The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded - The Limits of External Europeanization

With the borders of the European Union (EU) moved eastwards, students of Europeanization have been awarded yet another real-world experiment. This paper explores to what extent existing Europeanization approaches travel beyond the EU’s border to its South Eastern and Eastern neighbours, which are marked by bad governance with regard to both the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of their domestic institutions. The first part outlines key insights of the literature on Europeanization West regarding the outcomes and the mechanism of the domestic impact of the EU. Then, I summarize the main findings of research on Europeanization East focusing on factors that have limited or at least qualified the domestic impact of the EU in the ten Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries in comparison to the EU 15 (those that were members before the 2004 enlargement). This paper discusses to what extent the concepts and causal mechanisms need even further qualification when applied to countries, such as the European Neighbourhood Countries (ENC), that are neither willing nor necessarily capable of adapting to Europe and that do not even have the incentive of EU membership to cope with the costs. I will argue that the EU is unlikely to deploy any transformative power in its neighbourhood as long as it does not adjust its accession tool box to countries the EU does not want to take on as members. The paper concludes with some considerations on the policy implications of the EU’s approach of move closer but don’t touch which has started to creep into its relations with the Western Balkans and Turkey.EU-South-Eastern Europe; EU-South-Eastern Europe; governance; democracy; Europeanization; Europeanization

Comparative Regionalism - A New Research Agenda

After the end of the Cold War, students of International Relations observed an expansion of inter-state activities at the regional level. Regional and sub-regional groupings appeared to gain momentum as the way in which countries cooperate and should cooperate to pursue peace, stability, wealth and social justice. The surge and resurgence of regionalism has triggered the proliferation of concepts and approaches. The focus of this paper will be on processes and structures of state-led regionalism driven by the delegation of policies and political authority to regional institutions. Based on this understanding of regionalism, the existing literature will be reviewed with regard to three general questions. These questions do not only require research across regions but also allow developing a common research agenda to accumulate knowledge generated about specific regions. First, what are the outcomes of regionalism? How can we describe and compare the results of the delegation of policies and political authority? Second, what are the drivers of regionalism? Why do some governments choose to delegate policies and political authority while others do not? Finally, what are the internal effects of regionalism? How does the delegation of policies and political authority impact back on the domestic structures of the states involved?regional development; Europeanization; Europeanization

When Europeanization Hits Limited Statehood. The Western Balkans as a Test Case for the Transformative Power of Europe

The EU seeks to transform the domestic structures of the Western Balkan countries in order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in the region ridden by war and ethnic conflict. Unlike in case of the Mediterranean and Newly Independent States, the EU has even offered its South Eastern European neighbors a membership perspective. Whether the golden carrot is big enough, however, to draw the Western Balkans closer to Europe, is still an open question. Croatia has made sufficient progress to successfully conclude accession negotiations in the years to come. The EU rewarded domestic reforms in Macedonia and Montenegro with granting them candidate status, which Serbia is likely to receive in the near future. Albania, by contrast, appears to be more reluctant to engage in the changes necessary to get even with Macedonia and Montenegro. Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, finally, are seriously lagging behind and have not even applied for membership. Can Europeanization approaches account for the differential impact of the EU in the Western Balkans? The paper argues that problems of limited statehood have seriously curbed the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans - despite their membership perspective. Not only has the EU exerted less pressure for adaptation on Western Balkan governments. Weak state capacities and ethnic conflicts have reduced both their willingness and capacity to implement the acquis communautaire. Given its lack of experience in state building, the EU is ill-equipped to address these problems. This results in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the EU has offered the Western Balkans a membership perspective to stabilize the region and overcome problems caused by weak and contested statehood. On the other hand, it is the limited statehood of Western Balkan countries, which undermines their compliance with EU norms and rules.EU-South-Eastern Europe; EU-South-Eastern Europe; Europeanization; Europeanization

Identity politics, core State powers and regional Integration: Europe and beyond

This article concentrates on the path from the development of collective identities to the integration of core state powers. Firstly, we focus on the European experience. We argue that the identities of political, economic, and social elites have been crucial for the evolution of European integration. With regard to mass public opinion, European integration has been made possible by a consensus of EU citizens with inclusive national identities. Most recently, the politicization of EU affairs in many member states has been driven by populist forces mobilizing minorities with exclusive nationalist identities. Secondly, we discuss the extent to which insights from Europe have travelled to other regions of the world. Elites involved in region‐building almost always develop identity narratives linking their national experience to the respective regions. Moreover, there is evidence that the difference between inclusive and exclusive nationalist identifications has also travelled beyond Europe

the Western Balkans as a test case for the Transformative Power of Europe

1\. Introduction 2\. Hitting its Borders: The Domestic Impact of Europe on the Western Balkans 2.1 What Does it Take? Factors Mediating the Transformative Power of Europe 2.2 Limited Statehood and the Western Balkans: The Missing Link 2.3 Statehood and Progress towards EU Accession 2.4 The EU as a State- Builder? 3\. Conclusions LiteratureThe EU seeks to transform the domestic structures of the Western Balkan countries in order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in the region ridden by war and ethnic conflict. Unlike in case of the Mediterranean and Newly Independent States, the EU has even offered its South Eastern European neighbors a membership perspective. Whether the “golden carrot” is big enough, however, to draw the Western Balkans closer to Europe, is still an open question. Croatia has made sufficient progress to successfully conclude accession negotiations in the years to come. The EU rewarded domestic reforms in Macedonia and Montenegro with granting them candidate status, which Serbia is likely to receive in the near future. Albania, by contrast, appears to be more reluctant to engage in the changes necessary to get even with Macedonia and Montenegro. Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, finally, are seriously lagging behind and have not even applied for membership. Can Europeanization approaches account for the differential impact of the EU in the Western Balkans? The paper argues that problems of limited statehood have seriously curbed the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans - despite their membership perspective. Not only has the EU exerted less pressure for adaptation on Western Balkan governments. Weak state capacities and ethnic conflicts have reduced both their willingness and capacity to implement the acquis communautaire. Given its lack of experience in state building, the EU is ill-equipped to address these problems. This results in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the EU has offered the Western Balkans a membership perspective to stabilize the region and overcome problems caused by weak and contested statehood. On the other hand, it is the limited statehood of Western Balkan countries, which undermines their compliance with EU norms and rules

Regulatory Failure, Redistributive Conflict, and Euroskeptic Publics

This paper takes issue with the widely held view that Europe has failed to govern the multiple crises it has been facing because of too little integration. Rather than a lack of authority, a growing “commitment-compliance gap” has exacerbated the regulatory deficits of EU governance in core areas of the European integration project. The failure of the Member States to put into practice the policies they agreed upon at the EU level has its cause in Euro- nationalists dominating the politicization of EU policies and institutions. They have been empowered by the way in which the Member States have sought to solve the Euro crisis. The growing contestation of and opposition to the EU and its policies per se is not the problem. Nor is it the return of nationalism in Europe or the lack of a European public sphere. Instead of an outright rejection of European integration, we see the mobilization of illiberal, nationalist ideas of Europe, which are exclusionary, xenophobic, and anti-Islam. This paper argues that Euro-nationalism undermines not only the legitimacy but also the effectiveness of EU governance. It has been fueled by the mix of Member State negotiation and competition in the shadow of supranational hierarchy. This has worked for the EU as a regulatory state but is not suitable for dealing with the redistributive issues that have come to dominate important areas of European integration. In fact, simply extending the EU’s governance mix from regulatory to redistributive policies is likely to further undermine its effectiveness and legitimacy

Europeanization Subverted? The European Union’s Promotion of Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus

In order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in its near abroad, the European Union has invoked the European Neighbourhood Policy that seeks to transform the domestic structures of the Newly Independent States in the post-Soviet space thus building a ring of friends that share European norms and principles of democracy, rule of the law, market economy, and good governance. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the EU’s capacity to hit across its borders and to realize its reform agenda seems limited. Moreover, most neighborhood countries appear to be stuck in transition and suffer from serious problems of both weak state capacity and defect democracy. Hence, EU efforts may also bear the danger of unintended and negative effects on the domestic structures of states, as its policies and institutions do not only empower liberal reform coalitions, to the extent that they exist in the first place, but can also bolster the power of incumbent authoritarian and corrupt elites. This paper intends to capture this dark side of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig 2007). It thus conceptualizes ENP as a political opportunity structure that provides opportunities and constraints to both supporters and opponents of the European Union’s reform agenda. Which of the two ultimately get empowered depends not only on the EU’s capacity to push for reforms but also on the pull of domestic actors.neighbourhood policy; EU-South-Eastern Europe; EU-South-Eastern Europe; governance; Europeanization; Europeanization

false promises or flawed premises?

Governance with/out government has emerged as an alternative or functional equivalent to government. While there seems to be an increasing demand, the promise of governance to compensate for the weakness or failure of government rests on a major premise. Governments have to be strong enough so that non- governmental actors have an incentive to cooperate, and governments are not afraid of being captured. If this premise held, it would result in a serious dilemma for areas of limited statehood: The greater the demand for governance with/out government, the less likely it is to emerge and to be effective, precisely because government is weak. This paper explores to what extent government and statehood are necessary to make governance with/out government work. It discusses various options of how to commit non-governmental actors to the provision of common goods without a shadow of hierarchy cast by government and concludes with suggestions for future research on governance beyond statehood.„Governance with/out government“ wird häufig als funktionales Äquivalent zu staatlichem Regieren gehandelt. Inwiefern nicht-hierarchische Formen des Regierens Staatsversagen kompensieren können, scheint jedoch von einer wesentlichen Prämisse abzuhängen. Regierungen müssen stark genug sein, um Kooperationsanreize für nicht-staatliche Akteure zu erzeugen und gleichzeitig nicht die Gefahr des „state capture“ zu fürchten. Wenn dies zutrifft, ergibt sich daraus ein ernsthaftes Governance Dilemma für Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Je größer die Nachfrage nach „governance with/out government“ desto weniger wahrscheinlich ist es, dass nicht-hierarchische Formen des Regierens sich herausbilden und effektiv sind, gerade weil staatliches Regieren schwach ist. Das Papier untersucht, inwiefern staatliches Regieren und Staatlichkeit notwendige Bedingungen für die Effektivität von „governance with/out government“ sind. Welche Möglichkeiten gibt es außer dem durch intakte Staatlichkeit erzeugten Schatten der Hierarchie, um nicht-staatliche Akteure zu veranlassen, sich an der Bereitstellung von Governance-Leistungen zu beteiligen

How much statehood does it take – and what for?

This paper explores how much statehood it takes to make governance with/out the state work. The first part discusses the relationship between governance, state, and statehood. The distinction between governance as structure and governance as process allows us to disentangle state and statehood. The second part of the paper explores the different functions statehood has for governance. While there may be functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, there is more to statehood than the threat of hierarchically imposed regulation. Effective and legitimate governance may require at least some (external) form of consolidated statehood. The final part of the paper discusses varieties of statehood, arguing that the challenge for areas of limited statehood is not the lack of exclusivity of statehood but the need for an order of shared and divided statehood. The paper concludes by considering the dark sides of statehood, cautioning against building states without strengthening the rule of law and democracy.Das Papier diskutiert, wie viel Staatlichkeit es braucht, damit Governance mit sowie ohne Staat funktionieren kann. Im ersten Teil wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Governance, Staat und Staatlichkeit thematisiert. Der zweite Teil des Papiers untersucht die unterschiedlichen Funktionen von Staatlichkeit für Governance. Während es durchaus funktionale Äquivalente zum Schatten der Hierarchie gibt, besteht Staatlichkeit aus mehr als der Fähigkeit, einseitig kollektiv verbindliche Regelungen zu festzulegen und durchzusetzen. Effektives und legitimes Regieren verlangt deshalb zumindest eine (externe) Form von konsolidierter Staatlichkeit. Im letzten Teil werden unterschiedliche Formen von Staatlichkeit vorgestellt. Dabei wird klar, dass die Herausforderung für Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit nicht im Mangel an Exklusivität, sondern im Bedarf an einer Ordnung für geteilte Staatlichkeit besteht. Das Papier schließt mit einer Betrachtung der Schattenseiten von (ungebundener) Staatlichkeit und warnt vor einem einseitigen ‚State-Building‘, das nicht gleichzeitig Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit stärkt