6,008 research outputs found
Inequity aversion and team incentives
We study how the optimal contract in team production is affected when employees
are averse to inequity in the sense described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By designing a
reward scheme that creates inequity of the desired equilibrium, the employer can induce
employees to perform effort at a lower total wage cost than when they are not inequity
averse. We also show that the optimal output choice might change when employees
are inequity averse. Finally, we show that an employer can gain, and never lose, by
designing a contract that accounts for inequity aversion, even if employees have standard
preferences
The Place of Polish Films on German market between 1920s and 1930s, with special emphasis on Borderlands
This book was financially supported by the National Programme for the Development of Humanities: project āCinema: Intercultural Perspective. Western-European Cinema in Poland, Polish Cinema in Western Europe. Mutual Perception of Film Cultures (1918ā1939)
Equilibrium Play and Best Reply to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence the way subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain differences with previous work.Experiments Constant Sum Games Stated Beliefs
Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games
We perform a further experiment to check the robustness of the main result in Rey Biel (2005) to sequential play. We find that Equilibrium predictions work even better when the same games are played sequentially: 85% of first movers choose the Equilibrium strategy and 85% of second movers best respond to the action taken by first movers. We conclude by identifying constant sum games as a class of games where experimental subjects' choices coincide with theory predictions and we argue that in such games distributional and reciprocal preferences do not influence subjects' decisions.Experiments, Constant Sum Games, Best Response
Endogenous leadership in teams
In this paper we study the mechanics of āleading by exampleā in
teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are
conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership
can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits
a team most
Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our ex- periment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.Experiments, Constant Sum Games, Stated Beliefs
Inequity Version and Team Incentives
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.Inequity aversion, team incentives, behavioral contract theory
Inequity aversion and team incentives
We study optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A ''selfish'' employer can profitably exploit preferences for equity among his employees by offering contracts which create maximum inequity off-equilibrium and thus, leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not produce the optimal output level. We show how the optimal contract is designed such that the subgame played by the employees is dominance solvable, and thus, a unique optimal level of production is implemented. We also discuss conditions for inequity aversion to affect the optimal output choice. Similar results are obtained for other types of distributional preferences such status-seeking or efficiency concerns.035 Principal, agent, inequity aversion, team incentives, behavioral contract theory
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