10 research outputs found

    Deckard - a tree-based, scalable, and accurate code clone detection tool (version 1.2.3)

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    Lingxiao, J., Misherghi, G., Zhendong, S., & Glondu, S. (2007). Data from: Deckard - a tree-based, scalable, and accurate code clone detection tool (version 1.2.3). InK Repository at Singapore Management University. http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/researchdata/2/</p

    DECKARD: Scalable and accurate tree-based detection of code clones

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    NSF NeTS-NBD, NSF CAREER, NSF CyberTrus

    Deckard - a tree-based, scalable, and accurate code clone detection tool (version 1.2.1)

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    Lingxiao, J., Misherghi, G., Zhendong, S., & Glondu, S. (2007). Data from: Deckard - a tree-based, scalable, and accurate code clone detection tool (version 1.2.1). InK Repository at Singapore Management University. http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/researchdata/1/</p

    (a voté) Euh non : a cliqué

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    Blog Binaire LeMonde.f

    Election Verifiability for Helios under Weaker Trust Assumptions

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    International audienceMost electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing.In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials. We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi weakly verifiable. By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing).The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity of Helios and has been implemented and tested

    Distributed ElGamal Ă  la Pedersen - Application to Helios

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    International audienceReal-world elections often require threshold cryptosystems so that any t out of l trustees can proceed to tallying. This is needed to protect the confidentiality of the voters' votes against curious authorities (at least t+1 trustees must collude to learn individual votes) as well as to increase the robustness of the election (in case some trustees become unavailable, t+1 trustees suffice to compute the election result). We describe a fully distributed (with no dealer) threshold cryptosystem suitable for the Helios voting system (in particular, suitable to partial decryption), and prove it secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Secondly, we propose a fully distributed variant of Helios, that allows for arbitrary threshold parameters l,t, together with a proof of ballot privacy when used for referendums. Our modification of Helios can be seen as revision of the seminal multi-authority election system from Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers, upon which the original Helios system is based. As such, our work implies, to our knowledge, the first formal proof of ballot privacy for the scheme by Cramer et al. Thirdly, we provide the first open-source implementation of Helios with a fully distributed key generation setup

    Enforcing Type-Safe Linking using Inter-Package Relationships

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    Strongly-typed languages rely on link-time checks to ensure that type safety is not violated at the borders of compilation units. Such checks entail very fine-grained dependencies among compilation units, which are at odds with the implicit assumption of backward compatibility that is relied upon by common library packaging techniques adopted by FOSS (Free and Open Source Software) package-based distributions. As a consequence, package managers are often unable to prevent users to install a set of libraries which cannot be linked together. We discuss how to guarantee link-time compatibility using inter-package relationships; in doing so, we take into account real-life maintainability problems such as support for automatic package rebuild and manageability of ABI (Application Binary Interface) strings by humans. We present the dh_ocaml implementation of the proposed solution, which is currently in use in the Debian distribution to safely deploy more than 300 OCaml-related packages
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