Asiens aufstrebende Riesen: Perspektiven der sino-indischen Beziehungen: aus chinesischen Fachzeitschriften der Jahre 2007 und 2008

Im Zuge ihrer rasanten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung haben China und Indien in den letzten Jahren auch deutlich an internationalem Einfluss gewonnen, vor allem in Asien. Im Westen wird der Aufstieg des demokratischen Indien mit weitaus größerer Gelassenheit betrachtet als jener Chinas, weil die Volksrepublik eher als Herausforderung universal verstandener westlicher Standards und Werte wahrgenommen wird. Wie beurteilen die Chinesen die Entwicklung ihres südlichen Nachbarn? Welche Schlüsse ziehen sie daraus für die Zukunft der sino-indischen Beziehungen? (Autorenreferat

Der Klimagipfel von Kopenhagen aus der Sicht Chinas: aus chinesischen Fachzeitschriften vom Januar 2010

Vom 7. bis 18. Dezember 2009 fand in der dänischen Hauptstadt Kopenhagen die Klimakonferenz der Vereinten Nationen statt. Der Auftritt der chinesischen Delegation erregte dabei besonderes Aufsehen. Westliche Medien und Politiker machten in erster Linie die Volksrepublik für das Scheitern der Konferenz verantwortlich. China habe durch seine aggressive und destruktive Verhandlungsführung den Abschluss eines Klimaabkommens verhindert. Doch wie beurteilen die Chinesen selbst den Ausgang der Konferenz und ihr eigenes Auftreten in Kopenhagen? (Autorenreferat

Entspannung in der Taiwanstraße? Aus Publikationen taiwanesischer Denkfabriken in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2008

Nach den Wahlen in Taiwan 2008 und der Ablösung von Pekings »Erzfeind« Chen Shui bian (Demokratische Fortschrittspartei - DPP) durch den China-freundlicheren Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang - KMT) bestand die Hoffnung, dass sich die Beziehungen zum Festland verbessern würden. Trotz abgemilderter Rhetorik und vertrauensbildenden Gesten der neuen Regierung Ma gibt die chinesische Führung jedoch der Forderung Taiwans nach mehr internationalem Spielraum nicht nach. Es bleibt also die Frage, ob sich die in Ansätzen erkennbare Entspannung der Beziehungen verstetigt oder ob das mangelnde Entgegenkommen Pekings den innenpolitischen Druck in Taiwan verstärkt und für neue Spannungen in der Taiwanstraße sorgt. (Autorenreferat

Die "Harmonische Welt" und Chinas Rolle im internationalen System: aus chinesischen Fachzeitschriften der Jahre 2006-2008

Im Jahr 2005 rief der chinesische Staatspräsident Hu Jintao bei einer Rede anlässlich des 60. Jahrestages der Gründung der Vereinten Nationen erstmals zum Aufbau einer »Harmonischen Welt« auf. Diese zeichnet sich laut Hu durch dauerhaften Frieden und gemeinsamen Wohlstand aus. Die Außenpolitik, die China im Rahmen seiner derzeitigen »friedlichen Entwicklung« zur Großmacht verfolge, stehe im Zeichen von Frieden, Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit. Der auf die traditionelle konfuzianische Lehre zurückgeführte Begriff Harmonie hat sich in den letzten Jahren zu einem Modewort in der chinesischen Politik entwickelt: So ist die Rede vom Aufbau einer »Harmonischen Gesellschaft« im Inland, von einer »Harmonischen Asien-Pazifik-Region« oder vom »Harmonischen Nahen Osten«. Dabei fehlt es dem Begriff jedoch an einer scharfen Kontur und klaren Bedeutung. (Autorenreferat

China’s Rise as a Global S&T Power and China–EU Cooperation

In recent years, China has made noticeable progress in its quest to become a global science and technology (S&T) power. EU leaders see China as both a competitor and as a partner for scientific cooperation. The European Union benefits immensely from cooperating with China and has expectations regarding access to Chinese markets, knowledge, personnel and funding opportunities. However, China–EU S&T cooperation has also met a number of challenges, including the infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR), increasing competition from the Chinese high-tech sector, limited market access for European companies, and Chinese “indigenous innovation” measures. In addition, some analysts have raised concerns about the potential security impact of European technology transfers to China. While Europeans need to develop a greater awareness of potential security implications of their cooperation with China, this cooperation will be essential if the EU wants to maintain its position as a global S&T leader. The best way to stay ahead in the global S&T race is not to follow a strategy of “scientific containment,” but to strengthen Europe’s own innovative capabilities

China’s Rise as a Global S&T Power and China–EU Cooperation

In recent years, China has made noticeable progress in its quest to become a global science and technology (S&T) power. EU leaders see China as both a competitor and as a partner for scientific cooperation. The European Union benefits immensely from cooperating with China and has expectations regarding access to Chinese markets, knowledge, personnel and funding opportunities. However, China–EU S&T cooperation has also met a number of challenges, including the infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR), increasing competition from the Chinese high-tech sector, limited market access for European companies, and Chinese “indigenous innovation” measures. In addition, some analysts have raised concerns about the potential security impact of European technology transfers to China. While Europeans need to develop a greater awareness of potential security implications of their cooperation with China, this cooperation will be essential if the EU wants to maintain its position as a global S&T leader. The best way to stay ahead in the global S&T race is not to follow a strategy of “scientific containment,” but to strengthen Europe’s own innovative capabilities

The Current State of European Union–China High-Tech Cooperation

In line with the European policy of supporting China’s economic reform and development, research institutes and companies in the European Union (EU) have been the major sources for high-technology exports to the People’s Republic of China in the past thirty years. Dual-use technologies ranging from aerospace to semiconductors play a central role for economic development as well as for modern military development, including network-centric warfare. Yet a comprehensive EU paradigm on China’s military rise and the impact of these technology transfers has not evolved. The EU–China “strategic partnership” is still dominated by economic considerations. Lack of coordination between the national and the European level contribute to the risks accompanying EU–China collaboration in this field. The differences between EU and U.S. perceptions of China’s military rise provide potential for further Transatlantic discord, as happened during the acrimonious debate on the intended lifting of the EU arms embargo on China in 2004–2005

The Current State of European Union–China High-Tech Cooperation

In line with the European policy of supporting China’s economic reform and development, research institutes and companies in the European Union (EU) have been the major sources for high-technology exports to the People’s Republic of China in the past thirty years. Dual-use technologies ranging from aerospace to semiconductors play a central role for economic development as well as for modern military development, including network-centric warfare. Yet a comprehensive EU paradigm on China’s military rise and the impact of these technology transfers has not evolved. The EU–China “strategic partnership” is still dominated by economic considerations. Lack of coordination between the national and the European level contribute to the risks accompanying EU–China collaboration in this field. The differences between EU and U.S. perceptions of China’s military rise provide potential for further Transatlantic discord, as happened during the acrimonious debate on the intended lifting of the EU arms embargo on China in 2004–2005

The GABAB1a isoform mediates heterosynaptic depression at hippocampal mossy fiber synapses

GABA(B) receptor subtypes are based on the subunit isoforms GABA(B1a) and GABA(B1b), which associate with GABA(B2) subunits to form pharmacologically indistinguishable GABA(B(1a,2)) and GABA(B(1b,2)) receptors. Studies with mice selectively expressing GABA(B1a) or GABA(B1b) subunits revealed that GABA(B(1a,2)) receptors are more abundant than GABA(B(1b,2)) receptors at glutamatergic terminals. Accordingly, it was found that GABA(B(1a,2)) receptors are more efficient than GABA(B(1b,2)) receptors in inhibiting glutamate release when maximally activated by exogenous application of the agonist baclofen. Here, we used a combination of genetic, ultrastructural and electrophysiological approaches to analyze to what extent GABA(B(1a,2)) and GABA(B(1b,2)) receptors inhibit glutamate release in response to physiological activation. We first show that at hippocampal mossy fiber (MF)-CA3 pyramidal neuron synapses more GABA(B1a) than GABA(B1b) protein is present at presynaptic sites, consistent with the findings at other glutamatergic synapses. In the presence of baclofen at concentrations <or=1 microm, both GABA(B(1a,2)) and GABA(B(1b,2)) receptors contribute to presynaptic inhibition of glutamate release. However, at lower concentrations of baclofen, selectively GABA(B(1a,2)) receptors contribute to presynaptic inhibition. Remarkably, exclusively GABA(B(1a,2)) receptors inhibit glutamate release in response to synaptically released GABA. Specifically, we demonstrate that selectively GABA(B(1a,2)) receptors mediate heterosynaptic depression of MF transmission, a physiological phenomenon involving transsynaptic inhibition of glutamate release via presynaptic GABA(B) receptors. Our data demonstrate that the difference in GABA(B1a) and GABA(B1b) protein levels at MF terminals is sufficient to produce a strictly GABA(B1a)-specific effect under physiological conditions. This consolidates that the differential subcellular localization of the GABA(B1a) and GABA(B1b) proteins is of regulatory relevance