Capital Structure and Risk Management

This paper examines the impact of capital structure on the optimality of contingent financial contracts. The role of financial relationships is not only to provide funds but also to offer insurance to a risk adverse entrepreneur through contingent financial transfers. Since such financial relationships are long term, the question is on the depth of the financier's commitment to continue to offer financing in the future. If such a commitment cannot be obtained, insurance cannot be perfect. In that case, the entrepreneur chooses to complement outside insurance with internal financing. Depending on the financier's property rights on the firm's assets, the use of reserves can relax the financing constraints and considerably improve not only the level of insurance obtained through the contract but also the efficiency of investment decisions. This rationalizes the use of convertible debt in venture capital relationships. Cet article présente les impacts de la structure de capital sur l'optimalité des contrats financiers contingents. Le rôle des relations financières est non seulement de fournir des capitaux0501s aussi d'offrir de l'assurance à un entrepreneur riscophobe par des transferts contingents. Comme ces relations sont de longue durée, si le financier ne peut s'engager à toujours offrir du financement dans le futur, l'assurance ne peut pas être parfaite. Dans ce cas, l'entrepreneur choisit de complémenter l'assurance externe par du financement interne. Si le financier n'a pas tous les droits de propriété sur les réserves de la firme, l'utilisation des réserves internes peut relâcher les contraintes de refinancement externe et améliorer considérablement le niveau d'assurance ainsi que l'efficacité des décisions d'investissement. Ce résultat justifie l'usage de dette convertible dans les relations de capital risque.Capital structure, venture capital, risk management, long term financial contracts, Structure de capital, capital de risque, gestion des risques, financement de long terme

Dynamic Prevention in Short Term Insurance Contracts

This paper looks at the dynamic properties of insurance contracts when insurers have better technology at preventing catastrophic losses than the insured. The prevention technology is owned by the insurers and is permanent. If long-term contracts are not possible, the insured is faced with a commitment problem since he may want to renegotiate the contract or change insurer after his initial insurer has invested in prevention. Because of this hold-up problem, we find that the investment in prevention is delayed. Le but de cet article est d'étudier les propriétés dynamiques des contrats d'assurance lorsque les assureurs détiennent une meilleure technologie de prévention des catastrophes que les assurés. Cette technologie est permanente au sens où elle ne se déprécie pas. Si les contrats de long terme ne sont pas possibles, les assurés font face à un problème d'engagement puisqu'ils voudraient renégocier le contrat ou changer d'assureur après que l'assureur initial a investi le montant optimal en prévention. À cause de ce problème de hold-up, nous montrons que l'investissement en prévention est retardé, et ce même si l'assuré demeure avec le même assureur sur tout l'horizon de fonctionnement. Nous montrons également que la dynamique des primes d'assurance diffère d'une suite de primes actuarielles.Insurance, Prevention, Commitment, Contract Theory, Moral Hazard, Assurance, Prévention, Engagement, Théorie des contrats, Aléa Moral

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.Nous caractérisons la solution d'un modèle de lissage de la consommation avec financement externe sujet à des contraintes d'engagement et épargne. Nous démontrons que, sous certaines conditions, l'épargne et le financement externe se complètent parfaitement. Si le taux d'escompte est égal au taux d'intérêt, on obtient en temps fini un lissage parfait. Nous démontrons également que le lissage obtenu sur les marchés financiers affecte l'investissement en capital physique. Lorsque le lissage est imparfait, l'investissement est utilisé pour des fins de lissage

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable

Bank Value and Financial Fragility

We propose a valuation model for a bank which faces a bankruptcy risk. Banks are identified with a possibly infinite random sequence of net benefits. A bank is solvent as long as its benefits remain non-negative. To preserve distressed banks from destruction, banks will be pooled within a financial coalition. When possible, those with current positive balance sheet will refinance those in need of liquidity. Banks are refinanced to the extent that their current needs for liquidity do not exceed their expected endogenous continuation value. This value itself is affected by future refinancing possibilities. We provide a recursive formula to compute this value when there is an aggregate liquidity constraint. Nous proposons un modèle d'évaluation pour une banque sujette au risque de faire faillite. Les banques sont représentées par une séquence infinie de bénéfices aléatoires. Une banque est solvable tant que ses profits ne sont pas négatifs. Pour protéger les banques en détresse contre une possible liquidation, les banques sont membres d'une coalition financière. Lorsque c'est possible, celles qui ont un bilan courant positif refinanceront celles qui éprouvent un besoin de liquidité. Les banques sont refinancées tant que leurs besoins courants de liquidité ne dépassent pas leur valeur attendue de continuation. Cette valeur est endogène et dépend des possibilités de refinancement futures. Nous dérivons une formule récursive pour calculer cette valeur en présence d'une contrainte de liquidité agrégée.Bank value, aggregate liquidity constraint, financial coalition, refinancing, Valeur d'une banque, contrainte de liquidité agrégée, coalition financière, refinancement

Environmental Risks: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives: (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite it to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. In that case, making banks non liable can be socially desirable. On étudie ici l'effet de la responsabilité des banques pour les dommages environnementaux causés par leurs clients. Les tribunaux qui rendent les banques responsables de la réparation des dommages poursuivent le double objectif de trouver un payeur et de faire pression sur les partenaires des firmes qui peuvent inciter ces dernières à la réduction des risques. On étudie l'impact que de tels jugements peuvent avoir sur les relations de financement et sur les incitations à la prévention dans un environnement où les banques ne peuvent s'engager à toujours refinancer la firme. ¸ la suite d'un accident environnemental, les banques légalement responsables sont plus enclines à refinancer la firme en cause. On montre alors que la responsabilité bancaire facilite le refinancement, améliorant ainsi le partage de risque obtenu par la firme.0501s, par là-même, elle diminue les incitations des firmes à la prévention. On montre également que lorsqu'il y a responsabilité bancaire, le montant investi en technologie de prévention correspond à l'optimum privé. Si le niveau d'investissement socialement efficace est supérieur au niveau optimal privé, l'absence de responsabilité bancaire, qui pousse les firmes à surinvestir en capacité de prévention, peut être socialement désirable.Environment, bank liability, financial contracts, non-commitment, Environnement, responsabilité bancaire, contrats financiers, non engagement

Contrat dynamique de partage de risque avec contraintes d'engagement et épargne

This paper studies the effect of combining different insurance schemes on the efficiency of consumption smoothing in an environment without commitment. A savings account is introduced into the self-enforcing risk-sharing model of Thomas and Worrall (1988). The risk averse agent's savings play the role of a collateral, thereby improving consumption smoothing. Furthermore, the optimal use of the savings account relaxes the other agent's self-enforcing constraints. These results depend on the fact that savings are perfectly observable and that the rates of time preference are the same for the two agents, making savings and debt substitutable. If these assumptions are relaxed, consumption smoothing worsens but is still better than what is obtained without savings. Dans ce papier on regarde l'effet de la combinaison de différents moyens d'assurance sur l'efficacité du lissage de la consommation et les conséquences de l'engagement incomplet. Dans un contrat de partage de risque auto-exécutoire du type développé par Thomas et Worrall (1988), on introduit un compte d'épargne accessible à l'agent qui a de l'aversion pour le risque. L'accumulation d'épargne sert alors de collatéral et le lissage de la consommation est amélioré. De plus, l'utilisation judicieuse du compte d'épargne permet de relâcher les contraintes d'engagement de l'autre agent. Ces résultats dépendent du fait que le stock d'épargne est parfaitement observable et que les taux de préférence pour le présent sont égaux pour les deux agents, ce qui rend épargne et dette envers l'autre agent parfaitement substituables. Si on relâche ces hypothèses, le lissage de la consommation effectué par le contrat est moins efficace0501s il reste meilleur que ce que l'on obtient sans épargne.Consumption, savings, endogenous liquidity constraint, Consommation, épargne, contrainte de crédit endogène

Endogenous Value and Financial Fragility

We construct a model of valuation to assess the financial fragility of a set of firms in a closed economy. A firm is identified with a possibly infinite random sequence of benefits. Firms with negative benefits in a given period are said to be in distress and need liquidity to refinance their projects. Those liquidities must be obtained from firms with positive benefits (which represent excess liquidities). Distressed projects are refinanced to the extent that their need for liquidity does not exceed their endogenous continuation value. This value is, in turn, affected by current and future refinancing possibilities. We provide a recursive procedure to compute this value when there is an aggregate liquidity constraint. We compare the allocation under a centralized coalition of firms with that of a decentralized competitive liquidity market. We show that the competitive market is more fragile because it does not value the possibility that a currently distressed firm could become a provider of liquidity some period in the future. That is, the market value of a firm candiverge from its social value due to externalities involving the ability of that firm to refinance other distressed firms in the future.Financial fragility, Liquidity constraints, value, bankruptcy

Endogenous Value and Financial Fragility

We construct a model of valuation to assess the financial fragility of a set of firms in a closed economy. A firm is identified with a possibly infinite random sequence of benefits. Firms with negative benefits in a given period are said to be in distress and need liquidity to refinance their projects. Those liquidities must be obtained from firms with positive benefits (which represent excess liquidities). Distressed projects are refinanced to the extend that their need for liquidity does not exceed their endogenous continuation value. This value is, in turn, affected by current and future refinancing possibilities. We provide a recursive proceduure to compute this value when there is an aggregate liquidity constraint. We compare the allocation under a centralized coalition of firms with that of a decentralized competitive liquidity market. We show that the competitive market is more fragile because it does not value the possibility that a currently distressed firm could become a provider of liquidity some period in the future. That is, the market value of a firm can diverge from its social value due to externalities involving the ability of that firm to refinance other distressed firms in the future.Financial fragility, liquidity constraints, value, bankruptcy