Vicarious Shame and Guilt

Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another’s wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was predicted by one’s perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other person’s wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event. Implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed

Guilt, shame, and antiwar action in an authoritarian country at war

Feeling guilt and shame for the harm done to others by the ingroup can facilitate intergroup reconciliation. Most of the studies showing this effect are conducted in democratic countries and on historical, not current, conflicts. We investigated the role of group‐based guilt and shame in collective action in an authoritarian country at war. We asked more than 1000 Russians living in Russia, in a sample representative of the country's population by gender and age, about their experiences of group‐based guilt and shame regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine and their past and future antiwar political actions. We tested whether political efficacy is necessary for experiencing group‐based guilt and shame, and whether these emotions are predictive of antiwar action over and above other emotions and attitudes. Democratic values, not political efficacy, were the most robust predictor of group‐based guilt and shame. Only moral shame, but not image shame or guilt, predicted past and future antiwar action. Whereas attitude towards the war and moral shame predicted engagement in antiwar action (vs none), other negative dominant emotions like anger predicted the degree of this engagement. We highlight the gaps in the study of collective action and the need for more evidence from nondemocratic contexts

How do conflict narratives shape conflict- and peace-related outcomes among majority group members? The role of competitive victimhood in intractable conflicts

Previous research in the Turkish–Kurdish conflict context highlighted two opposing conflict narratives: (a) a terrorism narrative and (b) an independence narrative. In this article, we argue that these narratives are relevant to protracted and asymmetrical intergroup conflict (e.g., independence struggles), and therefore have consequences for conflict- and peace-related outcomes regardless of conflict contexts. We tested this generalizability hypothesis in parallel studies in the context of Turkish–Kurdish (Study 1) and Israeli–Palestinian relations (Study 2) among majority group members (Turks and Jewish Israelis, respectively). We also investigated competitive victimhood as a potential mediating variable in the relationship between conflict narratives on the one side and support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support for aggressive policies on the other, in parallel studies with the two aforementioned contexts. We argue that the terrorism narrative is essentially a negation of the narrative of the other group, and the independence narrative is a consideration of that narrative; therefore, competitive victimhood would be lower/higher when the narrative of the other is acknowledged/denied. Results point to the crucial relationship between endorsing conflict narratives and conflict- and peace-related outcomes through competitive victimhood, and to the possibility that these conflict narratives may show some similarities across different conflict contexts

How mainstream and alternative media shape public attitudes toward social change: evidence from two panel studies during Malaysia’s democratic transition

Mainstream and alternative media often frame key political events in divergent ways. The present research examined how mainstream and alternative media consumption was linked to public support for Bersih, a pro-democracy movement in Malaysia. We conducted a two-wave panel study before and after the Bersih 5 protests demanding electoral reform (N = 422), and another two-wave panel study before and after the 14th General Elections which were historic in unseating the ruling government (N = 386). Against mounting corruption, the two events were important to Malaysia's democratic transition. Across both studies, alternative media consumption was linked to more positive attitudes toward the Bersih movement, especially among people who were strong supporters of the previous ruling government. Mainstream media did not play a consistent role in shaping attitudes toward the movement, nor was there evidence of backlash among government supporters. Thus, alternative media may have legitimized the cause for social change

A Field Study Around a Racial Justice Protest on a College Campus: The Proximal Impact of Collective Action on the Social Change Attitudes of Uninvolved Bystanders

Social movements often use protests and other collective actions to draw public attention to their cause, yet the psychological reactions to such actions from their targeted audience is not well understood. This research investigates uninvolved bystanders’ immediate responses to collective action using a quasi-experimental field study designed around a racial justice protest that took place at a large public university in the United States. We surveyed two student samples exactly one week apart at the same time and location, first in the absence of protest and then again at the time of a racial justice protest (Total N = 240). We found that participants who believed that racism was not a problem on campus had more negative attitudes toward racial justice protests and protesters, as well as lower support for anti-racist efforts on campus on the day of the protest, compared to the day without a protest. These findings provide initial evidence that a protest encounter may trigger a backlash effect amongst those who have the most resistant attitudes toward social change

Media and public attitudes toward social change

Data, analysis code, and study materials for the paper on media and public attitudes toward social change in Malaysia

Empowerment and threat in response to mass protest shape public support for a social movement and social change: a panel study in the context of the Bersih movement in Malaysia

One path to social change is through sustained collective action. Although such actions often explicitly target the public audience to raise support for a movement's cause, we know little about how the public psychologically responds to protests. To examine this question, a sample of Malaysians was surveyed before and immediately after the occurrence of mass street protests in Malaysia (N = 422) using a two-wave longitudinal design. Analyses revealed that (beyond pre-existing levels of movement identity and support for social change) experiencing empowerment in response to the protests promoted a supportive movement identity and more support for social change after the protests, whereas experiencing threat in response to the protests promoted an oppositional movement identity and less support for social change after the protests. This research suggests that the psychological impact of ongoing protests on the public can determine subsequent public support for the movement and its goals

Collective psychological ownership and the rise of reactionary counter‐movements defending the status quo

Social movements pushing for social change are often met with reactionary counter-movements that defend the status quo. The present research examined this interplay by focusing on the role of racial majority group members claiming collective psychological ownership. We examined collective ownership that stems from being native to the land and from being founders of the nation. Study 1 found that in Malaysia, the Malay majority group endorsed more native ownership than Chinese and Indian minorities, which in turn predicted greater threat in response to protests demanding electoral reforms and subsequently greater support for a reactionary pro-government movement. Situated in the United States, Study 2 found that the more that White Americans endorsed founder ownership beliefs, the more they reported negative attitudes towards the Black Lives Matter protests, which in turn predicted more support for White nationalistic counter-protests. This effect was stronger among White people compared to people of colour. Study 3 examined both founder and native ownership in Australia. Founder (but not native) ownership beliefs predicted more negative attitudes towards Invasion Day protests, which subsequently predicted more support for counter-protests defending Australia Day celebrations. Implications of culture-specific beliefs about collective ownership for social movement research are discussed

They’re All the Same, Sometimes: Prejudicial Attitudes toward Muslims Influence Motivated Judgments of Entitativity and Collective Responsibility for an Individual’s Actions

Are groups responsible for the actions of individual members? Previous research suggests that people use judgments about the entitativity of an outgroup when judging its collective responsibility for the actions of its members. But do these judgments of outgroup entitativity change when outgroup individuals engage in positive vs. negative deeds? We argue that people make motivated judgments of outgroup entitativity based on their pre-existing attitudes toward the outgroup and the valence of outgroup members' actions. In both a first study and a pre-registered replication, we find that when people have positive attitudes toward Muslims, they judge Muslims to be lower in entitativity following a Muslim's negative action and higher in entitativity following a Muslim individuals' positive action, thus holding Muslims responsible for positive, but not negative individual actions. We also find a weaker mirror pattern of effects for those who have negative attitudes toward Muslims

They’re All the Same, Sometimes: Prejudicial Attitudes toward Muslims Influence Motivated Judgments of Entitativity and Collective Responsibility for an Individual’s Actions

Are groups responsible for the actions of individual members? Previous research suggests that people use judgments about the entitativity of an outgroup when judging its collective responsibility for the actions of its members. But do these judgments of outgroup entitativity change when outgroup individuals engage in positive vs. negative deeds? We argue that people make motivated judgments of outgroup entitativity based on their pre-existing attitudes toward the outgroup and the valence of outgroup members' actions. In both a first study and a pre-registered replication, we find that when people have positive attitudes toward Muslims, they judge Muslims to be lower in entitativity following a Muslim's negative action and higher in entitativity following a Muslim individuals' positive action, thus holding Muslims responsible for positive, but not negative individual actions. We also find a weaker mirror pattern of effects for those who have negative attitudes toward Muslims