Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness

Societal theories of trade policy stress the importance of domestic interest groups, whereas statist theories focus on the effects of domestic institutions. Debates over the relative merits of these approaches have been fierce, but little systematic empirical research has been brought to bear on the relative merits of these theories. In this paper, we argue that, while societal and statist factors are generally regarded as having independent and competing effects, it is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as conditional on the other. As societal explanations contend, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are a potent source of protectionist pressures. The extent to which such conditions reduce commercial openness, however, depends centrally on the domestic institutions through which societal pressures must filter to influence policy. Two institutional features stand out. First, in states marked by greater fragmentation and more “veto points,” it is harder to change existing policies because any number of actors can block such change. Consequently, we expect the effects of macroeconomic conditions on trade policy to be weaker in fragmented states than in those characterized by a highly centralized national government. Second, we expect both fragmentation and the societal pressures stemming from the economy to have a more potent impact on trade policy in democracies than in other regimes, since the electoral constraints facing democratic leaders force them to respond to demands made by key segments of society. The results of our statistical tests covering more than one hundred countries during the period from 1980 to 2000 strongly support these arguments.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40098/3/wp712.pd

Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness

Societal theories of trade policy stress the importance of domestic interest groups, whereas statist theories focus on the effects of domestic institutions. Debates over the relative merits of these approaches have been fierce, but little systematic empirical research has been brought to bear on the relative merits of these theories. In this paper, we argue that, while societal and statist factors are generally regarded as having independent and competing effects, it is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as conditional on the other. As societal explanations contend, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are a potent source of protectionist pressures. The extent to which such conditions reduce commercial openness, however, depends centrally on the domestic institutions through which societal pressures must filter to influence policy. Two institutional features stand out. First, in states marked by greater fragmentation and more “veto points,” it is harder to change existing policies because any number of actors can block such change. Consequently, we expect the effects of macroeconomic conditions on trade policy to be weaker in fragmented states than in those characterized by a highly centralized national government. Second, we expect both fragmentation and the societal pressures stemming from the economy to have a more potent impact on trade policy in democracies than in other regimes, since the electoral constraints facing democratic leaders force them to respond to demands made by key segments of society. The results of our statistical tests covering more than one hundred countries during the period from 1980 to 2000 strongly support these arguments.Protectionism, openness, veto players, veto points, positive political theory, unemployment, trade

John Rawls, the conception of a liberal self, and the communitarian critique

John Rawls\u27 A Theory of Justice stands as the single most important work in the Anglo-American liberal tradition after World War II. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls revives the social contract doctrine in order to determine principles of justice that would be chosen by persons who are free and equal moral individuals. Since Rawls believes that no single conception of the good can establish justice in a pluralistic society, he posits a set of principles of right which are prior to any particular good. Thus his theory, which he calls justice as fairness, is deontological. Since its publication in 1971, A Theory of Justice has generated extensive critical response from writers all along the philosophical spectrum

Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety

Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual\u27s income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person\u27s skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis reveals that education\u27s effects are less representative of skill than of individuals\u27 anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by trade

An Empirical Study of Public Accountants\u27 Risk-Taking Propensities

J. W. Martin is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and E. R. Mansfield is an Associate Professor of Statistics at the University of Alabama

Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness

Some theories of foreign economic policy stress the importance of domestic interest groups, whereas others focus on the effects of domestic institutions. Debates between advocates of these approaches are longstanding, but little systematic empirical research has been brought to bear on the relative merits of these theories. We argue that while interest group demands and institutions are often regarded as having independent and competing effects, it is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as conditional on the other. As explanations emphasizing societal interests contend, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are a potent source of protectionist sentiment. The extent to which such conditions reduce commercial openness, however, depends centrally on a country\u27s political institutions, especially the number of veto points in a country\u27s policy-making structure and its regime type. We expect the effects of macroeconomic conditions on trade policy to become weaker as the number of veto points increases. We also expect both veto points and the societal pressures stemming from the economy to have a more potent impact on trade policy in democracies than in other regimes. The results of our statistical tests covering almost 60 countries during the period from 1980 to 2000 strongly support these arguments

The Political Economy of Financial Reform: de Jure Liberalization vs. de Facto Implementation

Over the past 20 years, social scientists have displayed growing interest in the political economy of financial reform. Virtually all of these studies have focused on explaining policy changes resulting in the liberalization of the financial sector without addressing the extent to which the adopted financial reforms have actually been implemented. In this presentation, I will assess the factors contributing to both de jure financial reform and the implementation of such liberalization. We find that de jure reform tends to be conducted by poorer countries and participants in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Standby Arrangement and its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). We also find that the political economy of de jure reforms that are not implemented differs substantially from the political economy of de facto reforms that are implemented. Implementation is inhibited by economic crises, a democratic regime type, an advanced industrial economy, a large financial sector, and participation in the IMF’s PRGF. Implementation is promoted by economic recessions and involvement in an IMF Standby Arrangement. Our findings therefore confirm the importance of societal interests, political institutions, domestic economic conditions, and international institutions, each of which has been linked to financial reform in prior research. But these results break new ground by revealing important differences in how these factors influence policy reforms and the implementation of such reforms.Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent web page, Streaming video, Event photo

Distribution and Migration of the Bowhead Whale, Balaena mysticetus, in the Eastern North American Arctic

Large catches of bowhead whales, Balaena mysticetus, were made in the Eastern Arctic of North America, principally in Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, the Lancaster Sound region, Hudson Bay, and southern Foxe Basin, between 1719 and 1915. Initial stock sizes have been estimated as 11 000 in 1825 for the "Davis Strait stock" and 680 in 1859 for the "Hudson Bay stock." The separate identity of these two putative stocks needs confirmation through direct evidence. Three sets of data were used to evaluate historic and present-day trends in the distribution of bowheads in the Eastern Arctic and to test hypotheses concerning the nature, timing, and routes of their migration. Published records from commercial whale fisheries prior to 1915, unpublished and some published records from the post-commercial whaling period 1915-1974, and reported sightings made mainly by environmental assessment personnel between 1975 and 1979, were tabulated and plotted on charts. Comments made by whalers and nineteenth-century naturalists concerning bowhead distribution and movements were summarized and critically evaluated. The major whaling grounds were: (1) the west coast of Greenland between ca. 60°N and 73°N, the spring and early summer "east side " grounds of the British whalers; (2) the spring "south-west fishing" grounds, including the northeast coast of Labrador, the mouth of Hudson Strait, southeast Baffin Island, and the pack ice edge extending east from Resolution Island; (3) the summer "west water" grounds, including Pond Inlet, the Lancaster Sound region, and Prince Regent Inlet; (4) the autumn "rock-nosing" grounds along the entire east coast of Baffin Island; (5) Cumberland Sound, a spring and fall ground; and (6) northwest Hudson Bay/southwest Foxe Basin. The belief of whalers that some segregation occurs within the "Davis Strait stock" cannot be refuted or confirmed on the above evidence. However, the evident predominance of young whales and females with calves in early season catches at the Pond Inlet floe edge and in summer catches well inside Lancaster Sound and Prince Regent Inlet suggests that the route and timing of their migration differs from that of adult males. Apparently most of the whales taken on the autumn "rock-nosing" grounds were large males. The possibility that females and calves circumnavigate Baffin Island, returning south by way of Fury and Hecla Strait, is neither proven nor unproven. Evaluation of harpoon recoveries did not yield irrefutable evidence of interchange between any presently recognized bowhead stocks; however, this evidence along with recognition of distinctive morphological features does indicate that bowheads exhibit site fidelity to some degree. The conclusion is that the bowhead population in the Eastern Arctic, severely reduced by whaling activities, continues to occupy much of its former range and follows the same migratory schedule. There is no reliable and consistent evidence of appreciable recovery in absolute abundance of any Eastern Arctic stock.Key words: bowhead whale, Balaena mysticetus, distribution, migration, population identity, whaling history, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lancaster Sound, West Greenland, Hudson Bay, Foxe BasinMots clés: baleine boréale, Balaena mysticetus, distribution, migration, l'identité de la population, histoire de la pêche à la baleine, le détroit de Davis, la baie de Baffin, le détroit de Lancaster, ouest Groenland, la baie d'Hudson, le bassin de Fox

Sulfonated copolymers as heparin-mimicking stabilizer of fibroblast growth factor : size, architecture, and monomer distribution effects

Fibroblast growth factors (FGF) are involved in a wide range of biological processes such as cell proliferation and differentiation. In living organisms, the binding of FGF to its receptors are mediated through electrostatic interactions between FGF and naturally occurring heparin. Despite its prevalent use in medicine, heparin carries notable limitations, namely; its extraction from natural sources (expensive, low yield and extensive purification), viral contamination, and batch-to-batch heterogeneity. In this work a range of synthetic homopolymers and copolymers of sodium 2-acrylamido-2-methylpropane sulfonate (AMPS®) were evaluated as potential FGF stabilisers. This was studied by measuring the proliferation of BaF3-FR1c cells, as a model assay, and the results will be compared with the natural stabilisation and activation of FGF by heparin. This study explores the structure-activity relationship of these polysulfonated polymers with a focus on the effect of molecular weight, co-monomer type, charge dispersion and polymer architecture on protein stabilisation