On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity

A welfarist way of allocating resources consists in 1) equipping individuals with comparable indices of their well-being and 2) applying a unique aggregation rule to individual well-being levels. An equality of opportunity way of allocating resources consists in 1) making the distinction between personal characteristics which are under and beyond individuals’ control, and 2) decreasing inequalities due to differences in characteristics beyond individuals’ control. We show that under the proviso that indifferent individuals should not influence social judgements, welfarist and equal opportunity judgements on resource allocation are equivalent.Welfare, Opportunity, Equality

Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.Indivisible Good, Social Ordering Function, Leximin

On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to voting. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with two alternatives (e.g., Myerson (1998)). We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium under the simple plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two alterna- tives and the condition under which they exist. There is only one type of inefficient equilibrium with two alternatives. In this equilibrium, voters vote unresponsively because they all vote for the same alternative. Under the same condition, the same type of equilibrium exists with three alternatives. However, we show that the number and types of coordination failures increase with three alternatives, and that this leads to the existence of other types of inefficient equilibria as well, including those in which voters vote informatively.efficient information aggregation, simple plurality rule, Poisson games, Condorcet Jury Theorem

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.

Endogenous Affirmative Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas

The adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists, like the recent “parity law” in France, can be fully rationalized on the basis of the self interest of male incumbent politicians. This paper explains why the parity law was approved in its form and, at the same time, why it has not been very effective. The existence of a voters’ bias in favor of male candidates is sufficient to convince the incumbents to advocate for equal gender representation in party lists, because it raises the incumbents’ chances of being reelected. The existence of male bias in the French electorate is empirically confirmed in this paper. We also show that parity law may have assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system.

Poverty measurement (in India) : defining group-specific poverty lines or taking preferences into account?

We study absolute income poverty measurement when agents differ in preferences and face different prices. The difficulty arising from price heterogeneity is typically solved using equivalent income, but the choice of the reference price vector remains arbitrary. We provide a way to solve this arbitrariness problem by making the poverty measure consistent with preferences: an agent qualifies as poor if and only if she prefers the poverty line bundle to her current consumption bundle. We then prove that defining group/region specific poverty lines is another way of recovering consistency with preferences, provided one uses the headcount ratio. Comparing the resulting three approaches using Indian data, we find that the different approaches leads to different poverty conclusions. We show that not taking preferences into account leads to severely underestimating urban poverty