The optimal management of research portfolios

Risky research projects are, other things being equal, intrinsically harder to monitor than projects that are less risky. It is shown using agency theory that a standard cost benefit analysis, which ignores the agency problem, will introduce a bias towards excessively risky projects, and it will under‐estimate the benefits from complementary investments in libraries, scientific equipment and other expenditures that increase the productivity of scientists. Research managers should be risk‐averse in their choice of projects, and they should aim to hold a balanced portfolio of projects. The nature of this portfolio problem is, however, quite different from the portfolio management problem in financial markets.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Missing Environmental Markets and the Design of

Market failure is pervasive in the environmental sector, and naturally occurring markets are, in many cases, unlikely to produce socially optimal environmental outcomes. Despite this, the case for using “market based instruments” has recently become popular in the Australian environmental policy debate. The purpose of this paper is to survey some of the broad issues that arise in this debate. What do we mean by market based instruments, and what is the conceptual foundation for their use? What contribution can they make to Australian environmental policy? What needs to be done to improve policy development and implementation, in order to use these new instruments effectively?

Rent Seeking and Judicial Bias in Weak Legal Systems

We model rent seeking in litigation in weak legal systems as a Tulloch contest in which litigators may seek to influence the court directly through bribery as well as through the merit of the legal case that they bring. If the local firm has a competitive advantage in influencing the court then there is a strategic asymmetry between the players: the local firm regards expenditure by the foreign firm as a strategic complement, but the foreign firm regards local expenditure as a strategic substitute. This leads to different attitudes to commitment: the local firm would like to commit to a high level of effort to influence the court, the foreign firm to a low one. There is also an asymmetry in the commitment technology. It is not easy to commit to a low level of bribery, but it is feasible to commit to a high one: once a payment is made it cannot easily be recovered. We model the interaction as a two stage game: the players simultaneously commit to a minimum level of effort, then they play a simultaneous Tulloch influence game. We find a continuum of equilibria. An equilibrium selection argument selects a unique equilibrium that is outcome equivalent to the Stackelberg equilibrium of a simple Tulloch contest in which the local firm moves first. We thus find an argument for endogenous timing: the local firm moves first and secures a first mover advantage.judicial corruption, Tulloch contest, strategic asymmetry, commitment games, endogenous timing

Rat Races and Glass Ceilings- Career Paths in Organizations

In an ongoing organization, such as a large law partnership, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion, and the opportunity to influence policy and make rules in the future. This leads to a dynamic programming problem in contract design. We model career design in such a firm as a recursive mechanism design problem in an overlapping generations environment. Agents entering the firm may differ in their private characteristics which affect their costs of effort. We find that under recursive structure, a profit-maximizing principal offers, and promotion-motivated agents accept, "rat-race" contracts with very low wages and high effort levels. With wages driven down to zero, promotions become the main instrument to discriminate among agents in an adverse selection environment. The optimal adverse selection contract introduces a promotion barrier, or a "glass ceiling", for the high cost agents. We thus find that the issues of inefficiently high work levels (the "rat-race") and of unequal promotion rates (the "glass ceiling") are intimately interconnected. We apply this framework to equal opportunity and gender discrimination in employmentrecursive contracts, mechanism design, overlapping generations, rat-race, glass ceiling

Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement

Market based instruments are proving e¤ective in biodiversity procure- ment and in the management of regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these schemes brings together issues in auction design, con- tract theory, ecology, and monitoring. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard procurement model, we show that optimal contract design may di¤er signi?cantly between procurement and regulatory policy environ- mentsbiodiversity; procurement; adverse selection; contract theory

Some problems in algebraic group theory

For smooth actions of compact Lie groups on differentiable manifolds, the existence of a smooth slice transversal to each orbit gives a clear description of the local structure. In 1973, D. Luna proved the existence of a slice in the etale topology at a closed orbit, for reductive algebraic groups acting on an affine variety, over an algebraically closed field of characteristic zero. This thesis explores the extent to which Luna's methods work over an arbitrary field. Conditions for the quotient of a morphism to be etale are given, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a slice on a smooth affine scheme, and a new proof is given of the isomorphism of the unipotent variety of a split connected, simple, semisimple algebraic group with the nilpotent variety of its Lie algebra

Brokerage at the science–policy interface: from conceptual framework to practical guidance

This article analyses the conceptual framework of brokerage at the science–policy interface as an important boundary function to support trusted and transparent government decision-making. Policymaking involves a broad range of considerations, but science advice and evidence is critical to help inform decisions. However, mechanisms for requesting and receiving advice from the scientific community are not straightforward, considering that the knowledge needed generally spans multiple disciplines of the natural and social sciences. Once evidence has been appropriately synthesized, there remains the need to ensure an effective and unbiased translation to the policy and political community. The concept of knowledge brokerage revolves around an understanding of the ontologies, cultures and languages of both the policy community and the science community, in order to effectively link the two bidirectionally. In practical terms, this means ensuring that the information needs of the former are understood, and that the type and form of information offered by the latter aligns with those needs. Ideally, knowledge brokers act at the interface between researchers/experts and decision-makers to present evidence in a way that informs policy options but does not determine policy development. Conceptually, negotiating this interface involves acknowledging that values are embedded in the scientific process and evidentiary synthesis, and in particular, in considering the inferential risks inherent in making evidence claims. Brokers are faced with navigating complex policy dynamics and balancing information asymmetries between research providers and users. Building on the conceptual analysis and examination of the nuances of brokerage observed in practice, we propose a set of guidelines to translate the concepts of brokerage to practical application.publishedVersio

Towards Post-Pandemic Sustainable and Ethical Food Systems

The current global COVID-19 pandemic has led to a deep and multidimensional crisis across all sectors of society. As countries contemplate their mobility and social-distancing policy restrictions, we have a unique opportunity to re-imagine the deliberative frameworks and value priorities in our food systems. Pre-pandemic food systems at global, national, regional and local scales already needed revision to chart a common vision for sustainable and ethical food futures. Re-orientation is also needed by the relevant sciences, traditionally siloed in their disciplines and without adequate attention paid to how the food system problem is variously framed by diverse stakeholders according to their values. From the transdisciplinary perspective of food ethics, we argue that a post-pandemic scheme focused on bottom-up, regional, cross-sectoral and non-partisan deliberation may provide the re-orientation and benchmarks needed for not only more sustainable, but also more ethical food futures.publishedVersio