Competition Policy in Indonesia

The Indonesian economy was dominated by the government in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s through its control of major mining, manufacturing and agricultural activities. Hill (2000) estimates that as much as 40% of non-agricultural GDP was accounted for by government entities in the late 1980s There were still a lot of government corporations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s and governmental control over the banking system was still substantial. Non-financial state owned enterprises (SOEs) contributed 14.5% of GDP in the late 1980s. They also accounted for another 9% of gross domestic investment which rose to 15.7% over the period 1990 1997 (World Bank, 2000). Three SOEs are of particular note that dominate the sector in terms of revenue and assets are Pertamina (monopoly in oil and gas with diversified holdings in hotels, an airline and office buildings); PLN and PTTelkolm (monopoly in power and telecommunications industry respectively). The SOEs also employ a significant percentage of the labor force (25% according to data from the Indonesia Statistics Office). This strong role of the state was derived from the historical break with its colonial past under President Suharto and the distrust of capitalists. There was also a need for the Suharto regime in the three decades when he ruled to maintain control of enough industries to maintain its base for extortion and corruption. There was only a gradual and delayed shift toward export promotion and away from import substitution. This was partly the result of lobbying by entrenched interests that were making monopoly profits from new protected industries and corrupt officials that were operating the customs and port facilities. It also had to do with the control of key allocation and production agencies like Bulog and Pertamina. The decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s put pressure on the government to develop a more competitive economic environment which was reinforced by the growing integration of economies in Southeast Asia in conjunction with commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Policy measures focused on trade barriers. Tariffs were lowered and some import monopolies and import licenses were converted to tariff equivalents. There were also reforms in banking and the regulation of foreign direct investment. However, these reforms were partial in nature. Several banks remain under government control and policy required domestic partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI) approval (see Dowling and Yap (2005) for further details. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings in the policy environment, there was a measurable improvement in competition and economic efficiency, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Pangestu et al (2002) show that there was a decline in the level of industrial concentration and that the size distribution of firms has become more equal over time. There was also a decline in the prevalence of dominant firms therefore enhancing competition and reducing monopoly power. Finally, there was less stability in market shares after 1990, a development which reflects greater competition1. The evidence of enhanced competition over the decades of the 80s and90s is much less compelling in other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, services, infrastructure and some parts for manufacturing and mining sectors. There are a number of examples that can be cited to support this conclusion including the cement industry (where there were high tariffs on imports, restrictions on number of distributors and allocation of markets) as well as gas distribution, telecommunications and electricity (where an opaque regulatory framework prohibited a level playing field from developing as new entrants came into the market). Furthermore, in the telecoms sector the government remained the majority shareholder in PT. Telkom and Indosat.FTA, Indonesia, competition, telecom

Competition Policy in Indonesia

The Indonesian economy was dominated by the government in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s through its control of major mining, manufacturing and agricultural activities. Hill (2000) estimates that as much as 40% of non-agricultural GDP was accounted for by government entities in the late 1980s There were still a lot of government corporations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s and governmental control over the banking system was still substantial. Non-financial state owned enterprises (SOEs) contributed 14.5% of GDP in the late 1980s. They also accounted for another 9% of gross domestic investment which rose to 15.7% over the period 1990 –1997 (World Bank, 2000). Three SOEs are of particular note that dominate the sector in terms of revenue and assets are Pertamina (monopoly in oil and gas with diversified holdings in hotels, an airline and office buildings); PLN and PTTelkolm (monopoly in power and telecommunications industry respectively). The SOEs also employ a significant percentage of the labor force (25% according to data from the Indonesia’ Statistics Office). This strong role of the state was derived from the historical break with its colonial past under President Suharto and the distrust of “capitalists”. There was also a need for the Suharto regime in the three decades when he ruled to maintain control of enough industries to maintain its base for extortion and corruption. There was only a gradual and delayed shift toward export promotion and away from import substitution. This was partly the result of lobbying by entrenched interests that were making monopoly profits from new protected industries and corrupt officials that were operating the customs and port facilities. It also had to do with the control of key allocation and production agencies like Bulog and Pertamina. The decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s put pressure on the government to develop a more competitive economic environment which was reinforced by the growing integration of economies in Southeast Asia in conjunction with commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Policy measures focused on trade barriers. Tariffs were lowered and some import monopolies and import licenses were converted to tariff equivalents. There were also reforms in banking and the regulation of foreign direct investment. However, these reforms were partial in nature. Several banks remain under government control and policy required domestic partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI) approval (see Dowling and Yap (2005) for further details. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings in the policy environment, there was a measurable improvement in competition and economic efficiency, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Pangestu et al (2002) show that there was a decline in the level of industrial concentration and that the size distribution of firms has become more equal over time. There was also a decline in the prevalence of dominant firms therefore enhancing competition and reducing monopoly power. Finally, there was less stability in market shares after 1990, a development which reflects greater competition1. The evidence of enhanced competition over the decades of the ‘80s and’90s is much less compelling in other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, services, infrastructure and some parts for manufacturing and mining sectors. There are a number of examples that can be cited to support this conclusion including the cement industry (where there were high tariffs on imports, restrictions on number of distributors and allocation of markets) as well as gas distribution, telecommunications and electricity (where an opaque regulatory framework prohibited a level playing field from developing as new entrants came into the market). Furthermore, in the telecoms sector the government remained the majority shareholder in PT. Telkom and Indosat.

Central Asia’s Transition After Fifteen Years: Growth and Policy Choices

This paper presents a coherent and systematic analysis of the collapse and subsequent revival of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) since 1990. The focus is on the pattern of growth and structural change during the cycle of decline and subsequent revival in the CARs which have been inadequately analyzed in the literature on transition. The paper relates economic performance to initial conditions, country characteristics and policies. Within this framework, it proposes a simple typology of policies (including a new Type III set of policies on regional cooperation and industrial competitiveness) and relates them to the cycle of decline and revival in the CARs. It goes on to examine medium-term prospects and policy needs for the CARs.growth, economic reform, regional cooperation, industrial competitiveness, Central Asia, transitional economies

Design thinking and innovation: synthesising concepts of knowledge co-creation in spaces of professional development

This paper explores how design thinking connects to concepts of knowledge creation and innovation. A case study of a knowledge sharing network in the social services sector is used to illustrate how design thinking supports Ba, the spaces for knowledge creation. Further exploration of the four enabling conditions for Ba resulted in delineation of two distinct types: relational and structural. Relational enablers support three groups of enabling conditions: interaction, shared values and communication. It is proposed that design thinking aligns well with relational enabling conditions for Ba to create the ideal spaces for knowledge creation. The group of structural enablers can assist or obstruct change and relate to the culture and management approaches of an organization, which may or may not be assisted by design thinking. However, to ensure that design thinking is not undermined, and innovation is achieved, the presence of an appropriate structural enabler is critical for success

Homeostasis and Well Being

The paper suggests that maintenance of a homeostatic equilibrium provides a rationale for many actions of economic agents. Homeostatic equilibrium has physical, economic, emotional, psychological and environmental dimensions. The characteristics of this equilibrium include feelings of safety, trust, connectedness with friends, family and community, and a predictable and welcoming social and work environment. Individuals generally make decisions that help them move toward and achieve this state of equilibrium. Departure from homeostasis reduces well being and stimulates agents to take actions that will return them to a state of homeostasis. This hypothesis is tested with probit analysis using sample responses from the four waves of the World Values Surveys conducted between 1980 and 2002. Results generally support the homeostasis hypothesis. Variables that reflect departure from homeostasis such as divorce and poor health are highly significant, pointing to a reduction in well being. Variables that reflect the importance of friends, family, a trusting social and work environment have significant impacts to raise well being.

Kinase-independent function of RIP1, critical for mature T-cell survival and proliferation.

The death receptor, Fas, triggers apoptotic death and is essential for maintaining homeostasis in the peripheral lymphoid organs. RIP1 was originally cloned when searching for Fas-binding proteins and was later shown to associate also with the signaling complex of TNFR1. Although Fas exclusively induces apoptosis, TNFR1 primarily activates the pro-survival/pro-inflammatory NF-κB pathway. Mutations in Fas lead to lymphoproliferative (lpr) diseases, and deletion of TNFR1 results in defective innate immune responses. However, the function of RIP1 in the adult lymphoid system has not been well understood, primarily owing to perinatal lethality in mice lacking the entire RIP1 protein in germ cells. This current study investigated the requirement for RIP1 in the T lineage using viable RIP1 mutant mice containing a conditional and kinase-dead RIP1 allele. Disabling the kinase activity of RIP1 had no obvious impact on the T-cell compartment. However, T-cell-specific deletion of RIP1 led to a severe T-lymphopenic condition, owing to a dramatically reduced mature T-cell pool in the periphery. Interestingly, the immature T-cell compartment in the thymus appeared intact. Further analysis showed that mature RIP1(-/-) T cells were severely defective in antigen receptor-induced proliferative responses. Moreover, the RIP1(-/-) T cells displayed greatly increased death and contained elevated caspase activities, an indication of apoptosis. In total, these results revealed a novel, kinase-independent function of RIP1, which is essential for not only promoting TCR-induced proliferative responses but also in blocking apoptosis in mature T cells

Global Talentship: Toward a Decision Science Connecting Talent to Global Strategic Success

It is widely accepted that global competitive advantage frequently requires managing such complex situations that traditional organization and job structures are simply insufficient. Increasingly, in order to create a flexible and integrated set of decisions that balance local flexibility with global efficiency, organizations must rely on more social, informal and matrix-based shared visions among managers and employees. Research on global strategic advantage, global organizational structures, and even shared mindsets has suggested that dimensions of culture, product and function provide a valuable organizing framework. However, typical decisions about organization structure, HRM practices and talent often remain framed at such a high level as to preclude their solution. We maintain that there is often no logical answer to such questions as, “Should the sales force be local or global?” or “Should product authority rest with the countries or the corporate center?” However, we propose that embedding business processes or value chains within a Culture and Product matrix provides the necessary analytic detail to reveal otherwise elusive solutions. Moreover, by linking this global process matrix to a model that bridges strategy and talent, it is possible to identify global “pivotal talent pools,” and to target organizational and human resource investments toward those talent areas that have the greatest impact on strategic advantage. We demonstrate the Value-Chain, Culture and Product (VCCP) matrix using several examples, and discuss future research and practical implications, particularly for leadership and leadership development