Collective economic decisions and the discursive dilemma

Most economic decisions involve judgments. When decisions are taken collectively, various judgment aggregation problems may occur. Here we consider an aggregation problem called the "discursive dilemma", which is characterized by an inconsistency between the aggregate judgment on the premises for a conclusion and the aggregate judgment on the conclusion itself. It thus matter for the decision whether the group uses a premise- or a conclusion-based decisionmaking procedure. The current literature, primarily within jurisprudence, philosophy, and social choice, consider aggregation of qualitative judgments on propositions. Most economic decisions, however, involve quantitative judgments on economic variables. We develop a framework that is suitable for analyzing the relevance of the discursive dilemma for economic decisions. Assuming that decisions are reached either through majority voting or by averaging, we find that the dilemma cannot be ruled out, except under some restrictive assumptions about the relationship between the premise-variables and the conclusion.Collective economic decisions, Judgement aggregation, Inconsistency

The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non- monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have di¤erent judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.Discursive dilemma; Monetary policy; MPC; Policy boards

Majority voting leads to unanimity

We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions under which the winners wish to compensate all losers, thus leading to unanimity for reform, rather than compensating some losers to form a non-maximal majority. The analysis employs concepts from cooperative game theory

Comparing Monetary Policy Transparency. The Eijffinger and Geraats Index - a Comment

There is by now a large volume of literature on central bank transparency and communication. One branch of this literature compares transparency across central banks and over time. Recent contributions in this vein are Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), and Geraats (2008), who all use an index developed by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). In this note I argue that the index can be very misleading. The argument is illustrated by the case of Norway, which has received a relatively low score on the index

Four essays on the political economy of economic reform

This thesis provides political-economy explanations for the prevalence of inefficient government policies. Possible solutions to the problem of non-adoption of efficient policies are also provided. Understanding why inefficient government policies exist, and how they may be reformed, is key in the field of political economy. A leading example is trade policies, where the reality of most countries’ policies is so blatantly contrary to all the normative prescriptions of the economist that there seems to be no way to understand it except by delving into the politics. Labor market policies provide other examples. The recent wave of economic reforms has heightened the interest in these questions. The thesis is part of Claussen’s Dr. Polit exam at the University of Oslo. Claussen defended the thesis on March 24, 2003

The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.publishedVersio

Explaining the Low US Inflation – Coincidence or “New Economy”? Evidence Based on a Wage-Price Spiral

We study possible factors behind the subdued inflation in the United States since the mid-1990s. A standard expectations-augmented Phillips curve does not exhibit structural breaks. However, a wage-price spiral comprising wage growth, consumer price inflation and producer price inflation shows an otherwise unexplained downward shift in CPI inflation since the mid-1990s. We estimate this downward shift to be approximately 1 percentage point since 1994. The result emerges in spite of a large number of explanatory variables and seems to reflect deep structural changes of the economy. Counterfactual simulation of the wage-price spiral shows that the low level of U.S. inflation during the late 1990s stems from coincidental favourable shocks as well as factors that may reflect new economy developments.publishedVersio

A Quantitative Discursive Dilemma

The typical judgment aggregation problem in economics and other fields is the following: A group of people has to judge/estimate the value of an uncertain variable y which is a function of κ other variables, i.e. y=D(χ1, ...χκ) . We analyze when it is possible for the group to arrive at collective judgements on the variables that respect D. We consider aggregators that ful ll Arrow s IIA-condition and neutrality. We show how possibility and impossibility depend on the functional form of D, and generalize Pettit s (2001) binary discursive dilemma to quantitative judgements.updatedVersio

Explaining Interest Rate Decisions When the MPC Members Believe in Different Stories

Modern central banks do not only announce the interest rate decision, they also communicate a "story" that explains why they reached the particular decision. When decisions are made by a committee, it could be difficult to find a story that is both consistent with the decision and representative for the committee. Two alternatives that give a unique and consistent story are: (i) vote on the interest rate and let the winner decide the story, (ii) vote on the elements of the story and let the interest rate follow from the story. The two procedures tend to give different interest rate decisions and different stories due to an aggregation inconsistency called the "discursive dilemma". We investigate the quality of the stories under the two approaches, and find that alternative (ii) gives stories that tend to be closer to the true (but unobservable) story. Thus, our results give an argument in favour of premise-based, as opposed to conclusion-based, decisionmaking.publishedVersio