221 research outputs found
Dynamics and Coalitions in Sequential Games
We consider N-player non-zero sum games played on finite trees (i.e.,
sequential games), in which the players have the right to repeatedly update
their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome wrt to the
current strategy profile). This generates a dynamics in the game which may
eventually stabilise to a Nash Equilibrium (as with Kukushkin's lazy
improvement), and we argue that it is interesting to study the conditions that
guarantee such a dynamics to terminate.
We build on the works of Le Roux and Pauly who have studied extensively one
such dynamics, namely the Lazy Improvement Dynamics. We extend these works by
first defining a turn-based dynamics, proving that it terminates on subgame
perfect equilibria, and showing that several variants do not terminate. Second,
we define a variant of Kukushkin's lazy improvement where the players may now
form coalitions to change strategies. We show how properties of the players'
preferences on the outcomes affect the termination of this dynamics, and we
thereby characterise classes of games where it always terminates (in particular
two-player games).Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2017, arXiv:1709.0176
Simple Priced Timed Games Are Not That Simple
Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed
automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the
costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The
goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target
location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and
arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important
subclass of theirs (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute,
in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with
their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that
one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on
simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called
reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock)
Efficient Energy Distribution in a Smart Grid using Multi-Player Games
Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent
techniques for the design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed,
such techniques enable automatic synthesis: given a model of the environment
and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques automatically
produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider
a class of concurrent, weighted, multi-player games that are well-suited to
model and study the interactions of several agents who are competing for some
measurable resources like energy. We prove that a subclass of those games
always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play in
such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies
yielding those Nash equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents
deviate from the equilibrium, all the others form a coalition that will enforce
a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply those results
to a real-life case study in which several smart houses that produce their own
energy with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in micro-grid,
must distribute the use of this energy along the day in order to avoid
consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid. We demonstrate
that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these
houses: using penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we
force the houses to follow a pre-computed schedule that maximises the
proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.Comment: In Proceedings Cassting'16/SynCoP'16, arXiv:1608.0017
Quantitative Games under Failures
We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games
introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently
finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose
an extension of the sabotage games in which the first player (Runner) traverses
an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second player (Saboteur). In
our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget that
he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to
minimise the quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show
that, on the one hand, for most of the classical cost functions considered in
the literature, the problem of determining if Runner has a strategy to ensure a
cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, if the budget
of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost
functions. Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also
leads to better complexity
Ocular sonography in patients with raised intracranial pressure: the papilloedema revisited
Invasive devices are recommended for the early detection of raised intracranial pressure (ICP) after severe traumatic brain injury. Owing to contraindication or local issues, however, invasive ICP monitoring is not always possible. Moreover, a significant proportion of moderate traumatic brain injury patients (managed without invasive ICP) will develop raised ICP. Reliable noninvasive ICP techniques are therefore needed. Soldatos and colleagues report the usefulness of ocular sonography in the diagnosis of raised ICP. Focusing on cerebrospinal fluid accumulation around the retrobulbar optic nerve, they show interesting results for the optic nerve sheath diameter in the diagnosis of raised ICP. If confirmed by further studies, and despite important limitations related to sonography, this technique could serve as a screening test in patients at risk for raised ICP, when invasive monitoring is not possible or is not clearly recommended
To Reach or not to Reach? Efficient Algorithms for Total-Payoff Games
International audienceQuantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games – that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games – are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics to speed up the computations
Timed-Automata-Based Verification of MITL over Signals
It has been argued that the most suitable semantic model for real-time formalisms is the non-negative real line (signals), i.e. the continuous semantics, which naturally captures the continuous evolution of system states. Existing tools like UPPAAL are, however, based on omega-sequences with timestamps (timed words), i.e. the pointwise semantics. Furthermore, the support for logic formalisms is very limited in these tools. In this article, we amend these issues by a compositional translation from Metric Temporal Interval Logic (MITL) to signal automata. Combined with an emptiness-preserving encoding of signal automata into timed automata, we obtain a practical automata-based approach to MITL model-checking over signals. We implement the translation in our tool MightyL and report on case studies using LTSmin as the back-end
Dynamics on Games: Simulation-Based Techniques and Applications to Routing
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve the outcome w.r.t. the current strategy profile). This generates a dynamics in the game which may eventually stabilise to an equilibrium. The objective of the present paper is twofold. First, we aim at drawing a general framework to reason about the termination of such dynamics. In particular, we identify preorders on games (inspired from the classical notion of simulation between transitions systems, and from the notion of graph minor) which preserve termination of dynamics. Second, we show the applicability of the previously developed framework to interdomain routing problems
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