Know-how and non-propositional intentionality

This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality

Knowledge-intensive business services: a brief overview

In the last decade of the 20th century knowledge has gained importance in the economy. This lead to the emergence of knowledge-based activities: knowledge-intensive organizations, and particularly knowledge-intensive services. These organizations function as external knowledge sources for other organizations. Their performance depends largely on professional knowledge. Since their performance has an impact on the success of their clients, it is important to look at those factors which influence the knowledge transfer between service provider and client organization. Based on theory and empirical research, the paper addresses the specific aspects of knowledge transfer from knowledge-intensive business service organizations to client organizations.Knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS), client organization, client knowledge., Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, L84,

Growing Professionalism in the Services of Nonprofit Organizations

The nonprofit sector today has to meet growing demands for better quality services and growing competition from business and public organizations, and also from other nonprofit organizations. Because of these circumstances they have to become more professional in their activities. The paper examines the professionalization and knowledge management in nonprofit organizations. The theoretical issues of knowledge management of nonprofit organizations are supported by examples from (earlier and recent) research of the authors. The aspects of knowledge management presented in this paper, not only give an insight over the contribution of nonprofit organizations to the success of a larger project, but they ca be an example for other nonprofits dealing with similar problems, facing similar challenges.Knowledge-based services; knowledge transfer; nonprofit organizations; professionalization.

Know-wh does not reduce to know that

Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of an answer, for example in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind hypothesi

Extended mental features

The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This paper revisits the question of extending consciousness

The Boundaries of the Mind

The subject of mental processes or mental states is usually assumed to be an individual, and hence the boundaries of mental features – in a strict or metaphorical sense – are naturally regarded as reaching no further than the boundaries of the individual. This chapter addresses various philosophical developments in the 20th and 21st century that questioned this natural assumption. I will frame this discussion by fi rst presenting a historically infl uential commitment to the individualistic nature of the mental in Descartes’ theory. I identify various elements in the Cartesian conception of the mind that were subsequently criticized and rejected by various externalist theories, advocates of the extended mind hypothesis and defenders of embodied cognition. Then I will indicate the main trends in these critiques

Phenomenal intentionality without compromise

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narro