Better than expected: the influence of option expectations during decision-making

Our choices often arise from a consideration of options presented in a sequence (e.g. the products in a supermarket row). However, whether the precise sequential order of option presentation affects decision-making remains poorly understood. A recent model of choice proposes that, in a set of options presented sequentially, those that are better than expected will be perceived as more valuable, even when options are objectively equivalent within the set. Inspired by this proposal, we devised a novel decision-making task where we manipulated the order of option presentation together with expectations about option value. Even when we compared trials that were exactly equivalent except for option order, we observed a striking preference for options that were better than expected. Our findings show that expectations about options affect which option will be favoured within a sequence, an influence which is manifested as a preference for better-than-expected options. The findings have potential practical implications, as for example they may help policymakers in devising nudge strategies that rely on ad hoc option orders

Neural activity associated with the passive prediction of ambiguity and risk for aversive events

In economic decision making, outcomes are described in terms of risk (uncertain outcomes with certain probabilities) and ambiguity (uncertain outcomes with uncertain probabilities). Humans are more averse to ambiguity than to risk, with a distinct neural system suggested as mediating this effect. However, there has been no clear disambiguation of activity related to decisions themselves from perceptual processing of ambiguity. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, we contrasted ambiguity, defined as a lack of information about outcome probabilities, to risk, where outcome probabilities are known, or ignorance, where outcomes are completely unknown and unknowable.Wemodified previously learned pavlovian CSstimuli such that they became an ambiguous cue and contrasted evoked brain activity both with an unmodified predictive CS(risky cue), and a cue that conveyed no information about outcome probabilities (ignorance cue). Compared with risk, ambiguous cues elicited activity in posterior inferior frontal gyrus and posterior parietal cortex during outcome anticipation. Furthermore, a similar set of regions was activated when ambiguous cues were compared with ignorance cues. Thus, regions previously shown to be engaged by decisions about ambiguous rewarding outcomes are also engaged by ambiguous outcome prediction in the context of aversive outcomes. Moreover, activation in these regions was seen even when no actual decision is made. Our findings suggest that these regions subserve a general function of contextual analysis when search for hidden information during outcome anticipation is both necessary and meaningful

Neural correlates of processing valence and arousal in affective words

Psychological frameworks conceptualize emotion along 2 dimensions, "valence" and "arousal." Arousal invokes a single axis of intensity increasing from neutral to maximally arousing. Valence can be described variously as a bipolar continuum, as independent positive and negative dimensions, or as hedonic value (distance from neutral). In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to characterize neural activity correlating with arousal and with distinct models of valence during presentation of affective word stimuli. Our results extend observations in the chemosensory domain suggesting a double dissociation in which subregions of orbitofrontal cortex process valence, whereas amygdala preferentially processes arousal. In addition, our data support the physiological validity of descriptions of valence along independent axes or as absolute distance from neutral but fail to support the validity of descriptions of valence along a bipolar continuum

Learning Contextual Reward Expectations for Value Adaptation

Substantial evidence indicates that subjective value is adapted to the statistics of reward expected within a given temporal context. However, how these contextual expectations are learned is poorly understood. To examine such learning, we exploited a recent observation that participants performing a gambling task adjust their preferences as a function of context. We show that, in the absence of contextual cues providing reward information, an average reward expectation was learned from recent past experience. Learning dependent on contextual cues emerged when two contexts alternated at a fast rate, whereas both cue-independent and cue-dependent forms of learning were apparent when two contexts alternated at a slower rate. Motivated by these behavioral findings, we reanalyzed a previous fMRI data set to probe the neural substrates of learning contextual reward expectations. We observed a form of reward prediction error related to average reward such that, at option presentation, activity in ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra and ventral striatum correlated positively and negatively, respectively, with the actual and predicted value of options. Moreover, an inverse correlation between activity in ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra (but not striatum) and predicted option value was greater in participants showing enhanced choice adaptation to context. The findings help understanding the mechanisms underlying learning of contextual reward expectation

Attentional load and sensory competition in human vision: Modulation of fMRI responses by load fixation during task-irrelevant stimulation in the peripheral visual field.

Perceptual suppression of distractors may depend on both endogenous and exogenous factors, such as attentional load of the current task and sensory competition among simultaneous stimuli, respectively. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare these two types of attentional effects and examine how they may interact in the human brain. We varied the attentional load of a visual monitoring task performed on a rapid stream at central fixation without altering the central stimuli themselves, while measuring the impact on fMRI responses to task-irrelevant peripheral checkerboards presented either unilaterally or bilaterally. Activations in visual cortex for irrelevant peripheral stimulation decreased with increasing attentional load at fixation. This relative decrease was present even in V1, but became larger for successive visual areas through to V4. Decreases in activation for contralateral peripheral checkerboards due to higher central load were more pronounced within retinotopic cortex corresponding to 'inner' peripheral locations relatively near the central targets than for more eccentric 'outer' locations, demonstrating a predominant suppression of nearby surround rather than strict 'tunnel vision' during higher task load at central fixation. Contralateral activations for peripheral stimulation in one hemifield were reduced by competition with concurrent stimulation in the other hemifield only in inferior parietal cortex, not in retinotopic areas of occipital visual cortex. In addition, central attentional load interacted with competition due to bilateral versus unilateral peripheral stimuli specifically in posterior parietal and fusiform regions. These results reveal that task-dependent attentional load, and interhemifield stimulus-competition, can produce distinct influences on the neural responses to peripheral visual stimuli within the human visual system. These distinct mechanisms in selective visual processing may be integrated within posterior parietal areas, rather than earlier occipital cortex

Value encoding in the globus pallidus: fMRI reveals an interaction effect between reward and dopamine drive

The external part of the globus pallidus (GPe) is a core nucleus of the basal ganglia (BG) whose activity is disrupted under conditions of low dopamine release, as in Parkinson's disease. Current models assume decreased dopamine release in the dorsal striatum results in deactivation of dorsal GPe, which in turn affects motor expression via a regulatory effect on other nuclei of the BG. However, recent studies in healthy and pathological animal models have reported neural dynamics that do not match with this view of the GPe as a relay in the BG circuit. Thus, the computational role of the GPe in the BG is still to be determined. We previously proposed a neural model that revisits the functions of the nuclei of the BG, and this model predicts that GPe encodes values which are amplified under a condition of low striatal dopaminergic drive. To test this prediction, we used an fMRI paradigm involving a within-subject placebo-controlled design, using the dopamine antagonist risperidone, wherein healthy volunteers performed a motor selection and maintenance task under low and high reward conditions. ROI-based fMRI analysis revealed an interaction between reward and dopamine drive manipulations, with increased BOLD activity in GPe in a high compared to low reward condition, and under risperidone compared to placebo. These results confirm the core prediction of our computational model, and provide a new perspective on neural dynamics in the BG and their effects on motor selection and cognitive disorders

The influence of contextual reward statistics on risk preference

Decision theories mandate that organisms should adjust their behaviour in the light of the contextual reward statistics. We tested this notion using a gambling choice task involving distinct contexts with different reward distributions. The best fitting model of subjects' behaviour indicated that the subjective values of options depended on several factors, including a baseline gambling propensity, a gambling preference dependent on reward amount, and a contextual reward adaptation factor. Combining this behavioural model with simultaneous functional magnetic resonance imaging we probed neural responses in three key regions linked to reward and value, namely ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra (VTA/SN), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and ventral striatum (VST). We show that activity in the VTA/SN reflected contextual reward statistics to the extent that context affected behaviour, activity in the vmPFC represented a value difference between chosen and unchosen options while VST responses reflected a non-linear mapping between the actual objective rewards and their subjective value. The findings highlight a multifaceted basis for choice behaviour with distinct mappings between components of this behaviour and value sensitive brain regions

The Dopaminergic Midbrain Mediates an Effect of Average Reward on Pavlovian Vigor

Dopamine plays a key role in motivation. Phasic dopamine response reflects a reinforcement prediction error (RPE), whereas tonic dopamine activity is postulated to represent an average reward that mediates motivational vigor. However, it has been hard to find evidence concerning the neural encoding of average reward that is uncorrupted by influences of RPEs. We circumvented this difficulty in a novel visual search task where we measured participants' button pressing vigor in a context where information (underlying an RPE) about future average reward was provided well before the average reward itself. Despite no instrumental consequence, participants' pressing force increased for greater current average reward, consistent with a form of Pavlovian effect on motivational vigor. We recorded participants' brain activity during task performance with fMRI. Greater average reward was associated with enhanced activity in dopaminergic midbrain to a degree that correlated with the relationship between average reward and pressing vigor. Interestingly, an opposite pattern was observed in subgenual cingulate cortex, a region implicated in negative mood and motivational inhibition. These findings highlight a crucial role for dopaminergic midbrain in representing aspects of average reward and motivational vigor

Decreased value-sensitivity in schizophrenia

Pathophysiology in schizophrenia has been linked to aberrant incentive salience, namely the dysfunctional processing of value linked to abnormal dopaminergic activity. In line with this, recent studies showed impaired learning of value in schizophrenia. However, how value is used to guide behaviour independently from learning, as in risky choice, has rarely been examined in this disorder. We studied value-guided choice under risk in patients with schizophrenia and in controls using a task requiring a choice between a certain monetary reward, varying trial-by-trial, and a gamble offering an equal probability of getting double this certain amount or nothing. We observed that patients compared to controls exhibited reduced sensitivity to values, implying that their choices failed to flexibly adapt to the specific values on offer. Moreover, the degree of this value sensitivity inversely correlated with aberrant salience experience, suggesting that the inability to tune choice to value may be a key element of aberrant salience in the illness. Our results help clarify the cognitive mechanisms underlying improper attribution of value in schizophrenia and may thus inform cognitive interventions aimed at reinstating value sensitivity in patients

The role of the hippocampus in weighting expectations during inference under uncertainty

Making inference under uncertainty requires an optimal weighting of prior expectations and observations. How this weighting is realized in the brain remains elusive. To investigate this, we recorded functional neuroimaging data while participants estimated a number based on noisy observations. Crucially, the prior expectation about the variability of observations (an expected variability) was manipulated. Consistent with normative models, when novel observations were characterized by higher expected or observed variability, participants’ estimates relied more on expectations than novel observations and were characterized by higher stochasticity. Activity in hippocampus increased when novel evidence was characterized by higher expected or observed variability. Response in superior parietal cortex reflected a precision-weighted prediction error signal (i.e., the distance between observations and expectations) that was modulated by hippocampal activity. Our findings implicate the hippocampus during inference under uncertainty, suggesting a role in weighting prior representations over observations and in modulating responsivity of superior parietal cortex to prediction error