economy empirical results and the political behavior theory, although scholars need to adjust their theories to explain foreign economic policy differences across political regime type

Latin America Erupts: When Does Competitive Authoritarianism Take Root?

Democratically elected as Bolivia’s first indigenous president in 2005, Evo Morales eroded democracy and began a transition to competitive authoritarianism in the 2010s. By November 2020, however, both Morales and his successor, the right-wing president Jeanine Áñez, had fallen after failing to consolidate authoritarian rule. Why do some aspiring authoritarians succeed while many fail? A comparison of Bolivia to Brazil and Venezuela illuminates the challenges of both eroding democracy and institutionalizing new competitive authoritarian regimes. Aspiring autocrats must mobilize and control civil society in both stages of autocratization—a challenge that led to the fall of both Morales and Áñez

Fortalecimiento de la confianza y la inclusión socioeconómica

Tipo de recurso: Libro interactivo. Investigación: Objetivos • Análisis de algunos de los factores que inciden en la confianza, entre los actores empresariales y los firmantes del acuerdo de paz en Colombia. • Identificación de elementos que promueven la cooperación actores empresariales y firmantes del acuerdo de paz en Colombia. • El libro brinda recomendaciones y una hoja de ruta para favorecer la inclusión socioeconómica de los firmantes del acuerdo de paz. Área de conocimiento involucrado • Resolución de conflictos • Economía • Políticas públicas Cobertura geográfica: Antioquia, Colombia.Este libro interactivo presenta los resultados de la investigación sobre la incidencia de la confianza y la cooperación en la inclusión socioeconómica de los firmantes de paz, investigación se desarrolló entre la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad Externado de Colombia, la Fundación Ideas para la Paz y la Universidad de Essex, con la financiación del Fondo de Investigaciones para los Desafíos Globales (GCRF, por sus siglas en inglés) del Reino Unido. Como parte integral del libro interactivo, se incluyen los siguientes materiales: - Documento general sobre el diseño, desarrollo y resultados de la investigación. - Documento sobre la hoja de ruta para la construcción de confianza y cooperación entre firmantes de paz y empresarios. - Infografía sobre la confianza entre firmantes de paz y empresarios en Antioquia. - Infografía sobre la hoja de ruta para la construcción de confianza y cooperación entre firmantes de paz y empresarios. - Podcast sobre el significado de la confianza para firmantes de paz y empresarios en Antioquia. - Podcast sobre el desarrollo de la investigación y sus resultados

Learning from Latin America: Coordinating Policy Responses across National and Subnational Levels to Combat COVID-19

We provide policy lessons for governments across Latin America by drawing on an original dataset of daily national and subnational non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during the COVID-19 pandemic for eight Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. Our analysis offers lessons for health system decision-making at various levels of government and highlights the impact of subnational policy implementation for responding to health crises. However, subnational responses cannot replace coordinated national policy; governments should emphasize the vertical integration of evidence-based policy from national to local levels while tailoring local policies to local conditions as they evolve. Horizontal policy integration across sectors and jurisdictions will also improve coordination at each level of government. The Latin American experiences with policy and politics during the COVID-19 pandemic project glocal health policy recommendations that connect global considerations with local needs

Strengthening Health Systems to Face Pandemics: Subnational Policy Responses to Covid-19 in Latin America

Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as stay-at-home orders continue to be the main policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in countries with limited or slow vaccine rollout. Often, NPI are managed or implemented at the sub-national level, yet little information exists on within country variation in NPI policies. We focus on Latin America, a COVID-19 epicenter, and collect and analyze daily subnational data on public health measures in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru to compare within- and across-country NPI. We show high heterogeneity in the adoption of NPIs at the subnational level in Mexico and Brazil, consistent national guidelines with subnational heterogeneity in Argentina and Colombia, and homogeneous policies guided by centralized national policies in Bolivia, Chile and Peru. Our results point to the role of subnational policies and governments in responding to health crise