Liquidity Shocks and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the properties of an economy subject to random liquidity shocks. As in Kiyotaki and Moore [2008], liquidity shocks affect the ease with which equity can be used as to finance the down-payment for new investment projects. We obtain a liquidity frontier which separates the state-space into two regions (liquidity constrained and unconstrained). In the unconstrained region, the economy behaves according to the dynamics of the standard real business cycle model. Below the frontier, liquidity shocks have the effects of investment shocks. In this region, investment is under-efficient and there is a wedge between the price of equity and the real cost of capital. As with investment shocks, we argue that liquidity shocks are not an important source of business cycle fluctuations in absence of other frictions affecting the labor market.Business Cycle, Asset Pricing, Liquidity

Monetary Policy under Balance Sheet Uncertainty

A group of developing countries bear high rates of financial dollarisation. Under this circumstance, monetary-policy makers are uncertain about the presence and scale of potentially harmful effects that might appear because of balance sheet mismatches arising from high and unexpected depreciations of the domestic currency. We build a setup whereby central bankers have two competing models in mind. Model A is a standard model for a small open economy whereas Model B has a builtin non-linear balance sheet effect. Whether the balance sheet mismatch problem exists or not, a Bayesian optimization procedure that assigns a positive probability to Model B, perpetuates model-indeterminacy. This happens because the optimal Bayesian regulator does not allow sizeable exchange rate swings (dirty floating), and therefore blurs the information to distinguish among models. We call this effect the Balance Sheet Trap. We show that, given the presence of the Balance Sheet Trap, introducing the learning dynamics into the central banker’s problem is optimal. Thus, we argue that intentional policy experimentation is highly desirable since it provides for an escape to the Balance Sheet Trap

Learning under Fear of Floating

Cross-country evidence suggests that during recent years a large fraction of developing countries seem to began to overcome fear of oating, i.e., a lower relative volatility of exchange rates to monetary policy instruments. To explain this trend, we build a model that describes the behavior of Central Banks in developing countries under uncertainty and fear of misspecication about the eects of exchange rate depreciations. The Central Bank is uncertain about two sub-models which dier in that exchange rate depreciations can cause output either to expand (textbook eect) or contract (balance sheet eect). Optimal policy within the second sub-model is consistent with fear of floating. A feature of fear of oating is that, by preventing sizeable exchange rate swings, Central Banks could loose valuable information useful to distinguish among models. We describe how the Central Bank's the evolution of the prior depends on the optimal policy and viceversa. We conclude that the trend towards less fear of floating may not be explained by Bayesian or robust policies because it would have been too quick to explain the data. However, if there was a parameter change affecting many countries during the early 2000's, the model generates the observed pattern.Balance Sheet Effect, Fear of Floating, Model Uncertainty, Learning, Monetary Policy, Policy Experimentation, Robustness

Non-Linear Effects of Monetary Policy and Real Exchange Rate Shocks in Partially Dollarized Economies: An Empirical Study for Peru

We study whether monetary policy and real exchange rate shocks have non-linear effects on output and inflation in a partially dollarized economy such as Peru. For this purpose, we use a Smooth Transition Vector Autoregression methodology and then report impulse-response functions for shocks of different sign and size, and conditional to the initial position in the business cycle. We find evidence of non-linearities which imply a convex aggregate supply curve: in particular, monetary policy is more likely to affect the output during recessions than in booms, while the opposite is found for the inflation. Regarding real exchange rate shocks, we show that depreciations have greater negative effects during economic downturns and a higher pass-through rate in the positive side of the business cycle.Non-linearities, Monetary Policy, Smooth Transition VAR, Dollarization

Corruption and Development Indicators: An Empirical Review

In this paper we report international evidence on the relationship between corruption and several development indicators such as economic stability, quality in educational expenditures, fiscal income, inequality, investment and economic growth. We first show how this relationship is negative by presenting simple unconditional correlations between corruption and these indicators. We then procede to quantify the effects of corruption on growth: we estimate a Dynamic Panel Data model for a sample of 80 countries and taking 1960-2000 as our sample period. Our findings suggest that in improvement in corruption indicators from levels in Latina America and Africa to developed country standards would increase output growth in 0,5% and 0,7% respectively.Corruption, Development, Growth

A framework for debt-maturity management

En este trabajo se determina el problema de la gestión óptima de la deuda pública en una pequeña economía abierta. El Gobierno emite un continuo de bonos de vencimiento finito sujeto a restricciones de liquidez. Hallamos que la solución puede ser descentralizada: la emisión óptima de un bono de un vencimiento dado es proporcional a la diferencia entre su precio de mercado y su valoración doméstica, esta última definida como el precio obtenido empleando la tasa de descuento del Gobierno. Mostramos que la distribución de deuda en el estado estacionario disminuye con el vencimiento. Estos resultados se mantienen si extendemos el modelo para incorporar riesgo agregado o impago estratégicoWe characterize the optimal debt-maturity management problem of a government in a small open economy. The government issues a continuum of finite-maturity bonds in the presence of liquidity frictions. We find that the solution can be decentralized: the optimal issuance of a bond of a given maturity is proportional to the difference between its market price and its domestic valuation, the latter defined as the price computed using the government’s discount factor. We show how the steady-state debt distribution decreases with maturity. These results hold when extending the model to incorporate aggregate risk or strategic defaul

Un modelo semiestructural de proyección para la economía peruana

El documento describe el Modelo de Proyección Trimestral (MPT) utilizado por el Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) para fines de simulación de política monetaria y de proyección de las principales variables macroeconómicas. La estructura básica del modelo es una aproximación a la representación lineal de un modelo de equilibrio general dinámico para una economía pequeña y abierta con dolarización parcial. El modelo incorpora expectativas racionales y posee un fundamento neo-keynesiano (rigidez de precios) que permite un rol de la política monetaria sobre las variables reales en el corto plazo. Clasificación JEL: E37, E52, E58, F41

The Interplay between Financial Conditions and Monetary Policy Shocks

We study the interplay between monetary policy and financial conditions shocks. Such shocks have a significant and similar impact on the real economy, though with different degrees of persistence. The systematic fed funds rate response to a financial shock contributes to bringing the economy back towards trend, but a zero lower bound on policy rates can prevent this from happening, with a significant cost in terms of output and investment. In a retrospective analysis of the U.S. economy over the past 20 years, we decompose the realization of economic variables into the contributions of financial, monetary policy, and other shocks

A Detrimental Feedback Loop: Deleveraging and Adverse Selection

Market distress can be the catalyst of a deleveraging wave, as in the 2007/08 financial crisis. This paper demonstrates how market distress and deleveraging can fuel each other in the presence of adverse selection problems in asset markets. At the core of the detrimental feedback loop is agents' desire to reduce their reliance on distressed asset markets by decreasing their leverage which in turn amplifies the adverse selection problem in asset markets. In the extreme case, this leads to a market breakdown. I find that adverse selection creates both an "ex-ante" inefficiency because it distorts agents' long-term leverage choices and an "interim" inefficiency because it distorts agents' short-term liquidity management. I derive important implications for central bank policy

Learning under fear of floating

In recent years a large fraction of economies overcame the fear of floating. We study a model that describes the policy of a Central Bank uncertain about whether currency depreciations cause output to expand (textbook model) or contract (balance-sheet model). We conclude that the movement away from fear of floating may not be explained by Bayesian or Robust policies. When the private sector anticipates the Central Bank's policy and endogenously determines the model, Central Banks may fall in a learning trap. An increase in financial volatility provides an escape to such trap that replicates patterns in the data.Balance-sheet effect Fear of floating Model uncertainty Bayesian learning Robustness