268 research outputs found
Detecting social cliques for automated privacy control in online social networks
As a result of the increasing popularity of online social networking sites, millions of people spend a considerable portion of their social life on the Internet. The information exchanged in this context has obvious privacy risks. Interestingly, concerns of social network users about these risks are related not only to adversarial activities but also to users they are directly connected to (friends). In particular, many users want to occasionally hide portions of their information from certain groups of their friends. To satisfy their users' needs, social networking sites have introduced privacy mechanisms (such as Facebook's friend lists) that enable users to expose a particular piece of their information only to a subset of their friends. Unfortunately, friend lists need to be specified manually. As a result, users frequently do not use these mechanisms, either due to a lack of concern about privacy, but more often due to the large amount of time required for the necessary setup and management. In this paper, we propose a privacy control approach that addresses this problem by automatically detecting social cliques among the friends of a user. In our context, a social clique is a group of people whose members share a significant level of social connections, possibly due to common interests (hobbies) or a common location. To find cliques, we present an algorithm that, given a small number of friends (seed), uses the structure of the social graph to generate an approximate clique that contains this seed. The cliques found by the algorithm can be transformed directly into friend lists, making sure that a piece of sensitive data is exposed only to the members of a particular clique. Our evaluation on the Facebook platform shows that our method delivers good results, and the cliques that our algorithm identifies typically cover a large fraction of the actual social cliques. © 2012 IEEE
Message in a bottle: Sailing past censorship
Exploiting recent advances in monitoring technology and the drop of its costs, authoritarian and oppressive regimes are tightening the grip around the virtual lives of their citizens. Meanwhile, the dissidents, oppressed by these regimes, are organizing online, cloaking their activity with anti-censorship systems that typically consist of a network of anonymizing proxies. The censors have become well aware of this, and they are systematically finding and blocking all the entry points to these networks. So far, they have been quite successful. We believe that, to achieve resilience to blocking, anti-censorship systems must abandon the idea of having a limited number of entry points. Instead, they should establish first contact in an online location arbitrarily chosen by each of their users. To explore this idea, we have developed Message In A Bottle, a protocol where any blog post becomes a potential “drop point ” for hidden messages. We have developed and released a proof-of-concept application using our system, and demonstrated its feasibility. To block this system, censors are left with a needle-in-a-haystack problem: Unable to identify what bears hidden messages, they must block everything, effectively disconnecting their own network from a large part of the Internet. This, hopefully, is a cost too high to bear.
Shellzer: a tool for the dynamic analysis of malicious shellcode
Abstract. Shellcode is malicious binary code whose execution is triggered after the exploitation of a vulnerability. The automated analysis of malicious shellcode is a challenging task, since encryption and evasion techniques are often used. This paper introduces Shellzer, a novel dynamic shellcode analyzer that generates a complete list of the API functions called by the shellcode, and, in addition, returns the binaries retrieved at run-time by the shellcode. The tool is able to modify on-thefly the arguments and the return values of certain API functions in order to simulate specific execution contexts and the availability of the external resources needed by the shellcode. This tool has been tested with over 24,000 real-world samples, extracted from both web-based driveby-download attacks and malicious PDF documents. The results of the analysis show that Shellzer is able to successfully analyze 98 % of the shellcode samples
Token-Level Fuzzing
Fuzzing has become a commonly used approach to identifying bugs in complex,
real-world programs. However, interpreters are notoriously difficult to fuzz
effectively, as they expect highly structured inputs, which are rarely produced
by most fuzzing mutations. For this class of programs, grammar-based fuzzing
has been shown to be effective. Tools based on this approach can find bugs in
the code that is executed after parsing the interpreter inputs, by following
language-specific rules when generating and mutating test cases. Unfortunately,
grammar-based fuzzing is often unable to discover subtle bugs associated with
the parsing and handling of the language syntax. Additionally, if the grammar
provided to the fuzzer is incomplete, or does not match the implementation
completely, the fuzzer will fail to exercise important parts of the available
functionality. In this paper, we propose a new fuzzing technique, called
Token-Level Fuzzing. Instead of applying mutations either at the byte level or
at the grammar level, Token-Level Fuzzing applies mutations at the token level.
Evolutionary fuzzers can leverage this technique to both generate inputs that
are parsed successfully and generate inputs that do not conform strictly to the
grammar. As a result, the proposed approach can find bugs that neither
byte-level fuzzing nor grammar-based fuzzing can find. We evaluated Token-Level
Fuzzing by modifying AFL and fuzzing four popular JavaScript engines, finding
29 previously unknown bugs, several of which could not be found with
state-of-the-art byte-level and grammar-based fuzzers
POISED: Spotting Twitter Spam Off the Beaten Paths
Cybercriminals have found in online social networks a propitious medium to
spread spam and malicious content. Existing techniques for detecting spam
include predicting the trustworthiness of accounts and analyzing the content of
these messages. However, advanced attackers can still successfully evade these
defenses.
Online social networks bring people who have personal connections or share
common interests to form communities. In this paper, we first show that users
within a networked community share some topics of interest. Moreover, content
shared on these social network tend to propagate according to the interests of
people. Dissemination paths may emerge where some communities post similar
messages, based on the interests of those communities. Spam and other malicious
content, on the other hand, follow different spreading patterns.
In this paper, we follow this insight and present POISED, a system that
leverages the differences in propagation between benign and malicious messages
on social networks to identify spam and other unwanted content. We test our
system on a dataset of 1.3M tweets collected from 64K users, and we show that
our approach is effective in detecting malicious messages, reaching 91%
precision and 93% recall. We also show that POISED's detection is more
comprehensive than previous systems, by comparing it to three state-of-the-art
spam detection systems that have been proposed by the research community in the
past. POISED significantly outperforms each of these systems. Moreover, through
simulations, we show how POISED is effective in the early detection of spam
messages and how it is resilient against two well-known adversarial machine
learning attacks
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