Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important?

Central to understanding the effect of arbitration schemes on the process of collective bargaining is understanding the process by which arbitrators make decisions. A model of arbitrator behavior inconventional arbitration is developed that allows the arbitration award to be a function of both the offers of the parties and the(exogenous) facts of the case. The weight that the arbitrator puts on the facts relative to the offers is hypothesized to be a function of the quality of the offers as measured by the difference between the offers. Two special cases of this model are derived: 1) the arbitrator bases the award strictly on the offers of the parties(split-the-difference) and 2) the arbitrator bases the award strictly on the facts of the case.The model is implemented empirically using data gathered from practicing arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty-five hypothetical cases. These data have the advantage that they allow causal inference regarding the effect on the arbitration award of the facts relative to the offers. On the basis of the estimates, both of the special case models are strongly rejected. The arbitration awards are found to be influenced by both the offers of the parties and the facts of the case. In addition, the weight put on the facts of the case relative to the offers is found to vary significantly with the quality of the offers. When the offers are of low quality (far apart)the arbitrator weights the facts more heavily and the offers less heavily.These results suggest that the naive split-the difference view of arbitrator behavior, which is the basis of the critique of conventional arbitration that has led to the adoption of final-offer arbitration, is no correct in its extreme view. On the other hand,the awards are affected by the offers so that the parties can manipulate the outcome to some extent by manipulating their offers. However, the scope for this sort of influence is limited by the finding that the offers are weighted less heavily as their quality deteriorates.

Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."

One prominent explanation for disagreement in bargaining is that the parties have divergent and relatively optimistic expectations regarding the ultimate outcome if they fail to agree. The fact that settlement rates are much higher where final-offer arbitration is the dispute settlement procedure than where conventional arbitration is the dispute settlement procedure is used as the basis of a test of the role of divergent expectations in causing disagreement in negotiations. Calculations of identical-expectations contract zones using existing estimates of models of arbitrator behavior yield larger identical-expectations contract zones in conventional arbitration than in final-offer arbitration. This evidence clearly suggests that divergent expectations alone are not an adequate explanation of disagreement in labor-management negotiations. A number of alternative explanations for disagreement are suggested and evaluated.

The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration

A general model of arbitrator behavior in conventional and final-offer arbitration is developed that is based on an underlying notion of an appropriate award in a particular case. This appropriate award is defined as a function of the facts of the case independently of the offers of the parties. In conventional arbitration the arbitration award is argued to be a function of both the offers of the parties and the appropriate award. The weight that the arbitrator puts on the appropriate award relative to the offers is hypothesized to be a function of the quality of the offers as measured by the difference between the offers. In final-offer arbitration itis argued that the arbitrator chooses the offer that is closest to the appropriate award.The model is implemented empirically using data gathered from practicing arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty-five hypothetical cases. The estimates of the general model strongly support the characterizations of arbitrator behavior in the two schemes. No substantial differences were found in the determination of the appropriate award implicit in the conventional arbitration decisions and the determination of the appropriate award implicitin the final-offer decisions.

Embedding right-angled Artin groups into graph braid groups

We construct an embedding of any right-angled Artin group $G(\Delta)$ defined by a graph $\Delta$ into a graph braid group. The number of strands required for the braid group is equal to the chromatic number of $\Delta$. This construction yields an example of a hyperbolic surface subgroup embedded in a two strand planar graph braid group.Comment: 8 pages. Final version, appears in Geometriae Dedicata

A Systematic Approach for the Analytical Analysis and Prediction of the Yield From Liquid Propellant Explosions

This paper presents a systematic approach by which the expected yield from liquid propellants can be predicted and furthermore gives an insight into the physical phenomena involved. The yield potential and the mixing function can be determined allowing for the type of propellants, their relative proportions, the reaction rates between the components depending upon mixture composition, the heat transfer rates between the components and the propellants and the surroundings, the mode of failure and the resulting mixing characteristics, and the ignition and reaction delay times. Combining the above information into seven charts as presented leads to a systematic analytical determination of the expected yield

A comparison of arbitration procedures for risk averse disputants

We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of final offer arbitration, conventional arbitration, and some proposed alternatives to them. Our model allows the two disputants to be risk averse and assumes that the issue(s) in dispute can be summarized by a single quantifiable value. We compare the performance of the different arbitration procedures by analyzing the gap between the disputants' equilibrium offers and the width of the contract zone that these offers imply. Our results suggest that final offer arbitration should give results superior to those of conventional arbitration.Natural Sciences & Engineering Research Council (NSERC) Discovery Gran

Prediction of explosive yield and other characteristics of liquid rocket propellant explosions

Work which has been done at the University of Florida in arriving at credible explosive yield values for liquid rocket propellants is presented. The results are based upon logical methods which have been well worked out theoretically and verified through experimental procedures. Three independent methods to predict explosive yield values for liquid rocket propellants are described. All three give the same end result even though they utilize different parameters and procedures. They are: (1) mathematical model; (2) seven chart approach; and (3) critical mass method. A brief description of the methods, how they were derived, how they were applied, and the results which they produced are given. The experimental work used to support and verify the above methods both in the laboratory and in the field with actually explosive mixtures are presented. The methods developed are used and their value demonstrated in analyzing real problems, among them the destruct system of the Saturn 5, and the early configurations of the space shuttle