On Horgan's Causal Compatibilism

It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which rests on supervenience, is such an attractive theory. On one side it secures the mental a preservation of its unique and different nature; on the other side it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalistic view. But Kim's argument from supervenience reminds us that while trying to do so the antireductionists face the following dilemma: if mental properties have causal powers we risk a violation of the causal closure of the physics and threaten our physicalistic position; if they do not have them we adopt epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental causal powers of any sort. So, either we violate the causal closure of the physics or we adopt epiphenomenalism. We can write it as an argument in the form of a constructive dilemma and may call it the causal dilemma

In Brain We Trust

The central question of Churchland’s book Braintrust1 is where do moral values come from? She answers it in terms of the latest research in neuroscience, evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, and genetics. By explaining and understanding our social practices via scientific research Churchland tries to provide a neurobiological platform for morality and thus illuminates the usually neglected account that moral properties are in some sense natural properties. She puts the results of the latest empirical experiments into the philosophical framework in such a way that it forms a foundation for our moral behaviour. The book is therefore about the biological approach to human morality. However, in what sense moral properties are (via social properties) natural (neurobiological) properties, as the naturalistic approach to the origins of human morality suggests, remains murky. To blame is presumably the resently limited powers of neurobiological explanations of social, and consequently, moral behaviour since the complex neural mechanisms of our brains are still not clear enough

Die Grenzen der funktionalen Reduktion

It is obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which considers mental phenomena to be causally efficacious, is so attractive: it preserves the unique nature of the mental (mental realism), while at the same time it tries to secure a place for the mental in our world which is compatible with a physicalist ideology (physical monism). But Kim’s so called argument from supervenience reminds us of the dilemma that we face while favouring antireductionist solutions of mental causation which might force us to abandon them and look for some other more plausible ones. The trouble is, namely, the following: either mental properties have causal powers or not. If they have them then we violate the causal closure principle which means a denial of physicalism. If not, then we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental causal powers of any sort. So, either we give up physicalism or accept epiphenomenalism. Since antireductionism loses both ways neither of these options represents a true alternative for its proponents. For this reason some authors think that we should look at reductionism in order to explain mental causation in a more satisfactory manner. However, it is not the traditional Nagel model of reduction that is in play here, but some rather more sophisticated ones. The first part of the article presents the reasons for dropping classical reduction, the second part describes Kim’s functional model of reduction as one of its possible successors, and the final part of the article discusses the reasons for its failure.Il est évident pourquoi l`image antiréductionniste de la causalité mentale, selon laquelle les phénomènes mentaux sont considérés comme des causes efficientes est si attirante : elle préserve la nature unique du mental (réalisme mental), tout en essayant d`assurer la place pour le mental dans notre monde, ce qui est compatible à l`idéologie physicaliste (monisme physique). Mais le soi disant argument de Kim provenant de la survenance nous rappelle le dilemme auquel nous devons faire face lorsque nous favorisons les solutions antiréductionnistes de la causalité mentale, qui pourraient nous forcer à les abandonner et en chercher d`autres plus plausibles. La difficulté est la suivante: les propriétés mentales ont des pouvoirs causals ou non. Si elles en ont, nous violons alors le principe de la conclusion causale, ce qui est la négation du physicalisme. Si ce n`est pas le cas, nous acceptons l`épiphénoménalisme qui conteste les pouvoirs mentaux causals de toutes sortes. Ainsi, soit on renonce au physicalisme, soit on accepte l`épiphénoménalisme. Puisque, dans les deux cas, l`antiréductionnisme est perdant, aucune des deux options ne présente une vraie alternative pour ses tenants. Pour cette raison-là certains auteurs pensent que nous devons nous adresser au réductionnisme afin d`expliquer la causalité mentale d`une manière plus satisfaisante. Pourtant, ce n`est pas le modèle traditionnel de réduction de Nagel qui est ici en jeu, mais il s`agit plutôt d`autres modèles plus sophistiqués. La première partie de cet article présente les raisons pour que soit abandonnée la réduction classique, la deuxième décrit le modèle fonctionnel de réduction de Kim, qui en est un successeur potentiel, alors que la fin traite les raisons de son échec.Es liegt auf der Hand, warum das antireduktionistische Bild der mentalen Verursachung, die mentale Phänomene für kausal wirkungsvoll hält, so attraktiv ist: Es bewahrt die einmalige Natur des Mentalen (mentaler Realismus), während es gleichzeitig dem Mentalen in unserer Welt seinen Platz zu sichern sucht, was mit der physikalistischen Ideologie (physikalistischer Monismus) kompatibel ist. Doch Kims so genanntes Supervenienzargument erinnert an das Dilemma, dem wir begegnen, wenn wir antireduktionistischen Lösungen der mentalen Verursachung den Vorzug geben, was uns dazu zwingen kann, diese aufzugeben, um nach anderen, plausibleren zu suchen. Das Problem liegt nämlich im Folgenden: Entweder besitzen mentale Eigenschaften kausale Fähigkeiten, oder sie besitzen sie nicht. Wenn sie sie besitzen, dann verstoßen wir gegen das Kausalprinzip der Schlussfolgerung, was eine Negation des Physikalismus bedeutet. Wenn nicht, dann akzeptieren wir den Epiphänomenalismus, der kausale mentale Fähigkeiten jedweder Art negiert. Somit geben wir entweder den Physikalismus auf oder wir akzeptieren den Epiphänomenalismus. Da der Antireduktionismus in beiden Fällen verliert, bildet keine dieser Optionen eine echte Alternative für seine Proponenten. Aus diesem Grunde glauben einige Autoren, dass wir uns an den Reduktionismus halten sollten, um mentale Kausalitäten zufriedenstellend erklären zu können. Gleichwohl ist hierbei der traditionelle, von Nagel geprägte Reduktionismus nicht angebracht, ein anderes ausgeklügeltes Modell sollte auf den Plan treten. Der erste Teil des Artikels stellt Gründe für die Abkehr von der klassischen Reduktion vor, der zweite beschreibt Kims funktionales Modell der Reduktion als eines seiner möglichen Nachfolger, während der Schlussteil den Ursachen seines Scheiterns auf den Grund geht

Mentalna vzročnost: Kimova dilema

The crucial problems to which all theories of mind, not only the physicalistic, have to plausibly answer in order to successfully solve the mind-body problem are those that are related to causation. The problem of causal exclusion is particularly closely connected with physicalism, which under the assumption that every physical event also has a physical cause, threatens to exclude mental events from causal explanations. It questions thereby the causal efficacy of mental properties, which poses a serious problem for those who are looking for such answers to the question of the relation between mind and body that preserve physicalism as well as the special nature of the mental. Some physicalists have hoped that the mind-body problem might be solved with the help of supervenience but, in Kim's opinion, they are wrong. Kim namely argues that under the assumption of supervenience we end up with a dilemma whose horns, for such supervenient physicalists, do not represent a true alternative at all.Za vse teorije duha, ne samo fizikalistične, so problemi, na katerih se lomijo kopja in kijih mora dana teorija uspešno rešiti, če želi predstavljati pravo alternativo uveljavljenim, problemi, ki izhajajo iz vzročnosti. Se posebej tesno je s fizikalizmom povezan problem vzročne izključitve, ki ob predpostavki, da ima vsak fizični dogodek tudi svoj fizični vzrok, grozi, da bodo mentalne lastnosti izključene iz vzročnih razlag. S tem postavlja pod vprašaj njihovo vzročno učinkovitost in tako za iskanje takšnega odgovora na vprašanje o razmerju med duhom in telesom, ki ohranja fizikalizem, mentalnemu pa zagotavlja njegovo posebnost, predstavlja resno težavo. Nekateri fi-zikalisti so upali, da se bo dalo omenjeni problem rešiti s pomočjo supervenience, vendar so se po Kimovem mnenju ušteli, saj nas njegov argument kljub predpostavki o supervenienci vodi v vzročno dilemo, katere rogova za takšne supervenientne fizi-kaliste ne predstavljata prave alternative. V članku sta poleg omenjenega predstavljena še odgovor Thomassonove na vzročno dilemo in moj ugovor

In brain we trust

The central question of Churchland’s book Braintrust1 is where do moral values come from? She answers it in terms of the latest research in neuroscience, evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, and genetics. By explaining and understanding our social practices via scientific research Churchland tries to provide a neurobiological platform for morality and thus illuminates the usually neglected account that moral properties are in some sense natural properties. She puts the results of the latest empirical experiments into the philosophical framework in such a way that it forms a foundation for our moral behaviour. The book is therefore about the biological approach to human morality. However, in what sense moral properties are (via social properties) natural (neurobiological) properties, as the naturalistic approach to the origins of human morality suggests, remains murky. To blame is presumably the resently limited powers of neurobiological explanations of social, and consequently, moral behaviour since the complex neural mechanisms of our brains are still not clear enough

Critical thinking in education

The study argues for the claim that a correct argumentation, i.e. a non-fallacious or good reasoning, should be the essential part of the education process, which is not always the case. The bad argumentation makes human standards and interpersonal relationships worse, and leads to the growth of social conflicts and an instable society. If the legislature, executive and judiciary branches of power did not listen to good arguments, our lives would not be as good as they are since the state might pass bad, dangerous and unjust laws. A person trained in critical thinking starting in their youth would be able to tell a difference between good and bad arguments and recognize the fact that accepting the former and dropping the latter is the only way to avoid the above mentioned negative characteristics of a society. By teaching pupils how to employ the prescribed standards of a correct argumentation using everyday examples helps them to avoid adopting certain views on the ground of their popularity, affections produced in observers, their popularity etc., which are classic examples of logical fallacies. An early training in critical thinking could make obvious the fact that, a democracy consisting among other things also in a social, racial and gender equality, after all, does not mean that sometimes left arguments win and sometimes the right ones, and that there is no difference between them in the long run

Artificial intelligence versus human talents in learning process

To highlight the differences between conventional educational systems and CBLS - computer based learning systems. It is useful to consider CBLS, as the class of a system most closely related to artificial intelligence - AI. In such a system, the ultimate goal is to create a virtual duplicate of reality for learning, analysis, training, experimentation, or other purposes. Simulating reality is an approach that may or may not be useful at creating experience. This distinction yield several consequences. In CBLS, behaviour should be as realistic as possible, the representation of environment tends to be uniform and consistent and allowing users to act freely within that environment. To teach users through realistic experience CBLS design techniques can make the experience much more memorable. In such an environment the context and control afforded by design techniques allow the integration of technologies and evaluation of the overall experience. Perhaps it is time to take lessons of CBLS and AI in a learning design and teaching tools seriously. At the beginning we will point out one simple question: could the ideas, methodology and techniques of AI also be applied to a development of relatively serious mind applications and can they substitute human teachers? And the answer will be continued in our paper

The architecture of a school system according to the theory of dynamical systems

From the experience of recent years it seems clear that the existing educational system, as a whole, is perceived as an ailing system that fails to meet the needs of a major portion of the society it serves. Every aspect of the educational process must be studied and reconsidered in the light of new and different societal expectations. In the last decades we started with one school reform after the other, but it looks now that these changes had no positive impact whatsoever. Even worse, the school system was damaged afterwards. In this paper we will explore some possibilities how to improve it without facing these consequences. The main idea is, as a result of our latest research, that mathematical methods for describing and simulating could be very useful for predicting and simulating school systems without using a long term and complex empirical experimentation. The paper introduces the correlation between the dynamical mathematical calculus and the educational school system and elaborates to some extent the basic idea of using the former to predict the latter

Van Gulick\u27s solution of the exclusion problem revisited

The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i. e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurologythe latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them "epiphenomenal". The article introduces Van Gulick\u27s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick\u27s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accep