Anteseden dan Konsekuensi dari Price Satisfaction

The purpose of this paper is to explore the antecedents and consequents of price satisfaction. It argues that price satisfaction is composed of several dimensions (price transparency, pricequality ratio, relative price, price confidence, price reliability, and price fairness) and that companies should consider these dimensions when monitoring customer price satisfaction.Based on a theoretical discussion of the price dimensions, a questionnaire is developed that measures customer satisfaction with individual price dimensions. Using structural equation model analysis, the impact of price satisfaction dimensions on overall price satisfaction is measured, using a sample of 100 respondent that also customers from several car workshops.The research was analyzed with Structural Equation Model to analyze the path effect between the variable to answer the hypothesis testing. Before doing the structural equation model, thedata was tested with instrument testing, consist of validity and reliability test. Goodness fit measure was also used to make sure that the structural equation model in good fit condition.The result showed that price satisfaction, price confidence, price quality ratio, price fairness, and price transparency have significant effect toward price satisfaction. The relative price variable didn't have significant effect toward price satisfaction. For the price satisfaction toward word of mouth, also didn't give significant result. Based on the measurement of price satisfaction, managers are able to identify the drivers of price satisfaction, their satisfaction and relative importance in different market segments and, consequently they are able to take the right measures to increase customer satisfaction and word of mouth

Optimal time-based and cost-based coordinated project contracts with unobservable work rates

When managing a project with uncertain completion time and unobservable contractor's work rate, self-interest can create conflicts between the project manager and the contractor leading to actions that reduce the profits of both. We first investigate how the concept of supply contract coordination (i.e., a Nash equilibrium that yields the first-best solution for the entire supply chain) can be applied to project contract management. In our examination of three types of project contracts commonly used in practice, fixed price, time-based (i.e., price depends on the realized project completion time), and cost-based (i.e., price depends on the actual cost), we show that fixed price contracts and cost-plus contracts cannot coordinate a channel. With carefully chosen parameters, however, time-based, cost-sharing can achieve optimal channel coordination.Project contracts Supply contracts Channel coordination

Sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times: Impact on operating profits

When managing a project, a firm must evaluate multiple strategic factors and operational issues before deciding which tasks to keep in-house and which to outsource. We focus on one operational aspect of this evaluation process by examining the impact of different sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times on operating profits. As an initial attempt, we present two stylized models that capture two simplest types of projects: (a) a project with two "parallel" tasks that can be performed simultaneously and (b) a project with two "serial" tasks that must be performed sequentially. For each model, we determine the optimal operating profit for the case when the firm outsources zero task, one task, or two tasks. These operating profits can be informative for making sourcing decisions of different project tasks.Project management Sourcing decisions Stackelberg game

Project Management Contracts with Delayed Payments

When managing projects with considerable uncertainty, such as those arising in construction, defense, and new product development, it is customary for a manufacturer (project manager) to offer contracts under which each supplier (contractor) receives a prespecified payment when she completes her task. However, there are recent cases in which the manufacturer imposes "delayed payment" contracts under which each supplier is paid only when all suppliers have completed their tasks. By considering a model of one manufacturer and n \ge 2 identical and independent suppliers with exponential completion times, we analyze the impact of both a delayed payment regime and a no-delayed-payment regime on each supplier's effort level and on the manufacturer's net profit in equilibrium. When the suppliers' work rates are unadjustable, we conjecture that the manufacturer is actually worse off under the delayed payment regime. However, when the suppliers' work rates are adjustable, we obtain a different result: the delayed payment regime is more profitable for the manufacturer either when the project revenue is sufficiently small or when the number of suppliers is sufficiently large.supply chain management, game theory, product development and design